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During the first half of 2003, a teamcomprising staff from the WWFMacroeconomics for Sustainable
Development Program Office (WWF-MPO); the
Danish Agency for Development Assistance
Technical Advisory Service, Environment and
Natural Resource Program (Danida, TSA 6); the
International Institute for Environment and
Development (IIED); and Danida’s Working
Group on Sustainable Financing of Natural
Resource Management reviewed financing
options available to developing countries to pay
for sustainable natural resource management
projects and programs. 
Each participant brought to the table different but
complementary concerns. Danida was interested
in producing a short guide for its own staff and
for developing-country practitioners that would
present as many financing options as possible,
and highlight valuable experiences among
Danida’s focus countries. WWF was interested in
exploring how financing for sustainable natural
resource management (SNRM) has evolved and
what these changes would entail with regard to
the conservation movement and rural communi-
ties in the developing countries where WWF is
present.1 IIED was interested in disseminating the
findings of several of its recent reviews of experi-
ences with payments for environmental services
and private business-community partnerships.
Concerns among members of Danida’s Working
Group on Sustainable Financing ranged from how
the local or national context may condition the
choice of financing options, to the potential of new
financing options, to highlighting the Danish
experience in financing SNRM projects in devel-
oping countries.
The present report, and the accompanying elec-
tronic and training materials are the product of
this endeavor, and provide: 
• A user-friendly entry point to 52 financing
Options for SNRM, together with clear indica-
tions of where to go next, either for more in-
depth information and analysis, or to contact
people from the financing sources themselves. 
• A brief discussion and description that high-
lights which financing options might be more
accessible to poor rural communities, or offer
more opportunities for projects and programs to
simultaneously address rural livelihood improve-
ments and natural resources conservation. 
• A summary of ongoing experiences and
discussions regarding financing SNRM
through payments for environmental services
(PES) and private business-community part-
nerships, which have recently attracted much
attention but whose potentials and limitations
are still a matter of debate.
• A collection of recent SNRM financing cases
and experiences, particularly, but not limited
to cases in Danida’s focus countries and coun-
tries where WWF is working.
• Web addresses to access many of the institu-
tions and references mentioned in the survey,
and a forthcoming powerpoint presentation (in
the training material) that can be used as a self-
tutorial or as an aid for a half-day training
session.
This report is a composite of many contributions.
Maryanne Grieg-Gran and Camille Bann from
IIED are the authors of chapters 2 and 3 and also
contributed several case studies to chapter 6.
Other case studies were prepared by Lars
Christensen, Søren Hastrup, and Karsten Raae, all
of whom are members of Danida’s Working Group
on Sustainable Financing. Still other case studies
came from Tom Blomley (CARE International),
Therese Brinkate (WWF South Africa), Andreas
Jensen (Danida), and Chado Tenzin (WWF
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
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1. In recent years Danida’s focus countries have included Bangladesh, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia. Additionally, the following
countries are also recipients of Danish environmental assistance: Botswana
Cambodia, Ecuador, Laos, Lesotho, Malaysia, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland,
Thailand and Peru. WWF supports conservation and sustainable natural
resource management in over 70 developing countries. 
Bhutan). Pablo Gutman (from WWF-MPO) wrote
the remaining chapters and edited this report and
the related electronic materials.
Three meetings with Danida’s Working Group on
Sustainable Financing provided the venue for
lively discussions and many suggestions. Several
of the contributors mentioned above attended
these meetings, as well as Anders Billeschou,
Hanne Grolin, Michael Lindall, Michael Pearson,
Christian Prip, Poul Buch-Hansen, John Carlsen,
Thorikil Casse, Knud Elverskov, Martin Enghoff,
Sven Hindkjær, Carsten Kaspersen, John
Korenerup-Bang, Jørgen Korning, Ole Mertz,
Helle Munk Ravnborg, Niels Palmvang, Karin
Schultz, Sten Sverdrup Jensen, and Andrew
Wardell. Valuable comments were provided by
Lars Eskid Jensen, Herik Lerdof, Karsten
Gasseholm, Ole Stubodrup, and Bo Shultz, all of
whom are with Danida’s overseas programs, and
by Nola Chow. The support of WWF-MPO staff in
general and of Sarah Janicke in particular is also
acknowledged. 
Kim Carstensen of WWF-Denmark brokered this
whole project and saw it through its launch.  Hans
Hessel-Andersen and Andreas Jensen from
Danida’s Environment and Natural Resources
program brought Danida’s interest and support to
the project.  As Danida’s officer overseeing the
project, Andreas became a key partner and an
important contributor. The project was directed
by Pablo Gutman from WWF-MPO and was made
possible by the financial support of Danida and
WWF-MPO. 
Pablo Gutman
December 2003
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Why focus on long-term financing for
sustainable natural resource management?
To many development and conservation practi-
tioners, a discussion of financing issues in natural
resource management (NRM) is like putting the
cart before the horse:  “Where is the focus on
poverty?” “What will happen to biodiversity?”
“Does it make economic sense?” “What about
gender and indigenous people issues?” “Who
wants the project, anyhow?” “Has local ownership
been considered?” “Have you taken a livelihood
approach?” “Or would a human welfare ecology
approach be better?” “Corruption and lack of
transparency will swallow your proposal!” These
and many other concerns are worthwhile issues
in rural development and conservation, and the
implicit message is, “Why discuss financing
issues when more important concerns need to be
addressed beforehand?”
It is true that no amount of financing will secure a
project’s success. Yet the lack of adequate
financing will surely doom the best-crafted initia-
tive. This apparent contradiction simply points to
the fact that adequate financing—in terms of
amount, conditions, and timing—is a necessity
but not a sufficient condition for success.  In
focusing on financing issues this survey assumes
that the interested parties have already
addressed, or are simultaneously addressing, the
many other concerns that make up a viable and
potentially successful natural resource manage-
ment project or program. 
Then, even if we agree on the importance of
financing for SNRM, why open a discussion about
it? First there is the availability issue. Securing
financing for SNRM projects is becoming increas-
ingly difficult, as can be seen in the 1990s’ world-
wide downward trend of investment in rural
development and conservation by countries,
donors, and development banks. Hence, SNRM
practitioners need to be more innovative and
systematic in their search for financing options.
Second: the issue of new financing options. In
spite of resources for SNRM drying up or
perhaps because of it, since the 1990s new
approaches to financing for development and
sustainable natural resource management have
been advocated. They include ecotourism,
markets for green products, payments for envi-
ronmental services, local-scale community-based
NRM, environmental funds, international
payments for carbon sequestration, the provision
of global commons, and many more. At times, the
same approach has been touted by some as best
practice while dismissed by others as inconse-
quential.2 With all of these new financing options
there is room for discussion and learning. 
Third: despite financing’s critical importance,
most SNRM projects and programs still give only
cursory attention to financing prospects beyond
the implementation period. In a review of seven of
Danida’s SNRM projects we found that five did
not go beyond mentioning the amounts that
Danida and the country’s government would
contribute to implement the project. Only two
project documents added that the country’s
government would increase its funding as
Danida’s support phases out. Only one project
document discussed the challenges of securing
long-term financing, but did not advance any
proposal as to how those challenges could be met.
A similar review of 20 WWF-sponsored SNRM
project documents fared only marginally better.
This disregard for long-term financing issues is
limited to neither Danida and WWF nor to NRM
projects.  In a recent OECD review of 66 develop-
ment projects only one was found to discuss the
project’s financing sustainability.3 There is a clear
need to improve awareness of and literacy on
sustainable financing issues and options among
SNRM practitioners.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
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by Pablo Gutman
2. See, for example, the divergent opinions reported in Pagiola, Bishop, and
Landell-Mills (2002); Landell-Mills and Porras (2002); and Spergel (2001). 
3. See OECD, 2000, “Donor Support for Institutional Capacity Development in
Environment: Lessons Learned.” Evaluation and Effectiveness 3. Development
Assistance Committee. OECD, Paris.
Financing for whom and for what?
The sustainable management of natural resources
is an issue in rich and poor countries alike, and
among large rural businesses as well as among
small farmers—hence interesting experiences of
financing arrangements for natural resource
management can be found in many places around
the world. Since the focus of this survey is on low-
income developing countries, however, we limit our
discussion of financing options to those that are
available to developing countries. Likewise all the
cases reviewed are from developing countries.4 A
second focus is on financing options that are best
suited to support joint SNRM and poverty allevia-
tion initiatives and are more accessible to the rural
poor. These issues are highlighted in the discussion
of each financing alternative reviewed. 
Sustainable natural resource management
(SNRM) can refer to many types of natural
resources and management strategies. This
survey takes a broad approach, and the financing
options discussed address all three classic SNRM
situations as depicted in figure 1, namely:
• Strictly protected natural resources, such as
national parks and wildlife sanctuaries. In
these cases the SNRM focus is on the protec-
tion of biodiversity and other important
natural features.  Improvements in local
communities’ livelihood should be achieved
through natural resource uses such as recre-
ation ecotourism and tourism services, and
other activities that do not impinge on the
protected areas.
• Partially protected or unprotected natural
resources of high biodiversity value (e.g.,
protected area buffer zones, natural forests,
wetlands, coral reefs, coastal areas, and fish-
eries). Here there is a wider choice of SNRM
alternatives that can increase rural communi-
ties’ livelihood while preserving the area’s
biodiversity or even increasing it through
landscape restoration programs. 
• Natural resources of low biodiversity value, en-
compassing land devoted to farming, ranching,
forest plantations, and secondary forests. This is
where most human settlements are located and
most rural production takes place. In these cases
SNRM is focused on offering rural communities
productive ways to increase the income they
obtain from their natural resources, while main-
taining the long-term productivity of land and
water, and protecting watershed-related environ-
mental services.
These three SNRM cases are archetypes
and the task of SNRM practitioners can be
much more complicated. Nevertheless,
the distinction is useful when discussing
available financing options as they may
differ from one type of SNRM project to
the other.  These issues are also high-
lighted in the discussion of each financing
option reviewed. 
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FIGURE 1. THREE TYPICAL SETTINGS FOR SNRM
Farming Area Buffer area Strictly
protected
area
4. Nevertheless, many of the financing options discussed here
are relevant both to developing and developed countries. 
Potential users and uses of this survey 
Throughout the text this survey refers to project
or program developers. In all cases these terms
are no more than conventional shortcuts to a
much larger array of users, all of which can
benefit from a better understanding of financing
options for SNRM, as follows:5
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Nongovernment project and
program developers:
• Local communities
• National nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs)
• International NGOs
Identify potential sources of financing for their project and program proposals, and to adjust them to
take advantage of funding opportunities.
DIFFERENT USERS MAY FIND A SURVEY OF FINANCING OPTIONS FOR SNRM USEFUL TO:
Staff of developing countries’
government and financing
institutions:
• Sectoral agencies 
(e.g., rural development,
NR agency, etc.) 
• Economic or financial
agencies
• Development banks
(a) Identify potential sources of financing for their project and program beyond the agency current
budgets.
(b) Help review and assess proposals that third parties submit to their agency. 
(c) Help design the third parties’ proposals that they will later review.  Because staff of agencies and develop-
ment banks usually advise their would-be clients, a survey of financing options can be used to improve the
project design and identify opportunities to diversify the financing mix of the proposal. 
d) Make their own case. Many government agencies allocate their investment budget through a competition
process in which their departments are required to present fully developed proposals including financing
schemes. Here a better understanding of financing options can improve the proposal design and the identifi-
cation of matching funding sources. 
Staff of international agencies,
donors and banks:
• United Nations agencies 
(e.g., UNDP, FAO, UNEP,
IFAD)
• Rich country cooperation
agencies (e.g., USAID,
Danida, DFID, etc.)
• International and regional
development banks 
(e.g., WB, ADB, AFDB,
IDB, etc.) 
• Foundations 
(a) Identify potential sources of financing for their project and program beyond the agency’s budgets.
Although most of these agencies do not fundraise (some are actually forbidden to do so by their bylaws),
some do (e.g., many United Nations agencies) and staff of the latter may use a survey such as this to
identify potential sources of financing for their projects and programs beyond their agencies’ budgets.
(b) Help review and assess proposals that third parties submit to their agency. 
(c) Help design the third-party proposals that they will later review. Because the staff of agencies and devel-
opment banks usually advise their would-be clients, a survey of financing options can be used to improve
the proposal design and identify opportunities to diversify the financing mix of the proposal.
d) Make their own case. Many international agencies and donors allocate their own investment budget
through a competitive process whereby their own departments or units are required to present fully
developed proposals including their financing schemes. Here a better understanding of financing options
can improve the proposal design and the identification of matching funding sources.
5. Similarly, a large array of initiatives beyond projects and programs (e.g., sector
and programmatic initiatives) may be involved; we discuss this in chapter 2.
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What is in the survey? 
The survey is divided in two sections—the first
devoted to discussions and the second to
descriptions. 
Section 1 has four chapters: 
Chapter 1 discusses financing issues in a generic
initiative, and the particularities of long-term
financing for SNRM. It presents and briefly
discusses 52 financing options. Most of them are
currently available in most countries (e.g., mobi-
lizing local savings, grants, funds, loans, etc.).
Some are still in a developmental stage (e.g.,
carbon sequestration trade, earmarking national
or local taxes for SNRM, or developing systems of
payments for environmental services). A few
others are still hypothetical (e.g., an international
system of payments for the global commons, a
Tobin tax on international capital flows, or a
global energy tax earmarked for SNRM, etc.). A
detailed description of each financing alternative
is left to the “description cards” in chapter 5.
Chapter 2 and 3 discuss in more detail experi-
ences with markets for environmental services
and private sector–community partnerships for
SNRM. The discussion is based in recent work in
this field conducted at the International Institute
for Environment and Development (IIED). 
Chapter 4 discusses recent trends and offers conclu-
sions and recommendations (summarized below). 
Section 2 has three chapters: 
Chapter 5 presents 15 “description cards” that
briefly describe each financial alternative; provide
a qualitative score to their performance regarding
several concerns (e.g., for which natural
resources, for which project scale, for which type
of stakeholders and transaction costs, etc.); and
offer suggestions on where to go next in order to
pursue funding from these sources or simply
learn more about them.
Chapter 6 presents 12 case studies that describe
financing arrangements for as many SNRM proj-
ects in developing countries. By examining the
organizational and institutional frameworks of on-
the-ground initiatives these case studies provide a
context for some of the financing options discussed
in the survey.
Chapter 7 offers links to references and resources,
most of which are available online. Its first section,
“Guides to and resources for financing for SNRM”
lists Web sites and manuals designed to help the
practitioner looking for sources of financing for
SNRM.  The second section, “Publications on
financing SNRM” lists literature that reviews
financing mechanisms and case studies. In both
sections each entry is accompanied by a short
description of what is found in each resource. 
Some survey findings and lessons
After a decrease in financing for NRM in the 1990s,
there have recently been some encouraging signs as
societies in both developing and developed countries
increasingly recognize the value of sustainable
management of crops, watersheds, and forests. This
process has spurred a wider use of traditional
financing approaches such as the mobilization of local
communities’ own resources and growing markets
for green products and services (e.g., organic crops
and tourism). It has also spurred new financing
options such as environmental funds; debt-for-nature
swaps; payments for nontraditional environmental
products and services (e.g., certified forest products,
carbon sequestration schemes, and payments for
other global environmental commons); and new
financing arrangements (e.g., private sector–commu-
nity partnerships, markets for environmental serv-
ices). Furthermore, the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG), which have been at the center of
recent international development discussions, may
help highlight the links between poverty and the
environment in that MDG's list of goals begins with
eradicating poverty and ends with ensuring environ-
mental sustainability. 
Many challenges remain, however. On top of a
tighter financing market that affects all kinds of
development initiatives, some development and
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conservation views still oppose the very tenet of
sustainable natural resource management, that is,
the advantage of integrating environmental conserva-
tion and rural development. On the rural develop-
ment and poverty alleviation side, SNRM is at times
dismissed as an extra cost with low returns, or a
desirable goal but with a low priority compared to
other rural poverty alleviation needs such as health,
education, infrastructure, water and sanitation, etc.6
From the conservation side, some have given up on
the integrated conservation and development proj-
ects (ICDP) concept of the 1970s, arguing that it
costs too much and delivers few conservation
results. Their solution is that money should be given
up-front to whoever is able to provide conservation. 
There is a modicum of truth to these arguments.
That is, where there are few natural resources and
many rural people, much more than SNRM will be
needed to reduce rural poverty, although conserving
the scarce natural resources available may still be a
priority. Also, where there are abundant natural
resources and few people, gazetting new protected
areas and making them off-limits to the local popula-
tion may aid in conserving biodiversity, although it
may raise ethical and equity concerns.  However,
these are extreme situations. The general rule is that
most rural areas of developing countries are home to
both valuable environments and large numbers of
rural poor, and in these cases the tenet of SNRM
holds—we must integrate environmental conserva-
tion and poverty eradication. 
Advancing this perspective requires much inge-
nuity and multitasking on the part of SNRM prac-
titioners. First, it requires designing NRM
projects that balance short-term poverty reduc-
tion needs with long-term sustainability of natural
resources. Second, it requires convincing advo-
cates of one or the other that there are good
opportunities to jointly foster both. Last but not
least, this perspective requires exploring
financing arrangements that have a good chance
of being both sustainable and accessible to the
rural poor in developing countries. Box 1
suggests some common-sense principles to help
in this endeavor.7
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BOX 1. FIVE COMMON-SENSE PRINCIPLES WHEN
CONSIDERING FINANCING FOR SNRM
Financing is important
Never undertake an SNRM project before its short-term financing
needs are secured, its long-term financing needs are well under-
stood, and it has good prospects.
Financing is not that important
Never undertake an SNRM project simply because the money 
is available.
Think short and long term 
Everyone knows that you need to care about a project’s start-up
financing. Very few are clear why long-term financing should be an
issue, considering that no one can know for sure what will happen in
the future. Actually understanding long-term financing prospects is not
about knowing what the future will be but what the future may be, so
as to better prepare the project or program to cope with an 
uncertain future.
Financing is not an add-on or a “one size fits all”
It is an integral part of the project design. To a large degree,
financing arrangements are case- and context-specific. The
financing mix may affect issues such as ownership, dependency,
equity, risk taking and risk sharing, income generation, and more.
A mismatch between the project design and the project financing
will lead to problems down the road. Mismatches may result from
an SNRM project developer's lack of financial understanding, as
much as from a financing expert's lack of understanding of the
project’s goals and context.
Financing  SNRM projects requires more thinking than it used to
This is because there is a tendency to need multiple sources of
financing, and because new financing options are more complex
than traditional ones. Compare, for example, a simple grant-
supported project with the complexities of a project entailing
payments for environmental products and services, or a private
sector–community commercial partnership.
6. A good example is the lack of consideration given to environmental and natural
resource–related issues in some of the poverty alleviation literature and plans
of the last decade: For example, in the World Bank's 2000/2001 World
Development Report, “Attacking Poverty” neither natural resources nor the
environment make it to the table of contents.
7. In a complementary approach the participants in Danida’s Working Group on
Sustainable Financing have put together a list of “Guiding Questions” (available
from Ole Meretz [om@serverl.gogr.ku.dk] or Karsten Raae [info@
dfextension.dk]).
SECTION 1.
F INANCING ALTERNATIVES:  
A  DISCUSSION
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What is the scale of applicability? 
Projects, programs, sectors, and more
Once upon a time “a project” was the main unit of
design and discussion in the development and
conservation world. That is no longer the case.
Practitioners have scaled up from projects to
programs. Governments and funding organiza-
tions have gone further, moving up from project
funding to program funding, to sector funding, to
programmatic funding, and finally to budget
support.  Although some disagreement regarding
terminology exists, for the purposes of this
survey:
• A project is an integral set of steps to deliver
a specific product (e.g., from building a rural
school to building a large dam)
• A program is a set of related projects and
activities that together deliver a broad
product or goal (e.g., a countrywide agricul-
tural extension program, a program to create
a national system of protected areas, etc.) 
• Sector funding is the financing of a slice of a
sector’s programs over a specific period of
time (e.g., financing for the budget of the
rural agency, or the health agency). The
deliverable is often measured in terms of
achievement of objectives and milestones 
• Programmatic funding, in the World Bank
jargon, is funding for a program that cuts across
sectors (e.g., a program to reduce poverty,
which may entail projects related to health, rural
production, infrastructure, education, etc.). 
• Budgetary support (also called institutional
support or unrestricted funding) usually refers
to the financing of a slice of a government or
institution budget over a period of time. The
deliverable is often measured in terms of
achievements of goals and milestones.  
Moving from projects to programs, to sector
funding and so on, entails more than a change of
scale. For example, as deliverables move from a
specific product to broader goals the need for
monitoring increases since longer and more ambi-
tious initiatives usually require adjustments and
changes down the road. This dovetails well with
long-term financing concerns where the needs for
monitoring and adaptation are also high.  
Among the financing instruments reviewed in this
survey are some that can be used to support all of
the types of intervention levels described above
and others that are better suited to financing only
some of them. In most cases we use the terms
“project” or “program” to refer in general to the
larger list of projects, programs, sector funding,
programmatic funding, and budgetary support.
Financial requirements and financing
options in general
Financial issues in most projects or programs
relate to: (a) assessing the financial requirements
of the project, that is, knowing how much and
when money will be needed to put the project in
place and keep it going; (b) financing, which
concerns knowing where and how to get the
needed money; and (c) financial planning, which
encompasses both (a) and (b).
Figure 2 illustrates the financial requirements at
three characteristic stages of most projects or
programs: the initial investment requirements,
operation costs, and the periodical replacement
costs (boxes a, b, and c, respectively). To a good
extent a project’s financial requirements—the
amount of money and the dates when it is
needed—are related to the costs of the inputs it
requires. But the financial requirements could be
smaller or larger than the cost of these inputs.
For example, some of the inputs may be supplied
in-kind by project participants (e.g., farmer’s
labor, public lands, technical support from exten-
sion agencies, etc.), and would therefore not
appear among the financial requirements (box d).8
Furthermore, some of the financial requirements
are not related to the project inputs but to financial
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CHAPTER 1.  A  SURVEY OF F INANCING ALTERNATIVES
by Pablo Gutman
8. Some accounting approaches would assign a monetary value to the in-kind
inputs to arrive at a financial grand total, and then subtract them to come up
with the financial needs. 
arrangements themselves, such as the payment of
loan interest (box e).  
All projects require external support. This is
needed for everything from the roads necessary
for bringing commodities to the market to exten-
sion services that foster new conservation tech-
niques among farmers, to institutions to protect
rights and enforce rules (box f). If the project in
question makes a small demand on external
support activities already in place, the project
designers may well take them for granted.  On the
other hand, if the project entails large demands on
existing facilities and services, or if new ones are
required, their cost should be included as part of
the project’s financial requirements.
To the extent that supporting activities provide
resources and services to the project for free they
represent positive externalities benefiting the
project in question; and the project may recipro-
cate with positive externalities of its own (e.g.,
increasing the level of education or training of the
local community, etc.). On the other hand, some
projects may result in negative externalities, such
as forced relocation of communities, loss of
customary access to natural resources, environ-
mental losses, etc. (box g). These costs should be
acknowledged and included in the project’s costs
and the affected parties should be duly compen-
sated (internalizing the externalities in economic
parlance). Once the project’s financial require-
ments are assessed, different financing options
can be explored. Financing is about knowing
where and how to get the money needed to
initiate and support a project. In a nutshell there
are only three alternatives, as depicted in figure 3:
(a) use the internal money, that is, the money of
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FIGURE 2. ASSESSING THE FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF A PROJECT
(e) There may be additional financial
needs related to the project’s financial
arrangements, such as interest on loans
(a) Funding
requirements to
initiate the project
(d) In all
steps in-
kind inputs
would
reduce the
project’s
financial
needs
(f) Other activities, services,
infrastructures, and institutions
may be needed to support the
project or program, incurring
additional financing needs
(g) The project may entail
negative externalities (e.g.,
social and environmental
impacts) that need to be
included among the costs
(b) Money
needed to pay
for the year-
to-year costs
(c) More
money needed
here
Undertaking a
project or program Operation
Periodical
overhauling
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the project participants (e.g., the farmers' savings,
the participant agencies’ regular budgets, and
other local stakeholders’ money); or (b) pursue
external funds such as a loan, a grant from the
national or regional government, or any other
source external to the project participants; or (c)
use the funds the project itself creates, usually by
producing and selling goods and services.9
Although, at this basic level, financing may seem
straightforward, it is actually quite complicated.
There is a multitude of different financing options
and pursuing one, or a combination of several
requires understanding the pros and cons of
each, and how they match the project’s character-
istics and needs. 
Financial requirements and financing
options in SNRM
Compared with other types of development proj-
ects or business undertakings, SNRM projects
and programs feature some specific traits:
• Some benefits may take an exceedingly long
term to materialize. Even in cases in which
benefits may rapidly appear, such as
protecting endangered species from extinc-
tion, these benefits only make sense if they
are maintained in the long run. Hence, short-
term financing may not suit an SNRM project; 
• Some natural resources, and their services,
such as biodiversity, face imperfect markets
or lack markets altogether.10 As a result, they
have no market prices—or the existing prices
may grossly undervalue the natural resource
in question. This in turn complicates securing
financing for SNRM;
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FIGURE 3. FINANCING: THE THREE BASIC OPTIONS
9. This alternative will not kick in on time to cover the initial costs; that aspect
would still need financing, but in some cases the prospect of future earnings
may attract would-be financiers, and if profits are realized they may be used to
pay these investors back.
10. In economic jargon imperfect or nonexisting markets are called market failures
and may arise from incomplete markets, externalities, nonexclusion, nonrivalry,
nonconvexity, and asymmetric information, (Hanley, Shogren, and White, 1997,
Environmental Economics in Theory and Practice. London: Basingtoke.) 
Initial money
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(a) Use internal
financial resources
(e.g., participants
savings)
(b) Use financial
resources from
outside (e.g., loans,
grants, and private
investors)
(c) Create new financial
resources (e.g., by
producing and selling
goods and services)
• Some natural resources and their services are
partially or wholly public goods.11 Public goods
are available to all in that no one can be
prevented from using them (e.g., clean air) so
there is very little incentive for an individual to
voluntarily pay for them. In these cases there
may be little or no monetary benefit for the
investor or the would-be financier. 
For these and other reasons financing SNRM may
have special needs that call for one or the other
type of financing. Therefore it is important to
keep abreast of the options available and their
pros and cons, which are discussed below.
A checklist of 52 financing options
Table 1 presents 52 financing options for SNRM
projects or programs, grouped into six categories:
(1) public sources, (2) private not-for-profit
sources, (3) private for-profit sources, (4)
payments for environmental products, (5)
payments for environmental services, and (6)
“you many need less money than you think.” The
matrix format helps show that many financing
options may be classified under more than one of
these six categories. 
A list tends to be read as an “either or” menu,
which should not be the case here, particularly at
a time when “leverage,” “partnership,” and
“matching funds” are popular catch phrases. With
few exceptions, financiers prefer not to go into a
project alone. Rather, they see their contribution
as a way to leverage or mobilize other parties’
resources. Hence, almost every SNRM project
requires a combination of financing instruments:
credits, plus grants, plus public money, plus local
savings, and so on. 
The majority of financing options discussed in the
following chapters is currently available in most
countries (e.g., mobilizing local savings, grants,
funds, loans, etc.) Some others are still in their
early development stage (e.g., trade on carbon
sequestration, or developing systems of payments
for environmental services). A few others are still
conceptual but nonetheless merit discussion (e.g.,
an international system of payments for the global
commons and a global energy tax earmarked for
environmental projects). The discussion and
description of the financing options in the table
proceeds as follows:
• In the rest of this chapter we briefly discuss
the six main groups of financing options
mentioned above.
• Chapters 2 and 3 present a more detailed
discussion of potentials and limitations of
payments and markets for environmental
services, and private sector–community part-
nerships.
• In chapter 6, the 52 financing options are
presented in 15 description cards (DCs). For
each group of related financing options the
description card offers a short explanation of
their main features, rates their suitability with
regard to 11 SNRM concerns, and suggests
(a) how to contact the funders, (b) where to
go for country examples, and (c) where to go
for more information. 
“You may need less money than you think” 
(Financing options 50, 51, and 52 and description card 6)
In most initiatives, and certainly in SNRM proj-
ects and programs, there is room to reduce
financing needs, reduce the costs of financing,
and increase accessibility to it.  This is so much
so that some practitioners refer to “zero
financing” to describe the opportunities to save
public or private resources and free them for
investment in new endeavors. 
Much has been said about the advantages of
cutting subsidies to energy and water consump-
tion or to agricultural inputs and outputs.
According to their advocates such measures may
result in reduced pressure on the environment
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11. Again, in economic jargon a pure public good is one for which consumption is
nonrivalrous (one's consumption does not reduce the amount available for
another person to consume) and nonexcludable (it is impossible or very diffi-
cult to keep trespassers out).
and natural resources, save public money, and
free resources to invest elsewhere, such as in
SNRM projects and programs.  For example,
some recent estimates of energy subsidies in
developing countries are as high as 160 billion
dollars per year. But these subsidies are concen-
trated in a handful of large (e.g., Russia, China,
India, Indonesia) or energy-rich (e.g., Saudi
Arabia, Iran) countries (see Pagiola et al. 2002).
This large figure, however, is dwarfed by the size
of agricultural subsidies in the European Union,
Japan, and the United States. These agricultural
subsidies may harm the countries' own natural
resources, and surely harm markets and incomes
of developing countries’ farmers. 
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Mostly public sources
1. Public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs (DC 1)
2. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more general taxes collected at the
national, state, or local level (DC 1)
3. Special laws delivering extra-budgetary financial support to particular social groups, geograph-
ical areas, or activities (DC 1)
4. Tax breaks or subsidies for SNRM activities (DC 1)
5. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more selective taxes collected at the
national, state, or local level. (e.g., taxes on alcohol, tobacco, energy, airports, ports, cruise
ships, hotel and resorts charges, and others)  (DC 2)
6. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more charges, fees, fines, and
penalties related to the use (or abuse) of the natural resource (e.g., water charges, ground-
water charges, stumpage fees, and other natural resource extraction fees; hunting fees and
entrance and user fees in protected areas; charges on emissions and feedstock, release or
dumping of fertilizers and pesticides; charges related to solid waste, toxic waste, and environ-
mental fines and penalties; etc.) (DC 2)
7. National, state, and local development banks’ loans (DC 3)
8. Debt-for-nature swaps (DC 4)
9. Environmental funds (endowment, sinking, and revolving) (DC 4)
10. Multilateral aid and aid from development agencies (DC 5)
11. International development banks’ loans (DC 3)
12. Bilateral aid and development agencies (DC 5)
Note: “DC” indicates the description card in chapter 5 where the financing alternative is described in greater detail.





  

 
 



“You may need less money than you think”
Payments for environmental services
Payments for environmental products
Private for-profit sources
Private not-for-profit sources
Public sources
TABLE 1. A CHECKLIST OF FINANCING OPTIONS 
FOR SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
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Changes in public regulations may also free
private resources or encourage would-be
investors. For example, there is a large body of
evidence supporting the fact that clarifying and
securing participants’ rights to natural resources
will increase their willingness to invest their own
time and savings in the resources' sustainable
management, hence, reducing the needs for
external financing. 
Mostly private for-profit sources
20. Household saving and labor assets (DC 10)
21. Community-based enterprises—formal (co-ops) and informal (DC 10)
22. Micro-saving, micro-credit, and micro-insurance (DC 10)
23. Semiformal and informal micro-finance institutions(DC 10)
24. Private investment by local businesses (DC 10)
25. Commercial bank loans (DC 3)
26. Direct investment by nonlocal investors (DC 11)
27. Private-public partnerships (DC 11)
28 Private sector–community partnerships (DC 11)
29. Compensatory environmental investment of large developments (DC 11)
30. Venture capital (DC 11)
31. Portfolio investors (green funds) (DC 11)
Note: “DC” indicates the description card in chapter 5 where the financing alternative is described in greater detail.







  
 



“You may need less money than you think”
Payments for environmental services
Payments for environmental products
Private for-profit sources
Private not-for-profit sources
Public sources
TABLE 1. A CHECKLIST OF FINANCING OPTIONS 
FOR SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(cont'd.)
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
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Mostly private not-for-profit sources
13. Community self-support groups and other forms of social capital (DC 7)
14. Secular and faith-based charities (DC 7)
15. Special fundraising campaigns (e.g., “Save the pandas,” “Friends of the national park,” etc.)
(DC 8)
16. Merchandising and good cause marketing (DC 8)
17. Lotteries (DC 8)
18. Social and environmental NGOs (DC 9)
19. Foundations (DC 9)
 






While eliminating developing and developed
countries’ harmful subsides may be beyond the
scope of most NRM initiatives, there are other
opportunities, at the program or project level, to
reduce cost and increase access to financial
resources.  Several of them are presented in
description card 6 (e.g., pooling, insurance, guar-
antees, leverage, charettes, financial training).
The main lesson here is that it pays to go over the
initial financing assessment, think creatively, and
Mostly payments for environmental products
32. Markets for organic agricultural products (DC 12)
33. Markets for sustainably harvested non-timber forest products (DC 12)
34. Markets for certified forest products (DC 12)
35. Markets for certified fishery products (DC 12)
36. Resource extraction charges directly collected by the SNRM project (DC 14)
37. Allocating part of national, state, or local extraction fees to SNRM projects in the extraction
areas (DC 14)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 1. Financing Options: A Discussion 21
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Mostly payments for environmental services
38. Markets for biodiversity conservation and bioprospecting (DC 13)
39. Markets for carbon offsets  (DC 13)
40. Markets for watershed protection (DC 13)
41. Markets for landscape beauty, including ecotourism and tourism (DC 13)
42. Markets for development rights and conservation easements (DC 13)
43. Quasi-markets and non-market systems of payments for environmental services (DC 13)
44. Users fees and entry fees directly collected by the SNRM project (DC 14)
45. Allocating part of national, state, or local user fees to SNRM projects in the area providing
the environmental services (DC 14) 
46. Global Environmental Facility (GEF) payments for the global commons (DC 15)
47. Funds for SNRM associated with international treaties (DC 15)
48. Other possible systems of international payments for global commons (DC 15)
49. Earmarking for SNRM part of one or more international taxes (DC 15)
Note: “DC” indicates the description card in chapter 5 where the financing alternative is described in greater detail.
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“You may need less money than you think”
Payments for environmental services
Payments for environmental products
Private for-profit sources
Private not-for-profit sources
Public sources
TABLE 1. A CHECKLIST OF FINANCING OPTIONS 
FOR SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(cont'd.)
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
ask for advice—because it is probable that you
may need less money than you think.
Financing from public budget, taxes, and
revenues
(Financing options 1–6 and description cards 1 and 2) 
Public money is the largest source of financing
for SNRM throughout the world, and probably
will remain so for a long time. There are many
arrangements by which SNRM initiatives may
receive public funding, and we go over six of
them in description cards 1 and 2. They range
from annual budgetary allocations, to SNRM
financing through earmarking a portion of
general or specific taxes, to special laws and
funds, and to financing SNRM through
earmarking a portion of the fees, fines, and penal-
ties related to the use (or abuse) of natural
resources. 
The latter—financing SNRM from fees, fines, and
penalties related to the use (or abuse) of natural
resources—is particularly attractive in that a clear
cause-effect relation can be advocated in support
of it. However, it may not be free of problems if it
negatively impacts the rural and urban poor
whose livelihood in many cases depends on free
or low-cost access to natural resources.
There is a trend in some quarters to label “finan-
cially unsustainable” any project or program that
depends on the public budget rather than market-
based financing, the latter touted as more sustain-
able or truly sustainable. This is simply not true.
Depending solely on public money may not be
wise and surely is not sufficient to pay for SNRM
requirements in most countries. But markets fluc-
tuate widely and businesses come and go much
faster than public budgets.12
Also in many SNRM initiatives public sector
participation is not sought after solely as a poten-
tial funder, but also as a potential provider of legal
and institutional support and as an enabler and
facilitator. Some amount of public funding was
part of half the cases discussed in chapter 6, and
in all of them the public sector played an impor-
tant supporting role.
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Mostly reducing the need for additional financing
50. Freeing up existing public resources (e.g., redirecting money from harmful public subsidies to
SNRM projects) (DC 6)
51. Encouraging the mobilization of private resources (e.g., securing tenure, promotion, regulation
streamlining) (DC 6)
52. Mechanisms to increase the accessibility to and reduce the need for and cost of financing
(pooling, insurance, guarantees, leverage, charrettes, financial literacy training) (DC 6)
Note: “DC” indicates the description card in chapter 5 where the financing alternative is described in greater detail.
 
     
     
“You may need less money than you think”
Payments for environmental services
Payments for environmental products
Private for-profit sources
Private not-for-profit sources
Public sources
TABLE 1. A CHECKLIST OF FINANCING OPTIONS 
FOR SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(cont'd.)
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
12. For example, in the United States, 8 out of 10 start-up businesses close up shop
by their fifth year.
Section 1. Financing Options: A Discussion 23
Banks and loans
(Financing options 7, 11, and 25 description card 3)
Development banks, both national and interna-
tional, are an important source of SNRM
financing owing to their special focus on develop-
ment lending, long-term loans, and lower interest
rates. In middle-income and large developing
countries, national, state, and local development
banks are the major source of developing lending,
while international development banks' lending is
more important for low-income developing coun-
tries. Besides their direct financing role, interna-
tional development banks, particularly the larger
ones (e.g., the World Bank and the four regional
development banks) are important sources of
technical advice, fund leverage capability, and
policy development, making them—for better or
for worse—major reference points for rural devel-
opment and conservation. 
In contrast to development banks, commercial
banks thus far have played a limited role
financing SNRM projects in developing countries.
Both banks and would-be borrowers have been
wary that high risks and long maturing periods of
SNRM projects may make them unfit for commer-
cial bank loans. Yet there are examples in which
commercial banks have participated in financing
SNRM projects as intermediaries to disburse
public moneys and also as co-lenders or lenders
where collateral, government warranty schemes,
and pooling money from several sources reduces
the risks both for lenders and borrowers. An
interesting developing-country experience with
commercial-bank lending for SNRM is Brazil’s
“Green Protocol,” a description of which may be
found in Bayon (2002). Looking ahead, some new
financing arrangements such as private
sector–community partnerships (discussed in
chapter 3) may open new opportunities to
commercial banks' financing of SNRM.
Multilateral and bilateral donors
(Financing options 10 and 12 and description card 5)
Most multilateral aid and development agencies
are part of the United Nations (UN) family. The
United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) is the UN’s overall development agency,
and the UN also has several agencies with a
specific focus on natural resources.  Among them
are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). IFAD has
resources to grant funds but that is not the case
with UNDP, FAO, and UNEP, which are usually
low on funds. The UNDP also manages other
donors’ grants and programs.  Similarly to inter-
national development banks, UN agencies are
important sources of technical advice, and they
may help leverage third-party financing
resources. 
In addition to funding multilateral agencies, rich
countries channel much of their international aid
and development grants on a bilateral, country-by-
country basis, and through their own develop-
ment agency, which in most cases is part of the
foreign affairs ministry. Bilateral aid is a signifi-
cant source of resources in less developed and
small countries where it may represent a substan-
tial percentage of the public investment capacity
and of the funds available to NGOs and other civil
society organizations. There is a sort of division
of labor among donors with some focusing on a
particular group of countries, or a particular
group of activities to be supported. There are also
various strings attached to bilateral aid that may
make it more or less attractive for a particular
SNRM project. 
Five of the cases discussed in chapter 6 were
recipients of Danida’s grants and two other cases
were recipients of bilateral aid from the United
States and the Netherlands. 
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Private not-for-profit sources
(Financing options 8, 9, and 13–19 and description cards 4,
7, 8, and 9)
Private not-for-profit financing for SNRM includes
an array of financing options and arrangements
from local communities to international founda-
tions and NGOs. It ranges from small in-kind
contributions to substantial investments. Our
checklist includes eight of these financing
options, which are reviewed in four description
cards in chapter 6.
International NGOs have played an important role
in the development of two relatively new financing
options: environmental funds and debt-for-nature
swaps. National and international foundations are
an important source of grants for small and
medium-size projects.  Secular and faith-based
charities are often able to reach the more desti-
tute people and places. They can all be important
brokers to engage other funding sources as well.
Even in cases in which the financing contribution
of not-for-profit sources is small their participa-
tion, particularly the participation of locally based
institutions, may be crucial to increase local
buying-in and ownership of the SNRM initiative.
Private non-for-profit sources helped finance five
of the cases presented in chapter 6. 
Private for-profit sources
(Financing options 20–31 and description cards 10 and 11)
Private for-profit financing also encompasses very
different stakeholders and scales. It ranges from
local peasants and communities investing their
savings and labor, to small and medium-size local
businesses, to large businesses and international
corporations.
At the local level, almost all SNRM projects will
require the investment of participating house-
holds’ savings or labor. Oddly, most development
projects and programs assume local investment
but seldom acknowledge and quantify it in the
project design. Two of the cases reviewed in
chapter 6 do so. Beyond the financing require-
ments, mobilizing participant resources is crucial
to the local ownership of the SNRM project.
Experience shows that in order to motivate rural
households to invest in SNRM, projects need to
offer good prospects of short-term benefits within
the levels of risk acceptable to the participants.
New activities generated by the SNRM project
may also spur investment by local businesses,
ranging from local investments in lodging for
tourists to the roadside sale of handicrafts. 
At the large-scale end, there are many reasons to
try to attract extra-local private investors to the
financing of SNRM projects in the poor rural
areas of developing countries: they may
contribute resources far larger than those avail-
able locally; they may bring much needed tech-
nical and commercial knowledge; they can bridge
local SNRM projects with countrywide or world-
wide markets, and so on. There are also legiti-
mate concerns regarding large extra-local
investors. In particular practitioners need to be
concerned about the distribution of costs and
benefits among the would-be partners and also
the risk of natural resource overexploitation in
order to meet the benefit expectations of both the
private businesses and the local communities.
Private business financing of SNRM projects in
rural areas of developing countries may include
direct investments that take up one or more
components of the SNRM project (e.g., the hospi-
tality component of an ecotourism project),
private-public partnerships (e.g., developing
publicly owned natural resources), or private
sector–community partnerships (e.g., a forestry
or wildlife management project).  Recent experi-
ences with the latter are discussed in detail in
chapter 3 and are illustrated by two cases in
chapter 6. 
A different, more grant-type financing arises when
large private developments—such as dams, oil
and mining companies—pay for environmental or
social projects as compensation for the environ-
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mental or social disruption they may cause. Yet
another source is private business financing of
environmental initiatives as part of its public rela-
tion campaign, or its business ethics, as in the
case of the South Africa Green Fund, described in
chapter 6.
Payments for environmental products
(Financing options 32–37 and description cards 12 and 14)
Financing SNRM projects with the sale of green
products is undoubtedly attractive in that it would
match SNRM efforts with markets willing to pay
for them.  Many examples of successes and fail-
ures are available, feeding a lively polemic as to
the potentials and limitations of green products to
foster environmental conservation and improve
rural livelihoods.  There has also been a learning
curve as SNRM practitioners realize the impor-
tance of understanding or even creating the
markets and overcoming the institutional and
commercial barriers that may hinder participation
of the rural poor in markets for environmental
products and services. 
The Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) effort to
develop a market for sustainably produced wood
and wood products is an exciting example. In the
few years since its inception, the FSC has been
remarkably successful in enlisting large wood
producers and users in developed countries.  FSC
penetration in developing countries and among
small forest owners is still very limited but
growing. More recently, the FSC experience has
fostered a similar initiative, this one regarding
sustainable fisheries.
One drawback of market-based financing that
SNRM project developers should be aware of is
that money will come late in the project cycle,
when the goods have been produced and sold.
Thus, the need to secure financing for the start-up
costs remains.  A project with a very good market
prospect may be able to leverage financing for
start-up costs, but few SNRM projects are willing
to repay initial costs out of market sales, instead
they will usually reserve the market incomes to
pay for operation costs and to increase the partici-
pants’ income.
Payments for environmental services
(Financing options 38–45 and description cards 13 and 14)
Many SNRM schemes are not economically viable
because a substantial part of what they would
deliver are environmental services that are not
paid for, be they at local scale (e.g., soils and
water protection); national scale (e.g., watershed
protection, biodiversity, landscapes); or interna-
tional scale (e.g., biodiversity, carbon sequestra-
tion). Should these services be accounted for and
paid for, SNRM would be much more attractive
and rewarding to those that bear the cost of it,
particularly the rural poor. That is the rationale
behind the many existing schemes of payments
for environmental services (PES). 
Markets for environmental services (MES) are
one type of PES, characterized by their free-
wheeling transactions between would-be sellers
and would-be buyers of environmental services.
That is not to say that governments’ rules and
third-party facilitation do not play an important
role in establishing and developing MES, consid-
ering that no industry would be interested in
buying carbon sequestration rights were it not for
the international treaties and national regulations
that force them to reduce their carbon emissions.
Some PES schemes could be labeled as quasi-
markets in that they combine non-market systems
on the demand side and market approaches on
the supply side (e.g., Costa Rica's and Colombia's
systems of PES). Still other PES rely almost
entirely on regulatory schemes both on the
demand and on the supply side (e.g., Brazil’s
ICMS Ecológico). PES and particularly MES are
further discussed in chapter 2, and chapter 6
describes several MES and PES experiences.
Recently, some MES have raised the expectations
of practitioners and, in some cases, been touted
as the new solution to SNRM financing. The
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outcome thus far and the estimated prospects
suggest a more cautious attitude—namely, to
consider markets for environmental services as
one among many systems of payments for envi-
ronmental services, each one with pros and cons
that makes it more or less suitable to a particular
SNRM project or program.
Similarly to payments for environmental products,
in PES schemes the money is received only when
the service has been provided—and this may take
time.  Thus, the need to secure financing for the
start-up costs remains.  Very good PES prospects
may help attract financing for start-up costs,
however to this day few start-up costs have been
repaid out of PES incomes. Typically PES projects
have benefited from other sources of initial
support and have used the PES to pay for opera-
tional costs and to increase participants’ income.
International systems of payments for the
environmental commons
(Financing options 46–49 and description card 15)
From a worldwide perspective the atmosphere, the
oceans, biodiversity, and the tropical forests are all
global commons, environmental components of the
world’s global public goods. The latter, according
to a UNDP definition (Faust et al. 2001) are public
goods whose benefits are strongly universal in
terms of countries, people, and generations. 
As mentioned before, the adequate provision of
public goods is always difficult to achieve, and at
a national scale it usually requires government
interventions to force the beneficiaries to pay the
suppliers (e.g., through regulations, taxes, the
creation of special markets, etc.). Securing the
provision of global public goods on the interna-
tional scale is even more difficult since there is no
world authority to regulate, tax, or create markets
worldwide. 
Yet there has been progress in acknowledging
and paying for the global commons, mostly, but
not exclusively, through international treaties.
The best known case is the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF). Created in 1991 and funded
mostly by voluntary contributions from rich coun-
tries GEF mandate is to support developing coun-
tries' provision of global commons.13 International
treaties have also created mechanisms for the
financing of global commons that do not entail
international agencies such as GEF. For example,
private trade in bioprospecting and on carbon
sequestration is the result of international regula-
tions on biodiversity property rights (Convention
on Biological Diversity) and the control of climate
change (Convention on Climate Change).
Beyond the limited resources currently available
for financing the provision of the global commons,
there is an ongoing international discussion that
began in the early 1990s regarding what more
should or could be done. Proposals to raise money
to pay for the provision of global commons include
international environment-related taxes and
charges, such as an international carbon tax, an
international charge on the use of the ocean, an
international air transport tax, or an up-front inter-
national income tax. Also proposals have been
made to earmark part of non-environment-related
international taxes, of which the most debated thus
far is the Tobin tax (a tax on international currency
transactions, proposed by the economist and Nobel
laureate James Tobin). Although all of these alter-
natives may look farfetched their discussion
recently reached the preparatory meetings of the
2002 UN Conference on Financing for
Development—but facing strong opposition from
OECD countries, they were excised from the final
Conference document. 
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13. The GEF is also the permanent or temporary financing mechanism for the
international agreements on biodiversity, climate change, protection of the
ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants. 
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The basic principle of payments for environmental
services (PES) is that those who provide environ-
mental services should be compensated for the
cost of doing so, whether these are direct costs of
specific land use practices or more indirect oppor-
tunity costs of avoiding certain activities or types
of land use. Payments may be monetary or in-
kind, may involve private sector or government
financing, and can be made at local, national, and
global levels.  There are numerous examples of
PES in practice. Lower watershed users may pay
upper watershed communities for land manage-
ment. Governments may give tax breaks to
people setting aside land for conservation. And
companies may pay in other countries for activi-
ties that provide global environmental benefits
such as carbon sequestration or biodiversity
conservation.15
There are a number of different approaches to
PES, some of which are transactions between
private companies or individuals while others
have more government involvement. While the
term markets for environmental service (MES) is
applied by some—for example, Landell-Mills and
Porras (2002)—to all of these approaches,
others—for example Pagiola et al. (2002)—prefer
to restrict the use of this term to schemes with
the following key characteristics:
• Buyers and sellers come together on a
voluntary basis; and
• Prices are set through the interaction of
supply and demand.
Some schemes may have various characteristics
of markets in that they allow suppliers of environ-
mental services to respond to financial incentives
and decide how much of the service they want to
supply in response to the payment offered.  But in
some schemes the transaction from the buyer
side may not be voluntary.  That is the case, for
instance, when a municipality increases the price
of water supply to users in order to pay
landowners to conserve forests.  The payment
may also be administratively determined, as when
a government agency sets the price. These types
of initiatives can be considered partially market-
based but not markets in a strict sense and are
therefore often referred to as PES.  
The distinction between PES and MES can be
rather blurred particularly where markets are
imperfectly competitive, involving only one or a
few players on either the buying or supplying
side, or where governments are involved as the
seller or buyer of environmental services. 
There is also a certain degree of overlap between
the term PES and the term private sector–commu-
nity partnership.  Not all such partnerships relate
to the financing of natural resource management,
but when they do they can often be considered a
type of payment for environmental products or
services. This is because they often involve a
community providing access to land or wildlife or
refraining from activities that detract from conser-
vation or landscape beauty in exchange for a
variety of inputs from the private sector, both
financial and nonfinancial.  Direct negotiation is
the most common approach for developing such
partnerships and much of the research on them
has focused on how to improve this aspect, rather
than the broader market issues (partnership
approaches are discussed in chapter 3). 
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14. This chapter draws heavily on IIED’s recent research in the same subject,
particularly by Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) and papers from Pagiola, et al
(2002). 
15. There is some overlap between markets for environmental products (MEP) and
MES; for example, buyers of organic coffee may be paying either for the quality
of the product or for the service of protecting the forest where the coffee was
produced (or for both).
CHAPTER 2.  A  CLOSER LOOK AT PAYMENTS AND
MARKETS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
by Maryanne Grieg-Gran and Camille Bann / IIED14
In this chapter we examine the experience with
different types of PES with a particular focus on
market initiatives. Except where otherwise stated,
the discussion is largely based on Landell-Mills
and Porras (2002). 
Overview of the main types of 
environmental services
The four main types of environmental services
that have been addressed by PES and MES are
discussed below.16
Carbon sequestration
Forests sequester and store carbon and thereby
play an important role in regulating global
climate.  There are two main approaches to
increasing the amount of carbon sequestered by
forests—the planting of new trees (afforestation,
reforestation, and agroforestry), and the avoid-
ance of emissions by retaining trees (through
actions such as conservation or improved
management practices that prevent or reduce
deforestation, forest fires, and conversion of
forest to other land uses). 
The signing of the Kyoto protocol in 1997 (as part
of the United Nations’ Convention on Climate
Change) set the stage for the emergence of a
market for carbon offsets, including those based
on forest sequestration and storage.  The carbon
offset market has been evolving quickly.  Not only
are national governments passing laws to ensure
emission targets are met, but greenhouse gas
emitters, brokers, consultants, NGOs, communi-
ties, and potential suppliers are responding
directly to international policy processes.
However, the process has not been smooth and
many of the initiatives can still be characterized as
experimental, aimed at gaining experience and
improving public image of the companies
concerned. Nor is there a single unified trading
platform.  Rather, transactions have occurred at a
number of levels (i.e., local, national, regional, and
international), through a variety of payment
mechanisms (from bilateral to exchange based),
and with varying degrees of government partici-
pation.  Trading of forest-based offsets has been
hampered by the uncertainties over the rules at
the international level.  Although some clarifica-
tion was  attained at the Conference of the Parties
in Marrakesh in November 2001, there are still
many challenging issues, such as determination
of baselines and additionality, that constrain the
development of payment and market systems.
Transaction costs are also very high.
The most sophisticated systems are being set up
in industrialized countries as a result of concerted
government efforts to introduce emission caps
and establish clear rules and regulations to guide
market development.  For example, the United
Kingdom and Denmark have their own trading
system.  In these countries, ad hoc transactions
aimed at gaining experience and generating favor-
able publicity are being replaced with more
systematic trading of a defined carbon commodity
(typically one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent),
aimed at minimizing the costs of compliance with
the Kyoto Protocol targets.  
Developing countries’ participation in the
emerging international carbon sequestration
market is based in the Joint Implementation (JI)
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
of the Kyoto Protocol. Thus far these market
initiatives have been primarily generated through
complex and individually negotiated projects.
Investment in the development of an international
market architecture remains limited.  The ratifica-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol and the inclusion of
more favorable conditions for forestry, would be a
great impetus to the international market for
forest-based carbon offsets.  
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16. Landall-Mills and Porras review 75 examples of payments for forest-based
carbon offsets, 61 examples related to the establishment of markets for water-
shed services, 51 cases related to landscape beauty, and 72 emerging payment
schemes for biodiversity
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In an effort to become market leaders, an
increasing number of organizations (businesses,
public agencies, and NGOs) are setting up inter-
national brokerage services, investments funds,
clearinghouse markets and even exchanges.
Insurance companies, consultants, and certifica-
tion suppliers have been quick to offer potential
buyers and sellers services to support interna-
tional trade.  A number of these ventures cater to
forest-based offsets initiatives. 
Watershed protection
While forest watershed services vary from site to
site, forests are credited with protecting water
quality, regulating water flows, preventing floods,
controlling soil salinization, and maintaining
aquatic habitats.  Whereas historically the protec-
tion of watersheds was the responsibility of
governments, the role of private companies, indi-
vidual landowners, NGOs, and communities in
delivering and financing watershed services is
growing.  
Watershed services generally benefit downstream
activities and are characterized by threshold
effects.  Owing to these features, market develop-
ment depends on strengthening cooperative and
hierarchical arrangements to allow the benefici-
aries demanding the service and the providers of
the service to come together to formulate group
payment strategies and to tackle free-riding.  At
the same time, where cooperative or hierarchical
arrangements exist, and are under strain from
inequitable benefit sharing and high costs,
markets are being introduced to ease tensions
and facilitate financial and in-kind transfers.  The
emergence of markets for watershed services has
not been associated with significant competition
in supply or demand.  
A range of watershed service commodities has
developed, depending on the type of service
demanded.  Those interested in maintaining water
quality purchase this service, in some schemes,
through best management practice contracts with
watershed landholders, and in others, through
water quality credits.  Water table regulation is
being commoditized in a number of ways
including salinity credits, transpiration credits,
and stream flow reduction licenses. What land-
holders have to do to provide these commoditized
services varies according to the scheme and the
service but may involve refraining from certain
types of activity such as pesticide use, maintaining
natural forests or vegetation, or carrying out
specific activities such as tree planting. 
Given the large number of stakeholders involved
in watershed protection, payments need to be
channeled through intermediaries, allowing
buyers and sellers to contract out the negotiations
and conclusions of deals, overseeing implementa-
tion and enforcing contracts.  Intermediaries are
also valuable mechanisms for pooling funds from
a group of beneficiaries and/or collecting user
fees.  In more advanced countries, over-the-
counter trading using prepackaged commodities
is being promoted, in some cases alongside clear-
inghouse systems.  
Until recently, because of the difficulties of
excluding non-payers, suppliers of watershed
services have generally lacked leverage for
demanding payment. In more developed coun-
tries, new government regulations for improved
water quality have been the major force behind
payments for watershed protection. Also,
improved understanding of the benefits provided
by watersheds and the growing threats that they
are facing have increased beneficiaries’ willing-
ness to pay for watershed conservation. As
commodities and payment mechanisms become
increasingly sophisticated, supply-driven markets
are no longer improbable.
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To give one example of North-South carbon sequestra-
tion trade, by September 1999, Climate Care had offset
4,335 metric tons of carbon through two investments in
Uganda. The most important investment is in a FACE
Foundation project on Mount Elgon. 
It is not clear whether markets provide a prefer-
able mechanism for delivering watershed services
compared to regulatory systems that have already
been tried and tested.  For the most part, studies
offer superficial reviews of economic, social, and
environmental benefits with virtually no assess-
ment of costs.  Moreover, scientific uncertainty
remains regarding the forest-hydrology link,
which may undermine market development. 
Landscape beauty 
Landscape beauty has a market that is the most
recognizable of the four environmental services
considered here, but one that remains relatively
immature.  Generally, there is little effort to set
prices for access to landscape beauty according to
demand and supply conditions, payment mecha-
nisms are unsophisticated, and there is little
participation by private and community land-
holders.  As long as tour agencies resist paying
for landscape beauty, land stewards’ opportunities
for being rewarded for the service they provide
rests in establishing themselves as tourist enter-
prises.  Yet, without the skills to administer and
manage complex international businesses, this
route is fraught with difficulties—particularly for
poor people.  Some agencies and communities
believe that ecotourism must ultimately involve a
joint effort and the pooling of skills and
resources.  Whatever the model for landscape
beauty to be protected into the future, it is clear
that providers must receive fair compensation for
their inputs.
The provision of landscape beauty represents a
key attribute in the market for ecotourism.
However, payment systems for this service have
been slow to develop.  Tour operators have often
considered landscape beauty as a free input, while
on the supply side, entrance fees for government-
controlled protected areas have rarely reflected
consumers’ willingness to pay for even the costs
of management.  This has made it hard for private
or community-owned areas of natural beauty to
compete with government-controlled areas.  
In this framework market evolution is not a
simple process.  The introduction of payment
mechanisms where none existed before involves
the creation of new institutional arrangements
and the involvement of new stakeholders.  As tour
operators begin to establish themselves as paying
customers, communities and private landowners
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Environmentalists and conservation-minded local
authorities are proposing payments to landowners to
protect the forest cover and therefore maintain or
improve a watershed’s hydrological integrity.  For
example, Malawi’s national electricity supplier has
been paying local NGOs since 1994 to protect water-
sheds surrounding key hydroelectricity plants to
ensure protection against sedimentation.
Another example of payments for watershed protection
regards tree planting in salinity-prone areas as a way
to drive the water table down, thereby reducing the
risk of soil salinization.  Salinity credits are being
developed in Australia as part of a regulatory scheme
aimed at reducing soil salinity.  Salinity limits are
imposed to point source polluters, who can only
exceed the limits when they offset soil salinity with
salinity credits.  Land users who invest in activities
that reduce soil and water salinity, e.g., tree planting,
are issued salinity credits that they can sell to
polluters. 
Qi Li Hai Nature Reserve. Coastal swamps surrounded by maize
fields. Professional fishing is allowed in these freshwater swamps.
Yellow Sea, North of Tianjin, Tianjin Province, China
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are seeking to compete with publicly owned
protected areas.  At the same time, intermediary
organizations are responding to the demand for
support in seeking, negotiating, and imple-
menting deals.  
For the most part, payments are based on site-
specific negotiations or reformed entrance fees;
little progress has been made in developing
sophisticated payment mechanisms such as
auctions or clearinghouse mechanisms.  More
recently, the establishment of community-based
ecotourism operators and joint ventures has
allowed land stewards to tap tourists’ demand
directly.  Creative marketing by community
groups, often with the support of international
NGOs and donors, has begun to create a niche
market for community-based nature tourism.
Rather than selling access to landscape beauty via
tour operators, communities are setting up their
own businesses.  Examples of such ventures are
found in Belize, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nepal, Thailand, and
Uganda.  Tour operators that see a future in
community-based ecotourism are seeking to form
joint ventures with land stewards.  This is the
case in Ecuador and Peru.  Gradually, the market
for landscape beauty is evolving from one domi-
nated by government provisions and character-
ized by below-cost pricing, to a more competitive
situation involving a wide range of suppliers, the
development of niche products, and increased
consumer choice.  However, as with mainstream
tourism, this market is subject to fluctuations in
demand, with preferences of ecotourists often
being more influenced by security considerations
than by the physical attributes of a destination.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
In an example of payments for landscape values, the
Government of Rwanda was quick to recognize its
monopolistic position as home to Africa’s last
remaining mountain gorillas and the potential for
charging higher tourism fees. In the 1980s it intro-
duced charges of US$250 per tourist for entrance into
its Parc National des Volcans.  
Ecuador provides a different example of payments for
landscape beauty. In 1995, one of Ecuador’s first joint
ecotourism ventures was established between the
Cofan people and the Transturi Tourist Company in the
Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve.  The venture, “Aguarico
Trekking,” promised to reward the Cofans for their
careful maintenance of the area's famous scenic
beauty, which draws tourists from around the world. 
Ditches dug on both sides of a fence in order to keep rhinos away, so that they do not damage the fence. 
Village area on the outskirts of Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal.
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Biodiversity conservation
The services provided by biodiversity range from
the maintenance of ecosystem functions to option
and existence values. However, most of the serv-
ices are intangible, which makes them difficult to
package for sale.  They are rarely consumed by a
clearly identifiable clientele and there are
threshold effects in their supply (e.g., forest areas
below a certain size will fail to deliver the
demanded biodiversity) making it difficult to
portion out the services to individual buyers.
Despite these problems, governments, NGOs,
and private companies are paying for forest biodi-
versity conservation.  The growing public aware-
ness of biodiversity benefits and threats of loss
are the main drivers.  As funds have started to
flow toward biodiversity protection, individual
community and land stewards have become
increasingly proactive sellers of their services.
The growth and diversification in market partici-
pation has produced significant innovation in the
design of commodities and payment mechanisms.
Expensive and complex project-based deals are
giving way to intermediary-based transactions
(especially trust funds), pooled investment funds,
transactions that piggyback on retail sales (e.g.,
shade coffee), and even over-the-counter sales of
standardized products.  Each mechanism seeks to
reduce market risks, overcome threshold effects,
and minimize transaction costs.  As risks and
costs come down, market participation is likely to
continue to rise. 
Despite significant progress in recent years,
payments for biodiversity services remain nascent
for the most part and to a large degree, experi-
mental.  Major constraints to market development
remain, not least of which are the significant
transaction costs associated with the set-up and
implementation of trades. Box 2 outlines several
recent initiatives of payments for biodiversity
services.
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BOX 2. EXAMPLES OF PAYMENTS 
FOR BIODIVERSITY SERVICES
The Critical Ecosystem Partnership is a trust fund
which pools finance for biodiversity conservation in
critical ecosystems around the world.  It was launched
in February 2001 by Conservation International (CI),
the World Bank, and GEF. CI recently launched an
initiative to promote biodiversity-friendly cocoa through
the combination of cocoa with tree planting (shade
cocoa) in the Upper Guinean forest in West Africa.
Shade cocoa protects biodiversity by maintaining tree
ecosystems on farms and by preventing the conversion
of tropical forests to cocoa plantations.  Local benefits
include weed control, maintenance of soil fertility
through the provision of organic matter, soil erosion
control, reduced requirements for chemical fertilizer
and pesticides, and additional sources of income and
sustenance in the form of timber and non-timber forest
products (NTFPs).  CI is also seeking to tap the
organic products market.  
The International Finance Corporation has been the
forerunner of multilateral efforts to develop innovative
approaches to biodiversity venture capital and is
currently managing two major programs: the Small and
Medium- Size Enterprise program and the Terra Capital
Fund.
And finally, in 2000, Earthcall Telecommunications
Ltd. put into practice in the United Kingdom its plan to
capture public willingness to pay for biodiversity protec-
tion through biodiversity-friendly telephone calls.
Section 1. Financing Options: A Discussion 33
Implications of PES and MES for SNRM
PES schemes offer a way of leveraging funds for
environmental protection.  However, documenta-
tion of their impacts in practice is lacking so, to a
large extent, their effect on natural resources is
yet to be determined. 
Pagiola et al. (2002) in a review of 12 case studies
of market-based initiatives for forest conservation
adopt two basic criteria to examine their effective-
ness in promoting conservation: the extent to
which they attract participants and influence their
behavior, and the extent and nature of the forests
that are ultimately conserved.  The authors
conclude that most of the 12 initiatives have been
successful in attracting participants.  They stress,
however, that the extent to which a specific mech-
anism provides incentives to forest managers to
undertake conservation depends not only on the
amount and form of payments but also on the
opportunity cost of conservation.  The cases that
have been most effective are in relatively remote
areas with limited alternative land uses where
opportunity costs are low. In these circumstances,
the payments do not have to be very high to bring
a clear net benefit for the sellers of environmental
services.  A summary of the potential environ-
mental costs and benefits associated with some
PES and MES in the four environmental services
previously discussed is presented below.
Biodiversity. The impact of shade-grown coffee
initiatives on biodiversity conservation has been
well studied and there is evidence of a positive
effect on species counts for endemic and endan-
gered species (Pagiola et al. 2002).  There is less
documentation of the environmental effects of
other types of payment systems for biodiversity.
In some cases it may be possible to identify a
change in a proxy indicator such as an increase in
the area designated as protected, as in the case of
the ICMS Ecológico in Brazil. This says little,
however, about changes in biodiversity conserva-
tion on the ground.  Another constraint is that
new areas protected under market-based initia-
tives may be of insufficient size to ensure long-
term, genetically viable populations of many
species.  The private protected area scheme in
Chile is an example (Pagiola et al. 2002).  
Apart from biodiversity improvements, four main
environmental benefits may also be associated
with payments for biodiversity conservation—
water benefits (water quality maintenance,
reduced chemical pollution); soil benefits
(reduced soil erosion and maintenance of fertility,
moisture, and nutrients); air benefits (controlled
air pollution and carbon sequestration); and land-
scape beauty. But these potential benefits from
biodiversity conservation have rarely been meas-
ured and valued.
Carbon. The potential environmental benefits of
forest-based carbon trade include increased biodi-
versity; more regular water supplies and higher
water quality (as a result of the positive impacts of
forests on local hydrology and the diminishing
agricultural area subject to fertilizer and pesticide
use); controlled flooding; and increased scenic
beauty.  Possible costs include reduced biodiver-
sity where monoculture plantations are used;
increased erosion and siltation where plantations
are associated with poor land management and
road building; reduced water supplies associated
with fast-growing trees such as eucalyptus; and
increased greenhouse gas emissions where emit-
ters feel that by investing in offsets they gain a
“license” to pollute and actually increase carbon
emissions.  Few studies have measured these
impacts or highlighted their potentially negative
repercussions.  While none of the case studies
reviewed relates to the clearing of natural forests
for fast-growing plantations, this is a real concern
to environmentalists given that the Kyoto
Protocol acknowledges carbon offsets for planta-
tions, but not for forest protection.  Despite these
concerns there is a clear opportunity for carefully
designed carbon offset projects to promote a
package of forest-centered environmental serv-
ices (see the case study of the Noel Kempff
Climate Action Project in chapter 6).
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Watersheds. The effectiveness of markets for
watersheds as a way to protect the environment is
still being assessed.  Even though claims about
environmental benefits have been recorded, little
data have been produced to back those claims.
Moreover, the benefits claimed tend to be associ-
ated with watershed protection itself, not with the
introduction of markets.  The main reported bene-
fits may be split between watershed benefits and
spin-offs.  Watershed benefits include improved
water quality, flood protection, maintained base
flows through groundwater recharge, soil erosion
control, and soil fertility maintenance.  Positive
spin-offs include biodiversity protection, land-
scape beauty/aesthetic benefits, and carbon
sequestration.  Yet the lack of field data on most
of these benefits is disturbing, especially in light
of the scientific uncertainty about forest-water
linkages.
Landscape beauty. In a number of cases
ecotourism operations are promoted as mecha-
nisms for generating finance for conservation of
local environments, particularly in areas with high
levels of biodiversity.  Biodiversity is thus often
cited as a positive spin-off from the sale of land-
scape beauty for ecotourism ((e.g. through hunting
bans).  Another benefit is improved local water
quality due to reduced erosion and sedimentation. 
Implications of PES and MES for poverty
reduction
There are many potential advantages of PES.
They generate new sources of income for sellers,
improve service delivery for buyers, raise the effi-
ciency with which resources are being used and
allocated, and promote new investments in a
range of assets.  Yet, the use of PES, and market
creation in particular, to provide local sustainable
development benefits is contentious.  There is
little in-depth research on the impacts of market
incentives on small or marginalized communities,
and anecdotal evidence indicates that the impacts
on the poor can in fact be negative.  Research and
guidance is therefore needed on how payment
systems and markets can be created so as to
benefit poor communities.
In theory, the poor may reap many benefits
following the introduction of PES that could help
them transform natural capital embodied in
natural resources into real financial flows.  Such
initiatives are praised for providing local people
with increased income while reducing their
vulnerability by diversifying their income (assets)
base.  For example, in Kerala, India the develop-
ment of a local plant-based drug has spurred
payments by pharmaceutical companies to forest
communities.  PES can also provide an effective
mechanism for ensuring a sustained flow of serv-
ices to beneficiaries—these services are often
critical for the livelihoods of poorer groups.
Furthermore, PES can have positive conse-
quences for welfare because they can stimulate
the development of new skills and the strength-
ening of cooperative and hierarchical arrange-
ments on which the poor often depend.   
However, evidence on the impacts of PES on poor
communities is scarce and where information
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Since 1994 forestland in upland Vietnam (above 600
meters) has been regulated by the government’s
“People's Forestry” initiative, an example of a national
program of payments for watershed protection
services. The initiative involves the transfer of forest
management from the state to households and individ-
uals. Barren forestland is being allocated to house-
holds through land tenure certificates and contracts
for protection.  Financing for forest protection is
provided through a “National Programme to Create and
Protect Watershed Protection and Special Use Forest.”
Payments of up to VND 50,000/hectare/year
(US$3.34/hectare/year) are channeled to households
through “Forest Protection Units,” which monitor imple-
mentation.  By the end of 1996, about 6 million
hectares of forestland was allocated for protection
(about 5 percent of the country’s total forestland). 
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does exist it is often biased in the sense that while
benefits are widely applauded, costs are poorly
recorded.  It is not clear, therefore, how much or
even whether these payment and market schemes
for environmental services can actually contribute
to poverty reduction while protecting the environ-
ment.  
A concern is that MES may actually cause
damage to poorer groups whose access to
markets may be restricted for a variety of reasons.
For example, emerging evidence suggests that
poor smallholders in developing countries face
serious constraints in accessing carbon markets.
By spurring competition, markets may lead to
further marginalization or exclusion of weaker
groups from natural resources on which they
have traditionally depended.  Moreover, because
markets introduce a monetary-based system for
allocating resources, those with less money have
reduced influence over service delivery.  Apart
from the moral issues raised, the inequitable
distribution of benefits can make market expan-
sion difficult. 
There are several reasons why the development
of markets for environmental services may not
always benefit the poor:  
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Tsimihety child carrying forest products to the market. Near Belambo, Madagascar 
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• Because poor people often lack property
rights, they are likely to struggle for a share
of a business, and to fight to retain control
over, and access to, the resource on which
they depend. 
• Poor individuals lack the requisite skills and
knowledge for participating in emerging
markets, such as managerial skills for organ-
izing supply, negotiating and contracting
skills for structuring deals, scientific under-
standing of environmental services, and tech-
nical skills to deliver services.  
• Inadequate finance.  Participation in
emerging markets requires up-front invest-
ment.  With respect to supply, service
providers will need to invest in searching for
clients, acquiring skills, bringing the service
to market, insurance, etc.  On the demand
side, buyers need financing to conclude a deal
but poor groups tend to lack access to afford-
able finance.
• Poor market information and contacts.
• Insufficient communications infrastructure.
Transportation and communication infra-
structures are important in bringing parties
together.  
• Inappropriate commodity design.  In general
the provision of environmental services is a
long-term commitment (e.g., carbon deals
tend to span decades rather than months or
years).  However, poor communities rely on
livelihood strategies that are flexible and able
to cope with unexpected shocks.  Thus, even
where new markets offer opportunities for
increasing income, if they require extended
commitments, they are unlikely to attract
participation of vulnerable groups.  Where
poor people accept long-term contracts, there
are serious risks that these contracts will
decrease their ability to respond to shocks
and would damage their welfare. 
• High coordination costs: Transaction costs
associated with establishing and running
market mechanisms are high (seeking, nego-
tiating, agreeing, implementing, monitoring,
and certifying deals).  These transaction costs
will be higher the greater the number of
buyers and sellers involved (as in the case of
a watershed where a number of individuals
live).  Poor households with small plots will
tend to face high coordination costs as part of
any deal.  
• Minimal power.  Where poor groups have
little voice in the development of markets,
there is a real risk that they might be margin-
alized from market benefits.  Even when poor
communities can participate in markets, they
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Based on the Kyoto Protocol’s targets, Bosello and
Roson (1999) use an integrated assessment model to
analyze the impact of global trading of carbon seques-
tration on the per capita income of Annex B countries
(the rich ones) and non–Annex B countries (developing
countries).  While all countries show a positive welfare
gain from global trading, the gain is spread dispropor-
tionately—with Annex B countries gaining far more
than developing countries. When banking (the right to
accumulate carbon credits and gain future credits on
them) is incorporated into the analysis, incomes for
non–Annex B and former USSR countries are actually
negative in early years, turning positive only around
2040.
Norwatch, a Norwegian NGO, undertook an assess-
ment of a forest carbon offsets scheme in Uganda by
the company Tree Farms AS (2000).  The review high-
lighted a number of social concerns including (i) threat-
ened eviction of about 8,000 people who depended on
the area for farming, collection of non-timber forest
products, cattle grazing, and fishing; (ii) poor labor
relations even though only 43 people were employed
by the company; and (iii) potential impacts on local
water supplies as fast-growing plantations absorb
increasing amounts of groundwater. 
From F. Bosello and R. Roson, 1999, “Carbon Emission Trading and
Equity in International Agreements.”  FEEM working paper 57.99,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Matteri, Milan, Italy.
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tend to be the weakest party.  Where power
balances are unequal, achieving a level
playing field is very difficult.  
These constraints are also mutually reinforcing.
Poor market information and lack of contacts, for
instance, raise the transaction costs facing
marginalized groups.
From a buyer’s perspective, a further concern is
that poor groups will be harmed by new demands
for payments for services that they have previ-
ously received for free.  While in the long term
markets are being put in place to benefit all those
who depend on continued supply of services,
there may be short-term trade-offs.  Furthermore,
the distribution of benefits may not reflect the
distribution of payment obligations.  Where
poorer groups are asked to pay for environmental
services but lack the assets to benefit from
improved environmental conditions, there may be
serious negative equity impacts.  For example, if a
community negotiates payments for watershed
protection to improve the quality and depend-
ability of water supplies, landless households are
likely to benefit least since they do not use water
to the same extent as local farmers.    
Actions to ensure that MES are pro-poor
While the hurdles facing poor people’s participa-
tion in emerging markets for environmental serv-
ices are high, they are not insurmountable.
Seven possible steps for promoting pro-poor
markets are identified below:
• Secure resource tenure. Formalization of
natural resource rights is essential to give
marginalized groups control over, and rights
to returns from environmental services.
There are already signs that market develop-
ment has spurred forest land tenure formal-
ization in some disadvantaged communities in
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador, and India.
• Define appropriate commodities.  Simple and
flexible commodities that can be self-
enforced, that fit with existing legislation, and
that suit local livelihood strategies need to be
developed in poorer areas.  
• Devise cost-effective payment mechanisms.
In areas where regulatory capacity is weak,
trading skills are in short supply, and market
infrastructure (e.g., communications, informa-
tion systems, transport, monitoring) is under-
developed, simpler payment mechanisms are
likely to be more effective.  Innovative tech-
niques to lower transaction costs such as
systems for pooling demand and supply and
intermediary-based transactions should be
actively encouraged.
• Support cooperative institutions of service
providers to increase bargaining power.
While landowners with small plots are
unlikely to find a market for their carbon
offsets, biodiversity conservation, watershed
protection, or landscape beauty, a group of
landowners may attract investment.
Cooperation is critical in allowing poor
landowners and service beneficiaries to share
the costs associated with market participa-
tion.  It is also essential for achieving a
minimum level of supply and demand,
thereby permitting market participation.  
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
In an example of the high transaction costs that the
poor may face when trying to compete in MES, Chopra
et al.’s (1990) evaluation of Sukhomajri’s watershed
protection project in India incorporates transaction
costs into the cost-benefit analysis.  Transaction costs
were those associated with establishing a functioning
cooperative network and included the training of
villages in soil and water conservation techniques and
organizational leadership, and the cost of “motiva-
tional inputs.”  The benefit-cost ratio fell from 1.33 to
0.73 when transaction costs were included.  If the
local communities were to pay those costs their
benefits would be negative.  
From K. Chopra, G. Kadekodi, and M. N. Murty, 1990, Participatory
Development, People and Common Property Resources. New Delhi:
Sage Publications.
• Invest in training and education.  Training in
marketing, negotiation, management, finan-
cial accounting, contract formulation, and
conflict resolution are important prerequisites
for effective participation.  Technical skills
relating to forest management for environ-
mental services are also needed.  
• Establish a market support center.  To
improve poor people’s ability to participate in
emerging markets, a central support center
could offer free access to market information,
and an advice bureau could support the
design and implementation of contracts. 
• Provide start-up finance to ensure participa-
tion of poorer groups.  Where finance is
needed to negotiate and conclude environ-
mental service deals, the government may
have a role to play in providing start-up funds. 
The sustainability of PES and MES as
financing mechanisms
The sustainability of PES and particularly MES as
financing mechanisms is hard to assess empiri-
cally given that most initiatives are relatively new.
Pagiola et al. (2002) identify three crucial factors
for sustainability:  
• Continued demand for the services being
sold; 
• Continued ability of suppliers to provide the
services; and 
• Maintenance of the necessary institutional
structure.
Demand for environmental services is partly
exogenous, depending on such factors as popula-
tion, economic growth, and competition from low-
cost alternative technologies.  All of these factors
can result in changes in demand.  For some serv-
ices such as drinking water, it is likely that
demand will continue to grow.  Demand for other
services such as biodiversity is perhaps less
certain.  For example, as Pagiola et al. ask:
Will consumers be willing to pay a premium for
biodiversity-friendly coffee in a recession?  
Ability to supply the service depends on the relia-
bility of the scientific links made between activi-
ties carried out and services provided, as well as
the nature of the economic incentives created.
The risk of poor scientific evidence is perhaps
greatest in the watershed service market where
the forest-hydrology links are not certain. This in
turn could affect demand; if expected services are
not delivered, payments will be abandoned. Even
where the linkages are clear, it is possible that the
payment made is insufficient to compensate for
the opportunity costs involved.  As this becomes
clear to the suppliers of services, they may lose
interest.  This is more likely to happen where the
payment level is determined administratively or
as a result of political negotiation, rather than on
the basis of cost-benefit analysis.  
The sustainability of the institutional framework
in which markets evolve is important but it should
be noted that this framework rarely remains
static.  There is a constant process of change and
adaptation of institutions—be they market, regula-
tory, or cooperative—in response to changing
preferences and power balances.  Where market
mechanisms gain support from more powerful
groups and generate greater payments, it is likely
that they will be associated with increased invest-
ment in supporting institutions and that they will
become more sophisticated. Efforts to promote
payment for environmental services should,
therefore, seek to capitalize on a range of stake-
holders’ interests and avoid alienating particular
groups that may block market development.  The
impacts on poor households, for example, are of
particular interest, not just for equity reasons, but
for ensuring that markets are sustainable.
Monitoring (both to document service delivery to
buyers and in order to improve the operating
procedures), independent verification, and invest-
ment in supporting institutions are all actions that
can be undertaken to enhance sustainability.
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When should a project developer choose a
MES approach?  
What are the choices that an SNRM practitioner
faces in deciding whether an  MES is a good or
feasible approach to the financing of a particular
natural resource management project? Under
what circumstances could a market-based
approach be a good option? Some key questions
that a practitioner should consider are set out
below. 
• Is there a clear demand for an environmental
service associated with the project? Many
analysts believe that demand-driven initiatives
have the greatest chance of success.
Practitioners that begin on the supply side
run the risk of developing mechanisms that
supply the wrong services in the wrong place,
or at prices that buyers are unwilling to pay.  
• Can a clear link be established between the
activities of the project and the provision of
environmental services demanded? Buyers of
environmental services need to have evidence
that they are getting what they are paying for,
otherwise their willingness to pay may be as
best temporary.  
• Does the community have formalized rights
to the resource and to the environmental
services associated with it? If rights to the
resource are unclear or informal, it may be
difficult to negotiate deals with prospective
buyers as they want to be sure of delivery.
The creation of an MES may also have unin-
tended effects of stimulating others' interest
in the resource, leading to expropriation and
further marginalization of the community.
• Do strong cooperative institutions exist?
Many market-based initiatives require
pooling of supplies in order to reduce trans-
action costs, and in the case of watershed
services and biodiversity conservation, to
provide a minimum threshold of environ-
mental services.  
• Would a market-based initiative be compatible
with the existing legislative framework?  A
number of initiatives have required legislative
change in order to be feasible.  This goes
further than formalizing property rights
particularly where governments are involved
as sellers or buyers of services.  In Costa
Rica, water companies needed regulatory
approval in order to charge additional fees to
water users to cover environmental services.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Maldhari women carrying water Near Sasan Gir Gujarat, India
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• Are supporting institutions (intermediaries
and ancillary service providers) in place?
Most market-based initiatives require the
involvement of a number of organizations to
provide different support activities: to bring
suppliers into contact with buyers, to facili-
tate negotiations, and to certify service
delivery.  Establishing a new initiative will be
much easier where such organizations are
already in existence locally and able to
extend their support.
If the answers to the questions above are all nega-
tive, it may be more fruitful to concentrate on
changing these contextual conditions first, either
directly or through lobbying governments (see
box 3).  If there is little potential for changing
these conditions, alternative approaches for
financing the project need to be pursued.
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Governments clearly have a role to play in fostering the
market’s development and in shaping markets in order to
maximize welfare by establishing appropriate policies and
regulations.  There are a number of ways by which policy-
makers might jumpstart market development such as:
• Raising awareness. Suppliers need to learn about
the value of their service and buyers' potential will-
ingness to pay for its delivery, while beneficiaries
need to learn about the value of the service and
threats to its continued provision.  General environ-
mental education can help to stimulate public
demand for action. 
• Reducing transaction costs and trading risks.
Governments play an important role in providing an
enabling environment for market development.
Investment in market infrastructure, efficient
communication systems, research on service
delivery and measurement, and training and invest-
ment in supporting regulations and standards all
contribute to lowering transaction costs and risks for
potential market participants. 
• Providing secure property rights. Tenure security
is essential for the implementation of MES and for
market creation.  Without clear and defendable
rights to land, forest, or the environmental service
itself, suppliers cannot make a credible commitment
to supply an environmental service.  Actions that
can improve secure tenure include formalization and
registration of rights, maintenance of a central public
registry, coordination of government departments
involved in allocating rights, and the strengthening of
the dispute resolution mechanism.  Monitoring and
enforcement systems will also need to be improved
in order to ensure that rights can be defended where
challenged.
• Introducing stricter environmental standards.
Stricter environmental standards, where effectively
enforced, often stimulate the establishment of MES. 
Notwithstanding the importance of broad participation,
policymakers may catalyze market development by
targeting individuals or groups early in the process.  In
general, market development will move forward most
quickly where powerful stakeholders are supportive;
however, the distributional impacts of various courses of
action need to be considered to avoid the marginalization
of weaker groups. 
BOX 3. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING MES
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The term “partnership” is widely used and vari-
ously defined. To some it is a legally based
contractual agreement, while to others it is any
form of dialogue between two parties.  Some use
the term in a normative sense, implying that for
an arrangement to qualify as a partnership it
needs to have certain characteristics (e.g.  be
equitable to all parties).  In this chapter we use
the term private sector–community partnership in
a purely descriptive sense to refer to a wide range
of deals, contracts, and informal arrangements
that are entered into by companies, be those large
transnationals or small family-run enterprises, and
communities in the expectation of benefit.
Partnerships between the private sector and local
communities are a growing phenomenon in a
number of natural resource sectors worldwide,
particularly in tourism and forestry.  
Tourism is one of the world’s largest industries
and nature-based tourism and tourism in devel-
oping countries are among its fastest-growing
sectors.  To date, most benefits from tourism have
gone to commercial operators in the tourist-origi-
nating countries or in metropolitan centers of the
host country.  Tourism has therefore contributed
much less than might have been expected to
social and economic development in rural destina-
tions.  Private sector–community tourism partner-
ships offer potential for rectifying this. In a
number of developing countries, tourism partner-
ships between the private sector and local
communities are becoming more common, espe-
cially as communities are increasingly gaining
rights to wildlife and other valuable tourism
assets on their land, through national policy
changes on land tenure.  Partnerships are devel-
oping even in cases where the tourist operators
are the landowners. This happens because opera-
tors increasingly recognize not only that local
support is essential for the long-term maintenance
of tourism assets on which the industry depends,
but also that many communities have cultural
resources that can greatly enhance or diversify
the existing tourism product.
In the forest sector, a wide range of deals have
been made over the years between forestry
companies and local communities.  Companies
have sought access to land, labor, and continuous
supplies of wood while communities have sought
employment, technology, infrastructure, social
services, sources of income, and secure access to
a wide range of forest products.  What has been
less common is the incorporation of sustainable
forest management and social responsibility
considerations in such relationships, although this
is an emerging trend.
With defensible property rights and a policy
framework that allows flexible development of
partnerships, companies and communities can
collaborate for direct mutual gains (both financial
and nonfinancial) plus broader benefits to the envi-
ronment and society.  Well-structured partnerships
can, therefore, represent a means of achieving
sustainable natural resource management.  
Partnerships as a financing mechanism 
for SNRM
Not all partnerships between communities and
the private sector relate to natural resource
management. They may be purely focused on
production or may involve a company
contributing to local development in return for
community goodwill or a “social license to
operate.”  For a partnership to be considered a
financing mechanism for natural resource
management it should involve a private company
entering into an agreement with a community by
which the latter will be provided with certain
financial and nonfinancial benefits in return for
the former's access to natural resources held by
the community and/or conservation resource
management activities and avoidance of activities
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CHAPTER 3.  A  CLOSER LOOK AT PRIVATE SECTOR–
COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS
by Maryanne Grieg-Gran and Camille Bann / IIED17
17. This chapter draws heavily on recent IIED research on this issue, particularly
Mayers and Vermuelen (2002) and Roe et al. (2001).
damaging to the resource.  Thus, a company may
effectively be paying a community for resource
management activities, providing indirect incen-
tives for such activities, or in some cases bringing
the community into contact with buyers of envi-
ronmental services. 
There is some overlap between the concepts of
“partnerships” and “payments for environmental
services” in that partnerships can be considered
as one type of PES where the payment mecha-
nism involves direct negotiation between the
parties. But this is just one of a number of issues
in a partnership. Other important aspects of a
partnership include the way partnership opportu-
nities are identified; the way partners are
selected; the negotiation of the terms of the part-
nership, covering both inputs from and benefits to
each party, risk-sharing, and duration; and the
procedures in place for monitoring and review.
This chapter gives particular emphasis to these
aspects of a partnership. 
What motivates companies and communities
to form partnerships?
A range of factors may determine whether compa-
nies and communities are motivated to form part-
nerships together or actively avoid them.
Reasons why companies may aim for partnerships
with communities include the following: 
• Public and political pressure. Intolerance of
irresponsible corporate behavior and
demands to demonstrate social responsibility
are growing in many countries.  This has
driven a number of forest and tourism compa-
nies to adopt corporate social responsibility
policies.  For example, tourism companies in
Namibia have found that a visible commit-
ment to working with local communities is
strategically important, particularly in a post-
independence political climate. In South
Africa, the outgrower schemes operated by
the country’s largest forestry companies,
Sappi and Mondi, provide these companies
with a progressive image at a time when the
distribution of land rights is being called into
question. 
• Market advantages. The growing strength of
the “fair trade movement” and ethical
consumerism mean that increasingly,
consumers want to be assured that the prod-
ucts they buy benefit local communities and
are not damaging to the environment. For
tourism companies partnerships with commu-
nities offer the potential to utilize communal
resources and create unique selling points
that are able to attract new customers. This is
important as market trends in tourism are
demanding increasingly sophisticated and
varied products. Entering into an agreement
with a local community is a way of ensuring
exclusive access to a particular area and,
hence, enhancing the quality of the product.
• Land and resource access advantages. For
forestry companies there may be access
restrictions to wood sources and land.  These
restrictions may be avoided, and resource
security and diversity of sources of supply
increased through partnerships with local
land and resource owners.  Similarly, as
tourism grows it is necessary for private oper-
ators to seek new opportunities in new
areas—notably on land controlled by local
communities.
• Local risks that the community can help mini-
mize. Local risks include tenurial and land-use
conflicts, the destruction of company property,
violence against company employees, and
interference from local politicians. These risks
are important in forestry.  Similarly, ensuring
that local people benefit from tourism is a way
of reducing hostility to tourists and hence
increasing the security of the enterprise as
well. By providing an incentive to manage the
resource base upon which the tourism
product depends, the partnership reduces the
risk of environmentally damaging activities.
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As with the private sector, communities may have
a variety of short-term and long-term motivations
for entering into partnerships, including the
following:
• Visible benefits. Other individuals or communi-
ties have already been seen to benefit from
such relationships.  This applies especially to
tourism.
• Secure land tenure and resource rights. There
is a potential for “cashing in” on newly
acquired rights to land and wildlife resources
rather than just using them for subsistence
purposes. This was a major factor in Namibia
(see box 4).  Moreover, partnerships can
represent an easy form of benefits as they
may require only passive involvement, such
as authorizing a private company to conduct
an activity on communal lands.
• Access to private operator skills, technology,
capital markets, and assets. For example,
forest companies may bring to the partner-
ship new technologies, services or scientific
knowledge on the characteristics of alterna-
tive tree species, or access to international
markets.  
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BOX 4. DRIVERS OF TOURISM
PARTNERSHIPS IN NAMIBIA
A major driving force for the development of tourism
partnerships in Namibia has been the recently intro-
duced communal conservancies legislation which gives
local people user rights to wildlife and tourism on
communal land.*  As rights to land and wildlife
resources are increasingly being devolved at the local
level, the private sector is recognizing the need to work
with local people and to acknowledge their central role
in maintaining cultural and natural heritage assets that
attract tourists.  Previously, private operators could
negotiate with government ministries for access to
tourism resources on state or communal land.  They
now find themselves in the position of having to deal
directly with communities.  The communal conservan-
cies legislation, coupled with a national program on
community-based natural resource management,
provides a framework through which both biodiversity
conservation and rural development goals can be
achieved by enabling communities to benefit from
commercial ventures on their land.  Giving communi-
ties power to negotiate with the private sector, through
the devolution of rights to tourism assets and advice
on how to use that power, is a mechanism for ensuring
that they receive a more equitable deal for the use of
their natural resources.  
For this reason tourism partnerships are being encour-
aged by agencies and NGOs through the national
community-based natural resource management
(CBNRM) program as a way of accessing private sector
financing for rural development, which can make the
new conservancies more financially viable and self-
sustaining.  Government agencies, principally the
Directorate of Environmental Affairs (DEA), and devel-
opment and conservation NGOs are promoting more
formal partnerships by acting as facilitators or
advisors to communities. 
(*) In 1992, the then-Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism
(MWLCT) approved a policy document that made provision for the
establishment of wildlife management units called conservancies.
Conservancies were defined as: “...a group of farms and/or area of
communal land on which neighboring landowners/members have
pooled their resources for the purpose of conserving and utilizing
wildlife on their combined properties and/or area of communal land” Woman retuning from the field with animal fodder. Annapurna 
conservation area, Nepal.
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Types of partnerships 
Company-community forestry partnerships cover
a range of partners (from large-scale corporations
to small-scale private enterprises on the private
sector side; and farmers, individual local actors,
community-level units of social organizations such
as farmers’ groups, product user groups, and
cooperatives on the community side); forest types
(dense forest, open woodland, agroforestry, small-
holder woodlots, and commercial scale planta-
tions); and relationships.  The types of community
forestry deals, categorized by forest product, are
summarized in table 2.  
Similarly to the forestry sector, a variety of private
sector–community partnerships can be found in
ecotourism or wildlife, ranging from the very
formal and contractual to the informal.  Some
involve ecotourism, others hunting, while still
others focus on complementary activities such as
cultural villages and craft production.  These can
be found on communal, private, or state land.  For
each type of partnership there are a variety of
different types of inputs to be made (including
capital investment, land, labor, time) and benefits
to be received (e.g., exclusive rights, equity
shares, employment, training).  Box 5 presents a
profile of private sector–community partnerships
in Namibia to illustrate the types of tourism part-
nerships that are emerging in that specific
context.
Implications for SNRM
Research on the impact of private sector–commu-
nity partnerships has focused on equity aspects
and the costs and benefits to communities.  There
is relatively little evidence on whether partner-
ships improve natural resource management in
the long-term. Impacts seem to be very case-
specific. 
In the forestry sector partnerships have been
shown, in some cases, to provide incentives for
natural resource management—for example
through the promotion of sustainable multipur-
pose forest management or the reclamation of
degraded land, which is considered a major
benefit of the Xylo Inda Pratam (Faber Castell)
outgrower scheme in Indonesia; and the XIP farm
forestry schemes in India.  They have also been
associated with micro-scale improvements in
erosion and climate where trees are intercropped
or planted on boundaries—for example, in India.
However, negative environmental effects are
possible where plantations are badly managed or
promote the spread of alien species such as
wattle, which has been a problem in some of the
South African outgrower schemes.  Partnerships
have also been considered to provide new oppor-
tunities for large-scale logging in natural forests
or to provide incentives for clearing natural
forests for monoculture. This is a major concern
in Papua New Guinea where arrangements to
facilitate the leasing of communal land to private
companies are encouraging the conversion of
forest to oil palm plantations.
In the tourism sector, it is often assumed that the
involvement of communities in tourism and the
benefits they receive from the partnership will
provide incentives for management of the natural
resource base.  But in some cases, the link
between the benefits from the partnership and
the desired behavior is not all that transparent.
This applies particularly to partnerships where
the community input is against certain land uses.
In practice, it is the combination of partnerships
with other factors such as regulations on natural
resource management that has the greatest
impact.  In Namibia, the underlying regulatory
framework confers rights and responsibilities for
natural resource management to communities.
This is not just a case of avoiding certain land use
activities, which is a cost in itself; it also requires
expenditure by communities on fencing, water
holes, game guards, vehicles, and an office. The
financial benefits from partnerships with private
companies provide a means to cover these costs
and in some cases generate a surplus.  The key
issues are whether such partnerships can
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Industrial pulpwood Outgrower schemes—industry assists farmers in establishing and managing pulpwood planting, using guar-
anteed supply contracts.
Farm forestry support—farmers establish plantings with technical support from industry, and sell output
with purchase contracts.
Farm forestry crop share—plantings established on farmers’ land with support from industry, and crop
profits shared.
Joint ventures—communities and companies share equity in pulpwood production venture. 
Land leased from farmers/communities—forest owners lease to private companies for pulpwood
production.
Corporate social responsibility project—company contributes to local development. 
Outgrower scheme/farm forestry support—schemes that directly link producers with commodity whole-
salers or final users.
Contracts from communities—contracts or agreements for wood-using or logging companies to harvest
wood from community forests.
TABLE 2. THE TYPOLOGY OF COMPANY-COMMUNITY FORESTRY PARTNERSHIPS 
(BY MAIN FOREST PRODUCTS)
Product Type of partnership
High-quality timber Joint venture—forest communities manage timber in partnership with private company. 
Concessions leased from communities—forest communities lease concessions to private industry,
communities retain substantial control.
Outgrower schemes—small farms or communities participate in outgrower or crop share schemes with
private companies planting improved high-value timber.
Corporate social responsibility project—company contributes to local development in return for “social
license to operate.”
Commodity wood
Group/community certification with company support—forest communities or farm producer organiza-
tions with contacts or agreements with certified wood buyers or intermediaries to market products.
Certified wood
Co-management for non-timber forest products (NTFPs)—communities manage/benefit from NTFPs in
company-controlled areas producing wood or pulp.
Outgrower schemes—small-scale farmers grow and sell NTFPs through outgrower schemes with private
industry.
Non-timber forest
products
Community processing or farmer out-processing—community or farmer cooperative sawmill, supplying
markets in which large-scale, high efficiency mills do not compete.
Forest product
processing
Forest environmental services agreements—payments and other benefits to communities or farmer
groups from municipalities or conservation agencies, to provide forest environmental services such as
biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, carbon storage, and landscape amenity. 
Environmental
services
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continue to generate sufficient returns to make
resource management worthwhile in the longer
term and whether the market is large enough to
support more than a few conservancies.  
Some tourism partnerships have specifically built
in resource management concerns. For instance,
Lianshulu Lodge in Mudumu National Park in
northern Namibia agreed to compensate neigh-
boring communities for any cattle killed by lions.
It also provided cattle for community feasts in lieu
of them hunting buffalo, a decision that would
help the growth of the wild buffalo population.
Another company, Skeleton Coast Fly Safaris indi-
cated that it would negotiate a revenue-sharing
agreement with the Marienfluss Conservancy if
certain conservation goals were met.  For
instance, local people would be asked not to grow
vegetables on the pristine banks of the river as it
interferes with tourism activities.  
Social impact of partnerships
Partnerships can yield a wide range of financial
and nonfinancial benefits for communities.
However, the experience so far has been mixed,
and for every positive outcome noted there are
caveats as to its general applicability and the
actual level of achievement. These are summa-
rized below.
• Financial benefits: Hard evidence from
several countries indicates that for many
small-scale farmers growing trees under part-
nership is more profitable in the short term
than alternative crops (e.g., outgrowing euca-
lyptus and bamboo is a more profitable option
in Thailand than competing cash crops).18 In
tourism there are cases where communities
have received appreciable amounts from land
rental and other revenue-sharing arrange-
ments.  The Torra Conservancy in Namibia
has a partnership arrangement with
Wilderness Safaris for Damaraland Camp, a
luxury tented camp.  The revenue received
by the community from bednight levies
agreed under this partnership amounted in
1998/99 to the equivalent of three months'
wages per community member from casual
agricultural labor. But for most communities,
partnership activities, whether in forestry or
in tourism, are supplementary rather than
central to livelihoods.  In South Africa, for
instance, it is clear that company-community
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18. On the other hand, it is difficult to forecast the long-term economic prospects of
wood-related products versus agricultural crops.
BOX 5. A PROFILE OF PRIVATE
SECTOR–COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS IN NAMIBIA
Who is involved?
• Increasingly conservancies, but also traditional authorities and
individual community members
• Large international companies and individual owners of lodges
Inputs from both sides
• Community input: access to land, wildlife, or cultural attractions
and tourism rights (some of these may be intangible inputs that
are difficult to value)
• Private sector input: land rent, payment of bed-night levies,
payment for hunting quotas, employment, training
Who owns the partnership enterprise?
• Primarily privately owned; a few are community owned and none
are jointly owned  
• Community-owned ventures tend to be complementary activities
(e.g., traditional villages, craft production).
Who initiates the process?
• A majority initiated by the private sector partner but conservan-
cies are beginning to take the initiative
Formal or informal?
• A majority of partnerships are formal 
How are partners selected?
• Primarily through one-to-one negotiation
• Tendering only for hunting so far
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outgrower schemes are not enough, on their
own, to lift households out of poverty.  The
main positive impact of these partnerships is
their contribution to livelihood diversification.
• Employment and training: Partnerships have
been appreciated by communities because of
their potential to create jobs for local people.
For the Torra Conservancy, employment of
community members at the Damaraland
Camp is considered a significant benefit as
the pay is relatively good and reliable. Some
training has also been provided.  But the
numbers employed under tourism partner-
ships are generally small and the work is
mainly unskilled.  In the forestry sector, while
partnerships can provide some guaranteed
employment, there is little evidence that they
have delivered better working conditions to
forestry employees.
• Capacity building and strengthening of local
institutions: Some partnerships have resulted
in greater cohesion and organization among
community groups.  In the forestry sector,
however, there is little evidence at this point
of a substantial increase in the bargaining
power of communities.
Partnerships have at times also raised social
concerns. Such concerns, in the case of forestry
sector partnerships include the following:
• Low-wage labor and inequitable land distribu-
tion have been perpetuated in deals that
entrench existing patterns of ownership and
control.
• Disadvantaged community members have
been excluded from some schemes that
require possession of land and some initial
capital resources.  The eucalyptus-growing
schemes promoted by the company ITC BPL
in Andra Pradesh, India, for example, have
not attracted the participation of small
farmers as they cannot meet the initial and
recurring costs of tree plantations.
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Women plant rice on slopes that have been cleared and burned (tavy method). Near Belambo, Madagascar 
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• Few partnerships have given the community
a share in the ownership, and by implication,
the management and control of the partner-
ship enterprise.  However, the risks involved
in such arrangements are considerable and
no particular ownership structure is neces-
sarily better than another.  Much depends on
the priorities and capacity of the community
and the level of risk it is comfortable with.  
Sustainability of partnerships as a 
financing mechanism
The sustainability of partnerships as a financing
mechanism is primarily a function of their success
in meeting expectations and generating net bene-
fits on both sides.  Some deals collapse because of
misunderstandings between parties, resulting in
heavy losses and recrimination and even violence
as was the case with the Boise Cascade forestry
joint venture in Mexico. When partnerships last,
this is usually a reflection of mutual benefits that
keep the company interested in providing or facili-
tating the financing, and the community's interest
in managing the resource. Table 3 has some
examples of these mutual benefits in the context
of forestry.
Factors external to the partnership can also play
an important role, most notably in affecting
demand for the product around which the part-
nership revolves. This was the case of the Picop
outgrower scheme in the Philippines, which
collapsed after 30 years as other sources of pulp
became much cheaper. In Namibia political and
security hardships have severely disrupted the
progress of tourism partnerships. For example,
secessionist disturbances in the Caprivi Region of
Namibia since 2000 forced the government to call
a state of emergency in the area, and tourism has
since come to a complete halt. Land disputes have
also affected developments in some areas.
The support given to the community is also
important.  If communities are to be able to nego-
tiate as equal partners they will need a consider-
able amount of support in the preparation of the
partnership.  In Namibia, the support given by
NGOs such as the Integrated Rural Development
and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) and the Legal
Assistance Centre to communities in the facilita-
tion of negotiations, the drawing up of contracts,
etc. has been crucial.  Government agencies have
also provided support.  Once a partnership is in
operation a community will still need some level
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TABLE 3. MUTUAL BENEFITS FROM FORESTRY PARTNERSHIPS
Case Community benefits Company benefits
Sappi and Mondi (South Africa):
outgrower schemes
Cash returns compare well with
alternative land uses
Supply of 10 percent raw materials critical
to economies of scale in processing
Wimco and JK Corp (India): 
farm forestry support
Evolution of competitive farm forestry Sustained raw material supply
PT Perhutani (Indonesia): 
tenant agroforestry scheme
Easing of land shortage Cheap labor supply, less conflict
Babine (Canada): joint venture Expanding joint venture share Development into industry leader
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of support, for example, in reviewing the partner-
ship agreement or in dealing with disputes.  Such
support can be costly, therefore government or
aid funds are often necessary to enable partner-
ships to happen and can be crucial in how they
impact communities.  This lessens the self-suffi-
ciency of partnerships.  While they offer a way of
tapping into private sector resources to meet envi-
ronmental and community development goals,
other sources of funds are still required.   
Another issue is that the company involvement in
partnerships with communities may be partially
motivated by the availability of government finan-
cial incentives.  In Indonesia, for example, the
government has a policy of promoting partner-
ships between companies and smallholders or
communities with support from a Reforestation
Fund.  Thus, only some of the financing provided
by a company is additional.  This is not an issue
where government incentives play a catalytic role
in getting partnerships started.  But problems
may arise where the partnership is so dependent
on these incentives that their withdrawal results
in the termination of the collaboration between
company and community. The implication is that
partnerships will not replace government or
donor financing; at best they will reduce the
amount required.
Actions to encourage successful
partnerships
Criteria for success inevitably entails some subjec-
tivity.  Mayers and Vermeulen (2002) define a
perfect deal as one that is equitable, efficient, and
sustainable and that has been returning benefits
to company, community, and forest on a long-term
basis. Roe et al. (2001) place the emphasis on
managing and meeting expectations so that both
sides are satisfied with the outcome. Their study
defines a successful partnership as one that meets
expectations on both sides with regard to the
following: duration, extent of financial and nonfi-
nancial benefits generated by the partnership,
division between the partners of financial and
nonfinancial costs and benefits, and division
between the partners of responsibility for running
the partnership enterprise.  
A number of actions can be undertaken at
different stages of the partnership process in
order to promote a successful outcome. These
include assistance to communities—e.g., advice
on evaluating their resources and the offers made
by private companies, legal advice for contract
scrutiny, capacity building, “matchmaking” serv-
ices to link potential partners, and provision of
facilitation services for negotiations.  Third
parties such as governments, NGOs, banks, and
donors may have important roles to play in these
actions.  
Community preparation in establishing priorities
and analyzing the full range of land use options
(both the land use around which the proposed
partnership revolves and alternatives) is essential
as a precursor to negotiation. Expert advice may
be necessary for analyzing potential returns from
different land uses, particularly where an activity
that is new to the community, such as tourism, is
involved. Because the value of tourism assets and
hence the potential returns varies according to
the characteristics of the resource, communities
will need assistance from tourism specialists to
understand the value of their tourism assets.
Where communities have no previous experience
of an activity outside facilitators can ensure that
false expectations are not raised and that business
plans are realistic.  Forestry partnerships face
similar challenges, exacerbated by the fact that
they are necessarily long-term arrangements
given the slow-growing cycle of trees. Long-term
forestry arrangements present big challenges to
both sides, but particularly to the community,
which may have to deal with such alien issues as
forecasts of forest growth rates and productivity,
national policies, market opportunities and
prices—and understand how these will affect
returns.
Most partnerships involve direct negotiation and
the process is usually initiated by the company. In
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some cases it may be possible for the community
to invite proposals from more than one company
through an auction or tendering process in order
to encourage competition and increase its access
to information.  Some communities in Namibia
such as the Khoadi-Hoas Conservancy have bene-
fited from adopting a tendering process for their
wildlife hunting quotas in that this allows the
community to choose from a number of bidders.
Some steps in negotiating the terms of 
a partnership
Ownership of the partnership enterprise:
Enterprises based on partnerships might be
wholly owned by the private sector or the commu-
nity, or jointly owned.  There are advantages and
disadvantages to each ownership structure and
the “best” option will largely depend on the
nature of the enterprise and the priorities and
capacities of both sides.  Formal ownership may
also not be the issue for some communities but
rather aspects such as management and control,
which are closely linked with it.  The community
needs to be clear on what it wants in relation to
management involvement, income, and risk.  The
best approach is to build-in some flexibility to
allow change.  If the community does opt for
partial or full ownership at some stage it may be
important to include in the partnership explicit
provisions for training in management and other
skills to increase the chances that the ownership
will translate into involvement in running the
enterprise, rather than simply taking on more
risk.
Payment structure: The choice of payment struc-
ture and the degree to which it is linked to the
success of the enterprise through revenue or
profit-sharing depends on the level of risk the
community is willing to take on. A minimum
payment should also be incorporated to ensure
that the community receives something in the
event the operator does not start the activity or
operates at a very low level. It is advisable that
partnerships allow for changes in the payment
structure after a specified period.
Determining how much the overall package should
be: The community needs to weigh all of the costs
involved in resource management, including the
opportunity cost of forgone land uses, and in the
case of wildlife-related tourism projects, the costs
of the increased risk of damage to crops and live-
stock from wildlife.  If the agreement involves
restrictions on other development within a certain
radius the community should be compensated for
this. 
Employment and training: If the community is
keen on its members taking on higher-level
employment in the partnership enterprise, real-
istic targets for this should be incorporated in the
agreement regarding:
• Recruitment: Community institutions should
be involved in recruitment.
• Determining a fair wage: The community
members should expect to receive at least as
much as they do from their traditional activi-
ties.  Wages or salaries paid by other enter-
prises engaged in the same activity are a
useful benchmark but differences in skills
and education level need to be taken into
account.
Formalizing the partnership: All partnerships
should be based on a written agreement with
clearly defined rights and responsibilities on both
sides. It should be legally binding but not overly
complicated.  It should include resource manage-
ment practices that are expected from each side.
At the operational level it can be useful to have,
in addition, a joint work plan with a clear
schedule of activities within an overall manage-
ment framework.  
Contract length: It is suggested that contracts be
long enough to provide security on investments,
10–15 years in the case of tourism, but not so long
as to lock either side into unfavorable conditions.
In response to failure to meet agreed conditions
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or performance targets as well as renewal
clauses, an exit strategy should be built in to
enhance the security of both sides. 
Monitoring and review: While many partnerships
use a formalized contract, in the forestry sector it
has been found that such agreements often do not
include provisions for review, renegotiations, or
dispute resolution mechanisms. In order to
address unforeseen difficulties, as partnerships
tend to require some mutual learning-by-doing
and adaptation, it is important to make provisions
for review.  Some of the tourism agreements in
Namibia make explicit provisions for joint
company/community management committees to
meet periodically and discuss issues arising from
the partnership.
Mechanisms for sharing information are also
needed.  One of the concerns of landowners
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Terracing agriculture near river in Nepal.
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TABLE 4. STEPS IN DEVELOPING PRIVATE SECTOR–COMMUNITY TOURISM PARTNERSHIPS 
IN NAMIBIA
Points to consider
Steps Community Company
1. Identifying a
partnership
opportunity
2. Finding out 
about prospective
partners
Is the company likely to be suitable?
• Does it have a track record in tourism devel-
opment?
• Does it have experience in dealing with
communities?
• Can it produce a sound business plan? 
Is the community likely to be suitable?
• Is it too big?
• Does it have previous tourism experience?
• Does it have a strong institutional structure?
• How dependent is it on tourism?
• What is the skills base like?
• Does it have access to external support
and/or facilitation?
3. Selecting partners How can we make sure we get the best partner?
• Competitive tendering?
• Auction?
• Direct, one-to-one negotiations?
How can we make sure we get the best partner?
• Are there other communities with similar
tourism assets?
• Do they meet the suitability criteria above?
• Are there any other companies bidding with
the same community?
4. Getting assistance Do we need external help?
• A facilitator who knows the tourism business?
• Help determining a fair return?
Do we need external help?
• A facilitator who understands community
concerns?
• Someone who speaks the local language?
Have we got what it takes?
• How does tourism compare with other land
uses?
• What are our land use priorities?
• What tourism assets do we have?
• How much will it cost?
• Do we have the capacity? 
Have we got what it takes?
• Are we prepared for face-to-face meetings
with the community?
• Do we have someone with a personal
commitment to make this work?
• Do we have experience working with commu-
nities or do we need to get someone to help?
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TABLE 4. STEPS IN DEVELOPING PRIVATE SECTOR–COMMUNITY TOURISM PARTNERSHIPS 
IN NAMIBIA (cont'd.)
Points to consider
Steps Community Company
5. Negotiating the
components of a deal
6. Deciding on 
the duration of a
partnership
Are we in this forever?
• What is the normal length of contract for a
tourism or hunting enterprise?
• Can we get out of the contract if the company
fails to perform?
• Can we have a renewable contract clause?
How long a contract can we secure?
• Does the community understand that we need
security in terms of a contract of reasonable
length if we are to be able to make a signifi-
cant capital investment?
• Can we balance our need for security with the
community’s wish for flexibility in the face of
uncertainty?
What do we need to think about in the deal?
• Should the enterprise be owned by us, them,
or jointly?
• If they own it, do we get a say in a manage-
ment?
• Should we opt for a fixed payment or a more
risky but potentially more lucrative success-
linked structure?
• What are the minimum costs we need to
cover and how much more on top should we
expect?
• Is our payment fair and protected against
inflation, etc.?
• Are we getting a premium for allowing
exclusive use?
• How many people are employed and in what
sort of jobs?
• Who decides about recruitment?
• How much will employees get paid?
• Should there be a minimum payment clause?
What do we need to think about in the deal?
• Should the enterprise be owned by us, them,
or jointly?
• If they own it, do we get a say in manage-
ment?
• Does the community understand the implica-
tions of different types of payment options?
• Are we paying the community enough to at
least cover their costs—direct and indirect?
• Do they understand how the overall value of
the deal has been calculated?
• Have we ensured that payments are fair and
easily verifiable to the community?
• Does the community understand the implica-
tions of granting us exclusive use?
• Does the community have realistic expecta-
tions about how many people we can employ
and in what types of jobs?
• Have we ensured that an appropriate
community structure is involved in recruit-
ment?
• Are we paying a fair wage compared to their
enterprises? 
involved in a partnership with XIP in Indonesia
was that they had not been given copies of the
agreement they had signed.  Moreover, after the
original planning meetings, communication from
the company virtually ceased.
Table 4 provides a summary of guidelines
designed for tourism partnerships in Namibia to
provide advice on how both parties can get a
favorable deal out of the partnership.
When should a project developer choose a
partnership approach?
For the SNRM project developer to opt for a part-
nership approach, certain prerequisites must be
in place; the most critical being secure land
and/or resource tenure and enabling government
policies. The experience in Namibia has shown
the importance of clarifying the rights over
wildlife and tourism development on communal
land. In the forestry sector there is no single
model of property rights for partnerships—they
can work just as well on communally or individu-
ally held land—and the interplay between
company-community deals and land tenure has
many variations.  As with the tourism sector, the
key requirement is that the rights to the land and
the associated resources be secure.
Government enabling policies can be specific
such as the requirement for forestry companies in
Ghana to enter into social responsibility agree-
ments, but a broader base of “carrots and sticks”
in policy and institutional frameworks is also
required.  Particularly important, policies relating
to the provision of start-up funds and favorable
loans and insurance packages.
Communities need to have a strong and represen-
tative institutional structure to provide a focus for
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7. Formalizing the
partnership
How can we prevent any misunderstanding?
• Have we got it in writing?
• Are the rights and responsibilities of both
sides clearly understood and agreed?
How can we prevent any misunderstanding?
• Have we got it in writing?
• Are the rights and responsibilities of both
sides clearly understood and agreed?
8. Monitoring,
reviewing, and
amending a deal
How can we ensure that we continue to get a fair
deal?
• Can we access company records?
• Is there a provision for a joint management
committee?
• Does the contract allow for changes to the
deal?
How can we reassure the community that it is
getting a fair deal?
• Are we being transparent with our accounting
and reporting to the community?
• Is there a provision for a joint management
committee?
TABLE 4. STEPS IN DEVELOPING PRIVATE SECTOR–COMMUNITY TOURISM PARTNERSHIPS 
IN NAMIBIA (cont'd.)
Points to consider
Steps Community Company
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negotiations.  This also facilitates community
preparation. With strong community institutions,
it is more likely that community members can
discuss the different options and support the
decisions made.  Even where contracts are made
with individuals, as is often the case for forestry
partnerships, it may be worthwhile both for the
community and the company to invest in effective
and representative community institutions to
oversee the workings of the partnership.
It is necessary to be clear about the level of
demand for the partnership product, particularly
in niche markets where the first partnerships may
be very successful and create expectations among
other communities, but the demand may not be
there for subsequent partnerships. 
Would-be partners need to be realistic regarding
the conditions that will attract private companies,
particularly foreign ones.  Where political risk is
high and initial investment requirements are
substantial, there have to be clear benefits of
working with communities to offset the high
transaction costs involved.  For tourism, close
community involvement can be an asset, for
instance contributing to unique selling points of
the activity/venture, albeit in a niche market.
Where the community has something unique to
offer (e.g., access to a certain wildlife species or a
rare habitat), the chances of attracting private
sector interest are much higher. In a more
commodity-focused sector such as forestry, any
premiums will typically be for quality, particular
high quality species, and for sustainable forest
management.  Community involvement in
forestry is less likely to be associated with direct
market benefits for the company concerned
although there are broader benefits, such as repu-
tation improvement.
Support for communities from NGOs and/or
government agencies needs to be available on an
ongoing basis and not just during the preparation
and negotiation of the contract.  They should be
available to address issues that come up later
(e.g., reviews and amendments to the contract,
and dispute settlement). There are also a number
of community and company characteristics that
are important to the outcome of partnerships.
Issues rooted in these characteristics need to be
addressed during the negotiations.  
Community characteristics that are
important to the design of the partnership
Skills base: A high level of skill is not essential but
where skills are lacking, training is a crucial
component of a partnership contract, particularly
for tourism partnerships. 
Size: With small groups, individual rather than
community benefits may be more significant for
encouraging commitment to the venture.  If the
community is large, an emphasis on community
payments rather than individual payments can
extend financial benefits or increase their
impacts.  Where per capita cash payments are
likely to be small, an emphasis on nonfinancial
benefits is also important.  For large communities
it is also important to allow extra time for negotia-
tions.
Dependence on the partnership: Communities that
have few livelihood options are at risk of
becoming too heavily dependent on a partnership.
Conversely, if the partnership is of little signifi-
cance to the livelihoods of the community, then
the community's level of commitment to it is
likely to be low. 
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Lifestyle: Communities may often have a diverse
range of livelihood activities (e.g., agricultural or
seminomadic activities).  For a partnership to
succeed it must complement, not conflict with
these other activities. 
Company characteristics that are important
to the design of the partnership
Experience with the community: If the company
has no previous track record of working with
communities, it will be important to seek advice
from or use the facilitation services of community
development organizations and to accept a slow
process.
Experience in the sector: There is a higher risk of
failure if the company has little or no previous
experience in the activity around which the part-
nership revolves.  If a community goes into a part-
nership with an inexperienced company it should
consider ways of reducing the risk to itself.
Possible measures include: more secure returns,
for example, fixed monthly payments rather than
a percentage of turnover or profit; shorter
contract period; escape clauses in the contract
based, for example, on nonperformance or poor
performance of the operator.
Target market: A company that has an established
track record in niche markets, for example,
among special-interest tourists, is more likely to
be able to make a community-based product
work.  Companies whose traditional clientele has
more generic interests may have a difficult time
selling the partnership’s product.
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Small-scale artesanal wood processing
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Shifting the approach to financing SNRM
Until the 1980s the traditional approach to
financing SNRM could be described in relation to
the three basic types of NRM, as depicted in
figure 4. At one extreme, strict natural resources
conservation was viewed as a public good, usually
a national public good, dependent on government
resources for its financing. At the other extreme,
sustainable agriculture practices were supposed
to lead to larger harvests and increases in
farmers’ income; therefore farmers were expected
to pay a significant part of the SNRM costs. This
approach has produced some win-win stories of
protected areas adequately budgeted from public
money, and successful farmers practicing sustain-
able agriculture.
However, there are also many cases in which
national budgets for conservation are far below
corresponding needs, and many sustainable agri-
culture initiatives that fail because they do not
deliver enough profits to make them an attractive
option for the local population (see Gutman 2001).
For this and other reasons, the last 15 years have
witnessed a reduction of differences in
the financing approaches for these three
SNRM archetypes. On the one hand,
protected areas are increasingly
marketing their services and trying to
retain for their own budgets at least part
of what users are willing to pay
(entrance and users fees, tourism
charges, environmental service
charges). On the other hand, SNRM
programs in buffer zones and farming
areas are increasingly aware of the
potential of new markets for green prod-
ucts and environmental services that
used to go unnoticed and unpaid
(ecotourism, wildlife conservancies,
water and forest conservation). All of
this entails new opportunities for
financing SNRM but also requires more
efforts devoted to designing more complex proj-
ects and financing arrangements.
New financing instruments
The discussion in the previous chapters shows
that a substantial number of new financing instru-
ments for SNRM have been introduced and tried
since the early 1990s. These financing options
have many different origins. They range from
international agreements to pay for the protection
of the global commons (e.g., GEF) or to condone
debt in exchange of poverty alleviation programs
(the heavily indebted poor country initiative,
HIPC) to country-level earmarking of taxes to pay
for conservation programs (e.g., Costa Rica’s oil
tax); and from not-for-profit initiatives (environ-
mental funds) to market-based approaches (e.g.,
markets for green coffee or certified wood prod-
ucts). They also entail new forms of private-public
and private sector–community partnerships. 
Some critics have dismissed these new financing
options as being a mere name change. What is
the difference, they argue, among Brazil’s ICMS
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
4 .  F INANCING FOR SNRM: FROM GOODWILL TO
PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
by Pablo Gutman
FIGURE 4. THE TRADITIONAL FINANCING
APPROACH TO SNRM
Farming Area Buffer area Strictly
protected
area
More “grant type” financing
(grants, charity, etc.)
More “reimbursable” Financing
(credit, savings marketing, etc.)
Less public good character More public good character
Ecológico, Costa Rica’s tax funded PES scheme,
and traditional public transfers? Does it make any
difference if we called it foreign aid or payments
for the global commons? We submit that it makes
a great difference—the difference between a gift
and a right; between goodwill and payments for
environmental products and services. 
There is a long way to go and we still need both
goodwill money and payments for environmental
products and services, but there is a significant
trend at work toward a broader acknowledgement
of the many environmental products and services
that result from SNRM. This is a process that
simultaneously increases our awareness of the
services that the environment provides, our
responsibility to care for them, and the rights of
those who act as stewards of the environment to
be duly compensated. 
Less money
Even if there are more financing options, the
harsh truth is that throughout the 1990s there
has been a significant reduction in the flows of
world investment for rural development, natural
resource management, and environmental conser-
vation in developing countries.  This trend has
been reported in several recent World Bank
reviews. For instance, the annual World Bank
lending for agriculture, which was on average
$6.8 billion in the early 1980s, plummeted to an
annual average of $2.5 billion in the late 1990s.19
A similar dismal trend regarding expenditures in
forest management by African governments and
donors is reported in the FAO's recent (2003)
State of the World Forests. 
To some extent this decline accompanies the
decline in overall foreign aid, and the reduction of
government budgets in developing countries. But
investment in SNRM has plummeted deeper than
the average for several reasons, among them
donors' fatigue with the real or perceived lack of
success of many rural development projects, and
a shift in the international interest from the 1980s’
focus on sustainable development to the late-
1990s’ focus on poverty reduction and HIV/AIDS.
Environmental conservation and social develop-
ment do go together, but the international
community seems able to address only a limited
number of issues at a time.
Financing conservation, rural poverty
alleviation, or both?
Do we have to choose between rural poverty alle-
viation and sustainable natural resource manage-
ment?  Some people seem to think so. On the
rural development and poverty alleviation side,
SNRM is at times dismissed as an extra cost with
low returns, or a desirable goal but with low
priority compared to rural poverty alleviation
needs such as, health, education, infrastructure,
water and sanitation, etc.20 From the conservation
side, some have given up on the integrated conser-
vation and development projects (ICDP) concept
of the 1970s, arguing that it costs too much and
delivers too little in terms of conservation. Their
solution is that money should be given up-front to
whoever is able to provide conservation.21
There is some truth in these arguments. Given
few natural resources and a lot of people, much
more than SNRM will be needed to reduce rural
poverty (although conserving the scarce natural
resources available may still be a priority). Where
there are abundant natural resources and few
people, gazetting new protected areas and making
them off-limits to the local population may aid in
conserving biodiversity (although it may raise
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19. From figure 3 in the 2003 World Bank Operation Evaluation Department Precis
bulletin No. 232. See other examples of the same trend in the World Bank's
2002 Rural Development Strategy and its 2001 Review of the Bank’s
Performance on the Environment.
20. A good example is the lack of consideration given to environmental and natural
resource issues in the poverty alleviation literature and plans of the last decade.
As noted in our Summary above, for instance, the World Bank's 2000/2001
World Development Report, "Attacking Poverty" does not include the terms
"natural resources" or the "environment" in its table of contents. 
21. Among the academic supporters of this approach are Ferraro (2001) and
Hardner and Rice (2002). Conservation International (CI) and The Nature
Conservancy have tried it in several Latin American countries. See, for
example, the Noel Kempff Climate Action Plan (Bolivia) case study in
chapter 6. 
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ethical and equity concerns).  However, these
extreme situations are the exceptions, not the
rule. In most cases the rural areas of developing
countries are home to valuable environments and
large numbers of rural poor. There, the tenet of
sustainable natural resource management—that
is, the advantage of integrating environmental
conservation and poverty alleviation—holds true. 
To some extent the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG), which have been at the center of
recent international development discussions,
acknowledge these links between poverty and the
environment: the list of goals begins with eradi-
cating poverty and ends with ensuring environ-
mental sustainability. Actually, while links and
opportunities for positive reinforcement between
poverty eradication and several other goals in the
MDG list are well established, the truth is that
development agencies, governments, and NGOs
are still at odds in terms of the best way of inte-
grating poverty eradication and environmental
sustainability.22
Keeping the rural development focus on inte-
grating rural poverty alleviation and natural
resources conservation will surely require all the
ingenuity of SNRM practitioners and a lot of
multitasking: first, to design NRM projects that
balance short-term poverty reduction needs with
long-term sustainability of natural resources;
second, to convince advocates of one or the other
that there are opportunities to jointly foster both;
and last but not least, to explore financing
arrangements that have a good chance of being
sustainable and accessible to the rural poor.
Box 1 in our Summary (p. 11) suggests some
common-sense principles to help in this
endeavor.23
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
22. Among recent calls to integrate poverty alleviation and environmental conserva-
tion, see the declarations of the Poverty-Environment Partnership, a network of
donor agencies that includes, among others United Kingdom’s DFID, the
European Union, UNDP, and the World Bank.
23. In a complementary approach, the participants in Danida’s Working Group on
Sustainable Financing have put together a list of "Guiding Questions" (available
from Ole Meretz [om@serverl.gogr.ku.dk] or Karsten Raae [info@
dfextension.dk]).
Farmer woman presenting her produce on the market during Master Farmer's
agricultural day in South Africa.
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SECTION 2.
F INANCING ALTERNATIVES:
A DESCRIPTION 
Box 6 shows the 52 financing options discussed in
chapter 3, which are described in this chapter in
more detail and grouped under 15 description
cards.24 For each group of related financing
options the description card offers a short expla-
nation of their main features, rates their suitability
in regard to 11 SNRM concerns, and suggests
where to go for (a) the money, (b) country
examples, and (c) more information.25
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
CHAPTER 5.  F INANCING ALTERNATIVES:  
THE DESCRIPTION CARDS (DCs)
by Pablo Gutman
1. Public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs
(DC 1)
2. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one
or more general taxes collected at the national, state,
or local level (DC 1)
3. Special laws delivering extra-budgetary financial
support to particular social groups, geographical
areas, or activities. (DC 1)
4. Tax breaks or subsidies for SNRM activities (DC 1)
5. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one
or more selective taxes collected at the national,
state, or local level. (e.g., taxes on alcohol, tobacco,
energy, airports, ports, cruise ships, hotel and
resorts charges, and others) (DC 2)
6. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one
or more charges, fees, fines, and penalties related to
the use (or abuse) of natural resources (e.g., water
charges, groundwater charges, stumpage fees, and
other natural resources extraction fees; hunting fees,
entrance and user fees in protected areas; charges
for emissions and feedstock, release or dumping of
fertilizers, pesticides, solid wastes, toxic wastes; and
environmental fines and penalties; etc.) (DC 2)
7. National, state, and local development banks’ loans
(DC 3)
8. Debt-for-nature swaps (DC 4)
9. Environmental funds (endowment, sinking, and
revolving) (DC 4)
10. Multilateral aid and development agencies (DC 5)
11. International development banks’ loans (DC 3)
12. Bilateral aid and development agencies (DC 5)
13. Community self-support groups and other forms of
social capital (DC 7)
14. Secular and faith-based charities (DC 7)
15. Special fundraising campaigns (e.g., “Save the
pandas,” “Friends of the national park,” etc.) (DC 8)
16. Merchandising and good cause marketing (DC 8)
17. Lotteries (DC 8)
18. Social and environmental NGOs (DC 9)
19. Foundations (DC 9)
20. Household saving and labor assets (DC 10)
21. Community-based enterprises, formal (co-ops) and
informal (DC 10)
22. Micro-saving, micro-credit, and micro insurance (DC
10)
23. Semiformal and informal micro-finance institutions
(DC 10)
24. Private investment by local businesses (DC 10)
25. Commercial banks' loans (DC 3)
BOX 6. LIST OF FINANCING OPTIONS AND WHERE TO FIND THEM 
IN THE DESCRIPTION CARDS
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24. To avoid repetition, each description card groups several similar financing
options. The ID numbers in the description cards are the same as the numbers
on the checklist in chapter one. 
25. A number of good guides to financing for conservation and environmental proj-
ects have appeared recently, for example, Kloss (2002), The Conservation
Finance Alliance (2002), and EPA (1999). We have tried to avoid duplication of
this literature and throughout these description cards the reader will be
referred several times to these and similar guides (see a detailed list in
chapter 7). 
64 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
26. Direct investment by nonlocal investors (e.g., in eco-
tourism, sustainable forestry, etc.) (DC 11)
27. Private-public partnerships (DC 11)
28. Private sector–community partnerships (DC 11)
29. Compensatory environmental investment of large
developments (DC 11)
30. Venture capital (DC 11)
31. Portfolio investors (green funds) (DC 11)
32. Markets for organic, agricultural products (DC 12)
33. Markets for sustainably harvested non-timber forest
products (DC 12)
34. Markets for certified forest products (DC 12)
35. Markets for certified fishery products (DC 12)
36. Resource extraction charges directly collected by the
SNRM project (DC 14)
37. Allocating part of national, state, or local extraction
fees to SNRM projects in the extraction areas
(DC 14)
38. Markets for biodiversity conservation and
bioprospecting (DC 13)
39. Markets for carbon offsets (DC 13)
40. Markets for watershed protection (DC 13)
41. Markets for landscape beauty, including ecotourism
and tourism (DC 13)
42. Markets for development rights and conservation
easements (DC 13)
43. Quasi-markets and non-market systems of payments
for environmental services (DC 13)
44. User fees, entry fees directly collected by the SNRM
project  (DC 14)
45. Allocating part of national, state, or local user fees to
SNRM projects in the area providing the environ-
mental services (DC 14) 
46. GEF payments for the global commons (DC 15)
47. Funds for SNRM associated with international treaties
(DC 15)
48. Other possible systems of international payments for
global commons (DC 15)
49. Earmarking for SNRM part of one or more interna-
tional taxes (DC 15)
50. Freeing up existing public resources (e.g., redirecting
money from harmful public subsidies to SNRM
projects) (DC 6)
51. Encouraging the mobilization of private resources
(e.g., securing tenure, promotion, regulation stream-
lining) (DC 6)
52. Mechanisms to increase the accessibility to and
reduce the need for and cost of financing (pooling,
insurance, guarantees, leverage, charrettes, financial
literacy training) (DC 6)
BOX 6. LIST OF FINANCING OPTIONS AND WHERE TO FIND THEM 
IN THE DESCRIPTION CARDS (cont’d.)
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DESCRIPTION CARD 1
1. Public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs 
2. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more general taxes 
collected at the national, state, or local level 
3. Special laws to delivering extra-budgetary financial support to particular social groups, 
geographical areas, or activities
4. Tax breaks or subsidies for SNRM activities
Public money is the largest source of financing
for SNRM around the world, and probably will
remain so for a long time. The four alternatives
listed above are transfer payments, in that bene-
ficiaries are not expected to reimburse the
money they receive. The alternatives differ
mostly in the time frame and predictability of
the funding they provide. 
Public budgets are negotiated annually; hence
there is uncertainty regarding the amount, and
period for which the financing will be available.
Earmarking part of one or more general taxes
such as corporate taxes, income taxes, property
taxes, sale taxes, value-added tax (VAT), real
state taxes, and others, may be more difficult to
achieve but increases significantly long-term
funding prospects. Still the amount of yearly
funding available will vary with the amount of
the tax collected. 
Special laws delivering financial support to
particular SNRM programs usually specify the
amount of financing and the period for which it
will be available.  One drawback is that most of
these laws are enacted for a limited period of
time. Tax breaks or subsidies for SNRM work
similarly to a budgetary support or a special law,
but because they are specifically targeted to
support SNRM activities they may be easier to
negotiate.
• Available at what level? Mostly national or
state level. Local governments in most devel-
oping countries have little tax authority. 
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? To middle-income developing coun-
tries. Least-developed countries usually have
little budgetary leeway and a small tax base
(e.g., one cannot offer tax breaks to those
who pay no taxes).
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas. 1 and 2 are used for all of
them; 3 and 4 are more commonly used in
rural production and buffer zones. 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Rural communities / landless
rural poor / peasants and small farmers /
large commercial farmers / local businesses
/ national-scale firms / government agen-
cies / international corporations.  Usually
government agencies play an important role.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up: From low
to high, see below under “Where to go.”
• Need for government facilitation: High.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low to high. Vying for public
money usually requires a lot of lobbying ,
but see below under “Where to go.”
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium. 
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium. 
(continued)
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DESCRIPTION CARD 1 (cont’d.)
• Transaction costs: from low to high, see
below under “Where to go.”
Where to go for the money: If the budget or
the tax funds earmarked for SNRM financing
are already in place early in the project design,
the project developers should contact the
agency responsible for the allocation of those
resources (e.g., department of agriculture, envi-
ronmental agency, ministry of natural
resources, etc.) to check the conditions to
qualify for financing and to make the case for
the particular project. If the budget line is not
there, the project developers can still engage in
a discussion with the responsible agencies to
try to include the project’s financing needs in
future budgets. The timeframe is completely
different if the tax laws are there but no
earmarking for financing SNRM programs is in
place, or worse if the tax laws are not there.
Passing new tax legislation requires a lot of
lobbying and engaging the legislative branch of
government, and it is a multiyear process. It is a
full program in itself, one that may be worth
pursuing on its own, but surely it will not be
available to finance next year’s SNRM project.
Where to go for country examples: Almost
every country has some public budget for
SNRM financing, usually administered by the
national or state agencies in charge of rural or
environmental issues. (See the case of Trinidad
and Tobago in Conservation Finance Alliance
[2002]). Earmarking for environmental
purposes small percentages of a variety of local
and state taxes, including sales taxes, personal
income, and property taxes is a common
practice among U.S. states and European
countries. Brazil’s “ICMS Ecológico” has been
widely cited as a case of distributing tax
revenues according to environmental criteria.
Thus far, it is an initiative in 10 states, where a
portion of the state collected VAT is distributed
to municipalities according to an environmental
index.  (See case study 3 in chapter 6.)
Where to go for more information:
Information on public budget allocation for
SNRM with the details required to make it
useful to project developers is in most cases
available only in-country. When it reaches inter-
national publications it is too aggregated to be
of much use. See, for example, the report by
ECLAC-UNDP (2002) on financing for sustain-
able development in Latin America; see also an
aggregate picture in McNeely (1999) and
Pagiola et al. (2002). The EPA's “Guidebook of
Financial Tools” (1999) discusses in detail tax
earmarking for environmental purposes in the
United States that, all differences accounted for,
still may be of interest to developing countries'
practitioners. 
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DESCRIPTION CARD 2
5. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more selective taxes collected at the
national, state, or local level
6. Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more charges, fees, fines, and penalties
related to the use (or abuse) of natural resources
For many years selective taxes have been in
place in most countries because they are easy to
collect (custom taxes, oil and mining taxes), or
they are easy to justify as a tax on social “sins”
(alcohol and tobacco taxes), or a tax on the rich
(airport, cars, luxury goods taxes). Selective
taxes may also have a special appeal to less-
developed countries, in that they can target the
wealth that exists even in the poorest countries.
They may even target foreigners (taxes on
airports, hotels, cruse ships, rental cars, foreign
corporations, luxury goods, tourist taxes). From
an environmental perspective, it is doubly
appealing to enforce selective taxes on activities
that harm the environment, such as dirty
energy or hazardous products and waste (green
taxes). First, by increasing the cost of the
activity in question the tax will promote a
reduction on its use and second, it can
represent a source of funds to invest in environ-
mental goods.
Earmarking a percentage of these special taxes
to invest in development or conservation is a
widespread practice. A stronger case can be
made regarding earmarking for SNRM
financing a percentage of one or more fees,
fines, and penalties related to the use (or abuse)
of natural resources and actually, in many cases,
these fines, fees, and penalties have been
enacted specifically with the purpose of
financing the management of the natural
resource in question. There are many of these
types of fees: water charges, groundwater
charges, minerals and oil extraction fees,
stumpage fees, and other natural resource
extraction fees; hunting fees, entrance and user
fees in protected areas; emission charges;
feedstock charges; and charges on fertilizers,
pesticide, solid wastes, and toxic wastes. 
Specific taxes and charges for natural resources
may also have drawbacks that need to be
addressed.  First, taxes and charges on natural
resources may negatively impact the rural and
urban poor whose livelihood depends on free or
low-cost access to natural resources.  Second,
although most charges for natural resources
use are considered low, there are also examples
of cash-thirsty national or local governments
that, through overcharging, have chased away
the golden goose. 
• Available at what level? National, state, and
local.  In many cases decentralization
processes have given local governments the
right to tax and charge for natural resource
extraction. 
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All types.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas. 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Rural communities / landless
rural poor / peasants and small farmers /
large commercial farmers / local businesses
/ national-scale firms government agencies
/ international corporations.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up? From low
to high, see below under “Where to go.”
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• Need for government facilitation: high.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: low to high. Vying for public
moneys usually requires a lot of lobbying,
but see below under “Where to go.”
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
medium. 
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: medium, but see caveat above.
• Transaction costs: from low to high, see
below under “Where to go.”
Where to go for the money: If the selective
tax or the charges and fees are in place and
portions of them are already earmarked for
SNRM financing, the project developers should
contact the agency responsible for the allocation
of those resources early on (e.g., department of
agriculture, environmental agency, ministry of
natural resources, etc.) to check the conditions
to qualify for financing and to make the case for
the particular project. The timeframe is
completely different if the selective tax laws are
there but no earmarking for financing SNRM
programs is in place, or worse, if the tax laws or
charge systems are not there. Passing new tax
legislation requires a lot of lobbying, engaging
the legislative branch of government, and it is a
multiyear process. It is a full program in itself,
and one that may be worth pursuing on its own,
but practitioners should not count it among the
possible financing sources for next year’s SNRM
project. This may apply also when trying to
enact new charges and fees for natural
resources or trying to earmark a portion of the
existing ones for SNRM financing, but in many
countries levying charges and fees is an admin-
istrative decision that does not require a new
law; therefore it may be easier to pursue.
Where to go for country examples: Some
variety of specific taxes, and charges, fees, and
fines for natural resource use and abuse are in
place in most countries, although experts agree
that in most cases charges and fees for
renewable natural resource use are below what
they should be. Information regarding
earmarking is more fragmentary. A well known
case is Costa Rica’s FONAFIFO (National Fund
for Forest Financing), which receives one-third
of the country’s fuel sales tax. See also the
Quito water payments system in Conservation
Finance Alliance Guide (2002), and the Niger
fuel taxes in Richards (1999).
Where to go for more information: The
detailed information required by a project
developer looking for financing is only available
in-country.  On the other hand, there are many
references available about tax earmarking in
general. OECDs Environmental Financial
Strategy (2002) gives many leads for developing
countries, and the OECD Environmental
Directorate has published a great deal about
charges, fees, and specific taxes in OECD
country members. The EPA's “Guidebook of
Financial Tools” (1999) has a detailed discus-
sion of U.S. experiences in earmarking specific
taxes, charges, and fees at local and state levels
for environmental purposes.  FONAFIFO's Web
site, http://www.go.cr/fs/sa.html (in Spanish)
has the updated information on Costa Rica’s
experience, which is also reviewed in chapter 3
of Pagiola et al. (2002).
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7. National, state, and local development banks' loans
11. International development banks' loans
25. Commercial banks' loans
Commercial bank loans have thus far played a
limited role in financing SNRM projects in
developing countries.  Both banks and would-be
borrowers have been wary that the high risks
and long maturing periods of SNRM projects
make them unfit for commercial bank loans. Yet
there are examples in which commercial banks
have participated in financing SNRM projects,
as intermediaries to disburse public moneys and
also as co-lenders or lenders where collateral,
government warranty schemes, and pulling
money from several sources all reduce the risks
both for lenders and borrowers. By contrast,
development banks, both national or interna-
tional, are a more active source of SNRM
financing, owing to their special focus on devel-
opment lending, long-term loans, and lower
interest rates. 
In middle-income and large developing
countries, national, state, and local development
banks are a major source of financing. For
instance, in several years during the 1990s the
annual money loaned by Brazil’s development
banks surpassed the money loaned worldwide
by the World Bank. International development
banks play a more important role for low-
income developing countries. The major players
here are the World Bank, and the four continent-
wide banks, IDB in Latin America, ADB in Asia,
AFD in Africa, and EBRD in Europe. There are
also some 30 regional development banks that
lend to smaller groups of countries.
Traditionally international and regional develop-
ment banks lend only to governments to invest
in specific projects and programs.  Recently
there has been a move among these banks to
lend for sectoral or budgetary support and also
to lend directly to private businesses.
• Available at what level?: National, state, and
local but in many cases requires going
through the national headquarters, or
government department in charge of the
loan program.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? In-country development banking is
more important in middle-income and large
countries. International and regional banks
are more important to low-income and less-
developed countries.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?  To
the extent that loans must be repaid from
the project revenues they may appeal more
to rural production and buffer zone projects.
But in many cases the government pays
back the loans out of its regular budget. In
such cases, this is not a loan but a budg-
etary transfer from the point of view of the
SNRM project (see Description card 1). 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Rural communities / landless
rural poor / peasants and small farmers /
large commercial farmers / local businesses
/ national-scale firms / government agen-
cies / international corporations.
Government agencies are involved in most
cases.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up? From low
to medium. 
• Need for government facilitation: High if
loan comes through a government agency.
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• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium. 
• Potential in terms of  rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium. 
• Transaction costs: Low. 
Where to go for the money: Procedures to
borrow from in-country public and commercial
banks vary from bank to bank. Usually the staff
of public agencies that work in rural develop-
ment and conservation are aware of opportuni-
ties to obtain financing from public or
commercial banks, but project developers may
want to check directly with the banks' Web sites
or offices. Most international development
banks have a well-developed Web presence and
offices in many developing countries.  Most of
the money from international development
banks is channeled through the government,
and the staff of public agencies that work in
rural development and conservation are aware
of existing credit lines. But the staff of govern-
ment agencies may be unaware of the many
small funds and grants that are disbursed by
international development banks directly to
local undertakings, so going directly to the
sources may improve the outcome. 
Where to go for country examples: Lenders
are more outspoken than borrowers, and the
Web sites and bookshops of international devel-
opment banks are the best place to find country
examples including information on ongoing
projects.  An interesting developing-country
experience with commercial banks' lending for
SNRM is Brazil’s “Green Protocol.” (A descrip-
tion may be found in Bayon et al 2002).
Where to go for more information: There is
no single source of information. The Web sites
of the large international development banks
are good points of reference (www.worldbank.
org; www.iadb.org; www.adb.org; www.afd.org).
Information on country-level public and private
banks should be searched locally, but may be
difficult to find, since in most developing
countries, banks, be they public or private, have
little public relations tradition.
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8. Debt-for-nature swaps
9. Environmental funds (endowment, sinking, and revolving)
Debt-for-nature swaps have been extensively
used since the 1980s, particularly in Latin
America. They entail redeeming a portion of a
government’s external debt in exchange for the
developing country’s government using an
equivalent amount of local currency to finance
SNRM projects, usually through an environ-
mental fund.  They may be government-driven
initiatives; for example, the U.S. government
has several of these initiatives for Latin
American countries and in tropical forest
countries. More commonly, debt-for-nature
swaps have been pursued by international
NGOs that either act as a broker among the
several participants—creditor country, debtor
country, local NGOs—or directly pay a portion
of a developing country’s external debt in
exchange for the country investing in SNRM.
Debt-for-nature swaps amounted to approxi-
mately 1 billion dollars by early 2000 (see Kloss
2002) and although this is a fairly small amount
when compared with developing countries’
foreign debt, it still is significant in terms of
SNRM project financing. The ongoing interna-
tional negotiations to cancel the external debt of
a group of approximately 40 highly indebted
poor countries (HIPCs) opens an opportunity to
further promote debt-for-nature agreements.
There is a large variety of Environmental Funds
(EFs) around the world. They may get their
money as a lump sum initial endowment, have
some ongoing sources of income (e.g.,
earmarked taxes, charge fees, fines, etc.), or a
combination of both. EFs include:
• Large public or public-private EFs, investing
in many types of projects and programs, as
is the case with many national EFs in
Eastern European countries.
• Small, single-purpose EFs, devoted to
financing one SNRM project. 
• Endowment funds, where only the income
from the capital may be used. 
• Revolving funds where all the money in the
fund is used in the form of loans that will
eventually be collected and available for a
next cycle of financing. 
• Sinking funds, to be entirely used up in a
designated period of time. 
Money for EFs can come from country sources,
bilateral donors, international NGOs, interna-
tional agencies (e.g., GEF has contributed to
several EFs), debt-for-nature swaps, and more.
Some international agencies such as the
International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) and the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF) are a type of inter-
national fund. The former finances rural devel-
opment projects including SNRM, and the latter
is mandated to finance environmental projects.
Both of these funds get their resources from
periodical contributions from rich countries.
• Available at what level? Debt-for-nature
swaps are an international financing alterna-
tive. EFs are usually national or local, but
they may get funds from international
sources.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All, but there are more opportuni-
ties for swaps in less-developed countries
and more opportunities of in-country EFs in
middle-income or large developing countries
that have more resources available.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas.
(continued)
72 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
DESCRIPTION CARD 4 (cont’d.)
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Since EFs and swap-based
schemes usually give grants, they are
expected to do so to the benefit of the
worse-off.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up? 
Medium to high.
• Need for government facilitation: High 
in swaps, low to medium in EFs.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: High in swaps, medium to 
high in EFs. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium. 
• Potential in terms of  rural poverty 
alleviation: Medium. 
• Transaction costs: Medium to high. 
Where to go for the money: SNRM project
developers should inquire whether or not the
project qualifies for financing from an ongoing
or soon-to-be debt-for-nature swap, EFs in the
country in question, or an international fund
(e.g., IFAD, GEF). But if debt-for-nature swaps
or EFs do not already exist, it may be possible
to build them up as part of the SNRM project.
There are good examples and there is sufficient
expertise to refer to when engaging in a discus-
sion of the pros, cons, and methods (see below). 
Where to go for country examples: In the
next chapter we discuss two cases of environ-
mental funds (Uganda and South Africa), but
many more are available at the Interagency
Planning Group on Environmental Funds
(http://www.biodiversityeconomics.org/pdf/
topics-222-00.pdf). See also the Conservation
Finance Alliance Guide (2002) at www.
conservationfinance.org.  Several cases of debt-
for-nature swaps are presented in Quintela et al
(2002) and in Kloss (2002).
Where to go for more information: Two
international NGOs with headquarters in the
United States, The Nature Conservancy and
Conservation International (CI) have been very
active brokering debt-for-nature operations, and
their Web sites are a good point of entrance
(www.tnc.org; www.ic.org). WWF has pioneered
the establishment of EFs (www.panda.org). See
also the the Conservation Finance Alliance
Guide (2002) (www.conservationfinance.org)
and the Web site of the Planning Group on
Environmental Funds mentioned above.
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10. Multilateral aid and development agencies
12. Bilateral aid and development agencies
Multilateral and bilateral sources of nonreim-
bursable financing are known, in the interna-
tional policy parlance, as Official Development
Assistance (ODA). As if to complicate things,
many statistics also count loans from the
International Development Agency (operated by
the World Bank) and other soft credit lines as
ODA. In regard to loans or credits, even the
softest of them eventually must be repaid, so it
is better to think of them as loans (as discussed
in chapter 3). 
Most multilateral aid and development agencies
are part of the UN family. UNDP is UN’s overall
development agency, whereas FAO and IFAD
focus on agriculture and UNEP on the environ-
ment. IFAD has resources to grant but that is not
the case with UNDP, FAO, and UNEP, which are
usually low on funds (UNDP sometimes manages
third-party resources). The GEF and other inter-
national treaties that provide funds for environ-
mental projects are also multilateral sources of
financing (and are discussed in DC 15). 
Although rich countries do fund multilateral
agencies, they channel most of their interna-
tional aid and development grants through their
own development agencies—usually located at
their foreign affairs ministry—on a bilateral,
country-by-country basis. Bilateral aid is a
significant source of resources in less-developed
and small countries where it may represent a
substantial percentage of the public investment
capacity. There is a sort of division of labor
among donor countries with some focusing on a
particular group of countries, or a particular
group of activities to be supported. There is also
some coordination through periodical country
donor meetings (in many cases chaired by the
UNDP country office). There are different
kinds and number of strings attached to
bilateral aid that may make it more or less
attractive to a particular SNRM project (e.g.,
money only to buy in the donor country). Apart
from its member-country aid agencies the
European Union has its own aid program.
As another sort of international donor we may
include public or semipublic international insti-
tutions or networks, such as the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR), which do not provide money but can
be an important source of technical advice for
an SNRM initiative.
• Available at what level? All the above are
international sources of grant money.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? Multilateral development aid is
unevenly distributed among developing
countries. Small, rich countries tend to
spend their bilateral aid in the least-devel-
oped countries (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa).
Large, rich countries tend to use their bilat-
eral aid as part of their foreign policy
agenda: the United Kingdom favors the
Commonwealth, France the French-
speaking countries, the United States the
hot spots of its foreign policy, and so on.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas. 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  International and bilateral aid
purports to get to the poor but usually local
and foreign providers and governmental
agencies claim part of it.
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• Degree of difficulty in starting up? From low
to medium. 
• Need for government facilitation: Low if aid
can be directly disbursed to local stake-
holders, medium to high if it needs to go
through the recipient country's government. 
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low to medium.
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium. 
• Potential in terms of  rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium. 
• Transaction costs: Low. 
Where to go for the money: All multilateral
and bilateral donors have well-developed
Internet resources that may provide initial infor-
mation regarding funding availability and proce-
dures to submit proposals. UNDP country
offices are a good entry point for checking the
availability of financing from multilateral aid
programs for your country and type of project.
Other UN agencies usually have regional offices
or representatives affiliated with the UNDP
country office, or staff assigned to ongoing
regional projects. Most donor countries'
embassies have personnel to handle queries
about their country aid programs. Large donors
may also have offices of their aid agency in
recipient countries (e.g., USAID offices). Project
developers may contact the head offices of all
the above, but increasingly, project level funding
decisions are delegated to the country offices. 
Where to go for country examples: Several
of the cases presented in the next chapter have
been partially financed by multilateral or
bilateral donors. Many more examples can be
found on multilateral and bilateral donor Web
sites. 
Where to go for more information: The best
overall analysis and information regarding
Official Development Assistance, both bilateral
and multilateral, comes from the OECD
Development Assistance Committee and can be
found at www.oecd.org/dac.  But OECD/DAC
information and analysis are at the country or
sector level, so they may be of little assistance
in looking for project-level financing informa-
tion. For the latter, is best to go to the Web site
of each individual donor. A complete list of
addresses can be found on the GEF Web site at
http://www.gefweb.org/. 
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50. Freeing up existing public resources
51. Encouraging the mobilization of private resources
52. Mechanisms to increase the accessibility to and reduce the need for and cost of financing
Freeing up existing resources and redirecting
them to better uses may be an important source
of government money for SNRM. Some have
called this and similar saving and redirection
schemes “zero financing” opportunities.
Pundits have focused on the potential of elimi-
nating harmful subsides, such as energy and
agricultural input and output subsidies. They
argue that these subsidies have little social
benefit and encourage natural resources
misuses.  Unfortunately eliminating existing
subsidies is not a simple task. What looks like a
waste of money to many, surely does not look
that way to its beneficiaries. To complicate the
issue, the beneficiaries of the subsidies and the
would-be beneficiaries of the subsidies’ elimina-
tion may even be in different countries (e.g., the
farmers in Europe, the United States, and Japan,
and the farmers of developing countries).  
Another avenue for reducing financing needs
rests with measures to encourage the mobiliza-
tion of private resources. For example,
regarding SNRM projects, there is a large body
of evidence supporting the fact that clarifying
and securing participants’ rights to natural
resources will increase their willingness to
invest their own time and savings in the
resources' sustainable management, hence
reducing the needs for external financing. The
range of possible systems is wide—from indi-
vidual ownership of agricultural plots to
communal ownership of pastures and forest
areas, to rights to use, harvest, or collect wild
species in buffer zones and protected areas, etc.
These rights to natural resources can be what
the local community brings to a partnership
with external sources of capital, or may be used
as collateral to a loan reducing the cost of
borrowing. 
Finally, there is a large array of instruments to
reduce the cost of and increase the accessibility
to financing—among them pooling financing,
which consists of combining several projects in
the search for financing. The benefits of pooling
include the following: (a) the presence of more
profitable components may facilitate the
financing of the less profitable ones, (b) it
reduces transaction costs, (c) it gives access to
financing sources for which each individual
project may not qualify, and (d) it increases visi-
bility and public relation outreach. 
Private or public insurance or guaranteed
schemes reduce the cost of borrowing, increase
the availability of loans, and may also attract
investors. They are widely used in private busi-
nesses and international lending but thus far
have been little used in SNRM projects. 
Leveraging has a kind of “domino effect” on
project financing—if the project obtains
financing from x, z will be more willing to
finance the project. Leveraging may be formal
or informal, with the latter being a little
confusing for the project developer since it is
not always clear who is leveraging whom. In any
case, leveraging is a standard in SNRM
financing in that few financial sources want to
participate alone. 
According to EPA’s “Guidebook of Financial
Tools” (1999), a charrette is a forum where
agencies or project developers meet finance
experts from the public and private sectors to
request advice on financing issues. Public sector
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participants may come from national or state
agencies involved in the project.  Private sector
experts may come from business and industry,
banks and other financial institutions, and the
consulting firms. Typically, a charrette lasts a
half-day beginning with a description of the
project’s financing needs, followed by questions
and answers and recommendations by partici-
pant experts as individuals and/or as a group.
The proceedings are taped and the results are
summarized.
Finally increasing financial literacy, financial
training of project developers, and financial
advice from experts will usually result in better
financing arrangements for SNRM projects, and
there are many ways formal and informal, to
pursue it (see below and also chapter 7,
“Accessing references and resources”). 
• Available at what level?  Freeing public
resources and encouraging the mobilization
of private resources is mostly a national
government endeavor, but the same
approach can be useful at state and local
levels and the conceptual approach may
even be useful to audit nongovernment insti-
tutions. Mechanisms to increase accessi-
bility and reduce the need for and cost of
financing are available at all levels, but may
be more significant at the project or
program level.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All types. 
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas.
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands. 
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant? All types.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up?  Low
(Mechanisms to increase….) to high
(Freeing up public resources…). 
• Need for government facilitation: Low
(Mechanisms to increase….) to high
(Freeing up public resources…). 
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Medium to high. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium to high.
• Potential in terms of  rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium to high.
• Transaction costs: Low (Mechanisms to
increase….) to high (Freeing up public
resources…). 
Where to go for the money: These alterna-
tives are not about new money but about how to
access (or how to better access) existing money.
Where to go for country examples and for
more information and support: Pagiola et al.
(2002) give some examples of recent reductions
in energy and water subsidies in several devel-
oping countries (and more can be found on the
World Bank's Web site). Unfortunately there is
no indication that the freed money went to
support SNRM initiatives (actually there is no
indication where it went). EPA’s “Guidebook of
Financial Tools” (2002) (www.epa.gov/efinpage/
guidebk) is a good source of examples on how
to save on financing needs. To increase SNRM
financing literacy refer to the Training Guide of
the Conservation Finance Alliance at
www.conservationfinance.org. Other guide-
books and Web resources listed in chapter 7
offer detailed financing guidelines, in some
cases even providing the spreadsheets for the
number-crunching of a financial plan. SNRM
practitioners looking for accessible advice may
find it in nearby universities’ business schools
that usually have free consultation programs, or
with international rural development and
conservation agencies and NGOs.
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13. Community self-support groups and other forms of social capital
14. Secular and faith-based charities 
Community self-support groups and local
secular and faith-based charities may be a
source of money and in-kind financing for an
SNRM project. Even if these contributions are
small they may be crucial in that they will
increase the local community’s buying-in and
ownership of the SNRM project. 
From a broader perspective, community self-
support groups and local secular and faith-based
charities are just two of the many possible
expressions of a community’s social capital. A
community’s social capital encompasses all
types of local organizations that increase the
community’s capacity to discuss, agree on, and
implement shared goals, as well as its capacity
to campaign for its goals and to leverage
support and resources.  Social capital is an
important component in most SNRM projects
because, in many cases, a natural resource
management project will involve the manage-
ment of common resources (a local forest, a
watershed, a conservation area). Hence, SNRM
projects usually require community-level
decisions regarding land uses, natural resource
management practices, and so on. In turn, these
decisions require community-level discussions,
agreements, and actions. In addition, most rural
development or conservation projects need to
leverage external resources, and here again a
high level of social organization can increase the
visibility and appeal of the SNRM project among
potential funders.
• Available at what level?  Mostly local level
(but in some cases there are national federa-
tions of local organizations).
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All types. 
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas.
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands. 
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Rural communities, landless
rural poor peasants, and small farmers. 
• Degree of difficulty in starting up?  Low to
medium. 
• Need for government facilitation: Low.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium. 
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium.
• Transaction costs: Low. 
Where to go for the money: The investment
of community resources needs to be brokered
as part of the consultations with the local project
participants. Secular and faith-based charities
may already be established in the community or
the SNRM promoters may scout them based in
their thematic or geographic focus. 
Where to go for country examples: All inter-
national and national agencies and NGOs that
work on SNRM or ICDPs in developing
countries’ rural areas have examples of local
stakeholders' co-financing of rural conservation
and development programs.  See, for example,
in chapter 6 the case of Ecuador’s participative
forest development in the Andes, and the case
of the El Pital Agroforestry project on CARE’s
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Web site (http://www.care.dk/eng/projects/
nicara.htm).
Where to go for more information: Check
the Web sites of FAO, IFAD, Oxfam, WWF, CI,
and CARE for examples and guidelines on how
to mobilize local community support for SNRM
projects. You may also visit the GDRC Virtual
Library of Micro Credit at http://www.
biodiversityeconomics.org/pdf/
topics-222-00.pdf.
Elephants conveying a load of elephant grass fodder. Manas National Park. Bhutan.
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15. Special fundraising campaigns (“Save the pandas,” “Friends of the national park,” etc.)
16. Merchandising and good cause marketing
17. Lotteries
Special fundraising campaigns (to save the
pandas, support a national park, adopt a village,
etc.); merchandizing (e.g., selling products asso-
ciated with the SNRM project, in park shops or
NGO shops); and good cause marketing (e.g.,
selling standard products with a mark-up to
people willing to pay a premium to support a
good cause) are all fund raising strategies exten-
sively used by NGOs, government agencies
(e.g., national parks), and international agencies
(e.g., UNICEF). Sometimes the money collected
will support the full array of activities under-
taken by the fundraising institutions, but there
are also many cases where the drive is in
support of a particular SNRM project. However,
these financing options are seldom available to
pay for the initial SNRM project costs; they are
typically a source of income after the project is
well established. 
According to the WWF-US's Center for
Conservation Finance (see Spergel 2001)
earmarking a percentage of national or state
lotteries for conservation has raised large
amounts of money for SNRM projects in many
countries. For example, in the United States the
Colorado State Lottery raises over 60 million
dollars a year for conservation programs in that
state and WWF-Netherlands has received tens
of millions of dollars from the Dutch national
lottery to finance SNRM projects in developing
countries. 
• Available at what level? International and
national levels.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? Middle-income developing coun-
tries may target their own wealthy popula-
tions, but poorer countries may find a
market in foreign tourists and foreign coun-
tries.  Playing the lottery, however, is
popular at all income levels.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas, or other conservation
programs in that they are more
“marketable” than rural development, but
highlighting the social dimension of SNRM
projects may make them marketable as well.
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Any one of them where a well
known feature (e.g., a flagship species)
attracts support. 
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Rural communities, as the final
recipients, and NGOs and government agen-
cies as the intermediaries.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up?  Low to
high depending on the scale. 
• Need for government facilitation: High in
the case of earmarking part of public lottery
revenues, low for all others.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Medium to high to reach a
national or international audience, low if it is
an on-site initiative.
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Low to medium. 
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Low to medium. 
• Transaction costs: Low. 
(*) To avoid repetition, each description card groups several similar financing options. The ID numbers in the description cards are the same as the numbers on the checklist. 
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Where to go for the money: For the SNRM
project developer there are the options of (a)
tapping into the income of an ongoing system of
fundraising campaigns, merchandizing, good
cause marketing, or lotteries; (b) asking for the
support of these ongoing programs to help set
up a fundraising scheme for the new SNRM
project in question; and (c) trying to put a
scheme in place on her/his own. We strongly
suggest first trying options (a) and (b).
Where to go for country examples: Rich
countries such as the United States, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have
more examples of earmarking a portion of
lottery incomes for conservation programs than
poor countries. Several developing countries,
such as South Africa, and NGOs such as WWF
have had good experiences with special
fundraising campaigns, merchandizing, and
good cause marketing. (See www.panda.org).
Where to go for more information: Consult
EPA's “Guidebook of Financial Tools” (1999)
(www.epa.gov/efinpage/guidebk); the Training
Guide of the Conservation Finance Alliance at
www.conservationfinance.org; and the Web sites
of WWF and The Nature Conservancy for more
on these alternatives.
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18. Social and Environmental NGOs
19. Foundations 
Most SNRM projects in developing countries
include among their stakeholders a local or
national NGO. Teams and resources from inter-
national NGOs also support many SNRM
projects in developing countries.  NGOs may
bring their own financing resources and
leverage financing from other sources or
channel resources from governments, donor
agencies, and the public at large. NGOs are also
an important source of expertise, training, and
advocacy for SNRM. Several NGOs have been
in the forefront of developing and applying inno-
vative financing instruments including environ-
mental funds, debt-for-nature swaps, integrated
conservation and development projects, certifi-
cation of green products, fundraising
campaigns, and PES schemes.
Several middle-income and large developing
countries have national foundations that grant
money to a variety of initiatives and projects,
and there is a large number of foundations in
rich countries that support social and environ-
mental initiatives in developing countries. There
are thousands of NGOs and foundations in the
world, but the major players (in terms of budget
and projects) number in the dozens, and are
mostly headquartered in rich countries.  
Foundations provide money in accordance with
their priorities regarding issues, countries, insti-
tutions, and beneficiaries.  It is rare that an
NGO would give as much money as a founda-
tion does. NGOs prefer to be an active partner
in the project, so it may be sensible to approach
them much earlier in the SNRM project devel-
opment. 
• Available at what level? Local, state, national,
and international. 
• Mostly available in which type of developing
country? NGOs are present in all developing
countries. Foundations tend to concentrate
in rich countries.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas. But priorities vary widely
among foundations and NGOs.
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Usually NGOs and foundations
focus on the poor and tend to bypass
government agencies.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up?  From
low to medium. 
• Need for government facilitation: Low.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low to medium.
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium. 
• Potential in terms of  rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium.
• Transaction costs: Low to medium. 
Where to go for the money: Expect stiff
competition for grant money. We suggest that
the SNRM project developer undertake both a
bottom-up and top-down approach. The bottom-
up approach would consist of an assessment of
which NGOs or foundations are or have been
active in the local area of the project, and then
pursuing this lead up to the headquarters of
these institutions. The top-down approach
involves contacting the headquarters of large
NGOs and foundations and assessing their
(continued)
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interest in the goals and locations of the SNRM
project. 
Where to go for country examples: Most of
the SNRM projects discussed in the following
chapter have included national and international
NGOs.  A few mention receiving money from
private foundations.  Large NGOs and founda-
tions (e.g., Oxfam, CARE, WWF, CI, The Nature
Conservancy, and the Ford Foundation) discuss
many such cases on their Web sites. (Visit www.
panda.org or www.conservation.org.) An
example of a project partially funded by the
Ford Foundation is the Zimbabwe Maheney
wildlife project, which is discussed in http://
www.fordfound.org/publications/
recent_articles/docs/Solutions_68-73.pdf.
Where to go for more information: The
Foundation Center (www.fdncenter.org) has an
abundance of information about thousands of
foundations including what they fund and which
countries they invest in, as well as links to Web
sites. Although it mostly focuses on the over-
70,000 U.S. foundations, it also has information
on non-U.S. ones. The web site of the
Worldwide Initiative for Grantmakers Support
www.wengeb.org is also a point of entrance to
numerous foundation sites.  A directory of Web
sites of conservation NGOs around the world
can be found at http://www.lib.kth.se/~lg/
front.htm. The National Wildlife Federation–
U.S. (www.nwf.org) has published an extremely
comprehensive guide to U.S. conservation
NGOs.
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20. Household savings and labor assets
21. Community-based enterprises, formal (co-ops) and informal 
22. Micro-saving, micro-credit, and micro-insurance
23. Semiformal and informal micro-finance institutions
24. Private investment by local businesses
Mobilizing the participant households’
resources is crucial to the local ownership of
the SNRM project. In the last 20 years, rural
development projects have had many experi-
ences in this. For example, households may
invest in improvements of their own plot in
order to benefit from the new opportunities that
the SNRM project would bring to the area.
Cooperatives may be organized to sell the new
products that the SNRM project will deliver.
Revolving credit schemes based in formal and
informal financing arrangements such as the
well-known Grameen bank from Bangladesh can
be put in place.  Participants can also contribute
their labor—for example by working in their
plots and in communal lands, operating and
maintaining new or existing infrastructures, and
more.  New activities generated by the SNRM
project may also spur investment by current or
would-be local businesses ranging from local
capital investing in lodging for tourists to the
roadside sale of handicrafts. According to the
SNRM project design these fringe commercial
activities may be seen as part of the project and
as such be included in its financing schemes or
may be considered as positive spillover of the
SNRM project but not part of it.
Experience shows that in order to motivate
rural households to invest in SNRM, projects
need to feature a good prospect for short-term
benefits within the levels of risk acceptable to
the participants. There is a trade-off here in that
the smaller the share of the family income
invested in the success of the SNRM project the
smaller the risk it entails, but as the prospective
benefits decrease so may the interest of the
local participants.
• Available at what level? Local.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All types.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?  Rural
production areas and buffer zones where
chances of investment in SNRM projects
having a clear return to local dwellers are
larger.
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Peasants and small farmers /
large commercial farmers / local busi-
nesses.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up?  From
low to medium. 
• Need for government facilitation: Low.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium. 
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium. 
• Transaction costs: Low. 
Where to go for the money: This is a locally
based activity to be developed by the SNRM
project team.  Similar experiences in the project
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area or elsewhere can be sources of ideas on
how to proceed when trying to get local house-
holds to invest in the project.
Where to go for country examples: Several
projects discussed in the following chapter
include financing from the local population.
Most cases of green production or local
ecotourism will include partial financing by the
local participants. See also Pagiola et al. (2002)
for the description of shade-grown coffee in
Mexico and El Salvador; Mayers and Vermulen
(2002) for a discussion of India and Nepal’s
community forest projects; and the IFAD and
FAO Web sites for more experiences and ways
to organize local financing schemes.
Where to go for more information: Look in
FAO’s People Participation Program at http://
www.fao.org/sd/Ppdirect/PPre0004.htm for a
discussion on how to mobilize local savings, and
at http://www.fao.org/sd/Ppdirect/PPan0015.
htm for experiences with informal local
financing. See IFAD's experience with financing
in rural areas at www.ifad.org/pub/other/
rural_e.pdf.
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26. Direct investment by nonlocal investors (e.g., ecotourism, sustainable forestry, etc.)
27. Private-public partnerships
28. Private sector–community partnerships
29. Compensatory environmental investment of large developments 
30. Venture capital
31. Portfolio investors (green funds)
When discussing private financing of SNRM in
developing countries we may refer to two
different issues. One is private businesses'
(national or transnational) financing of SNRM
on part or all of the large tract of natural
resources they directly own, control, or use in
developing countries (these resources may
involve or include minerals, oils, forests, planta-
tions, ranching, large farming, food and feed
industry, tourism and hotel chains, etc.) The
other is private businesses' financing of SNRM
projects that have participation from small
farmers, the rural poor, and rural communities.
Perhaps needless to say, the former dwarfs the
latter in terms of the money and in many cases
also in terms of the natural resources involved.
However, we are not addressing it here since
this survey focuses on financing SNRM projects
among the rural poor. 
There are many reasons to try to attract extra-
local private investors to the financing of SNRM
projects in the poor rural areas of developing
countries: these investors may contribute
resources far larger than the ones available
elsewhere; they can bring much-needed
technical and commercial knowledge; they can
bridge local SNRM projects with countrywide or
worldwide markets; and so on. There are also
legitimate concerns, particularly regarding the
distribution of costs and benefits among the
would-be partners, and also regarding the risk
of natural resource overexploitation in order to
meet the benefit expectations of the private
businesses and the local communities.
Private business financing of SNRM projects in
rural areas of developing countries may include
direct investments that take up one or more
components of the SNRM project (e.g., the
hospitality component of an ecotourism project);
or private-public partnerships (e.g., developing
publicly owned natural resources); or private
sector–community partnerships (e.g., private
industries supporting and buying a community
forest production).  A different, more grant-type
financing emerges when large private develop-
ments—such as dams, oil and mining
companies—pay for environmental or social
projects as a compensation for the environ-
mental or social disruption they may cause. Yet
another source is private business financing of
environmental initiatives as part of its public
relation campaign, or business ethics.
In rich countries there is an increasing number
of investment funds that keep “green portfo-
lios.” These are funds that invest in shares of
green or socially conscious businesses, but
there are few similar endeavors in developing
countries (see below for a reference to Brazil's
green fund). Even more farfetched is the
prospect of venture capitals financing SNRM
projects (venture capital funds high-risk invest-
ments in new and promising businesses in
exchange for a share of future earnings). Still,
some future breakthrough, for example in the
profitability of bioprospecting, may put these
financing mechanisms within the reach of
SNRM projects. 
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• Available at what level? International and
national.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All, although less-developed coun-
tries may have to rely more on transnational
business. 
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?  To
the extent that the financing is profit-
oriented, these mechanisms may appeal
more to rural production and buffer zone
projects, and protected areas with high
tourism potential.
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant? Rural communities / small
farmers / large commercial farmers /
national-scale firms / government agencies /
transnational businesses. 
• Degree of difficulty in starting up?  Medium
to high.
• Need for government facilitation: Low for
direct private investment. For private-public
partnership and private sector–community
partnership it can go from low (if the legal
framework and institutions to support these
types of partnerships are already in place) to
high (if those are missing). 
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Medium to high. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Low to medium.
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Low to medium.
• Transaction costs: Low for direct private
investment, high for all others. 
Where to go for the money: Engaging private
businesses in financing SNRM projects in poor
rural areas is case-by-case work. Project devel-
opers should look around to see which busi-
nesses are already active in the project area
and/or in the products and services the SNRM
project will deliver (from tourism to sustainable
forest management). On the national level they
should check which private businesses have
invested in similar projects elsewhere in the
country; look for ideas in other countries’ expe-
riences (e.g., which type of firms were more
interested? who sold them the SNRM project
idea?); ask business chambers and public
agencies for leads to potentially interested
private firms, and establish exploratory contacts
with potential private investors. Even if those
individuals decline to invest in the project, the
discussion may give the SNRM project devel-
opers a better understanding of how to make
the project proposal more appealing to private
investors.
Where to go for country examples: Chapter
6 presents summaries of several private
business- community projects, such as South
Africa’s outgrower schemes, Bolivia’s Noel
Kempff Climate Action project, and Namibia's
Torra Conservancy. Bayon et al. (2000) discuss
The Terra Capital Fund and EcoEnterprise
funds, both green funds consisting of private,
public, and NGO capital to invest in environ-
mental projects in Latin America. 
Where to go for more information: Chapter
3 discusses private sector–community partner-
ships based in the recent Mayers and Vermulen
2002 review of company-community forestry
partnerships and Roe, Grieg-Gran, and
Schalken's (2001) review of private
sector–community tourism. Both texts can be
accessed at www.iied.org. 
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32. Markets for organic agricultural products
33. Markets for sustainably harvested non-timber forest products
34. Markets for certified forest products
35. Markets for certified fishery products
From early on, project developers have been
aware that SNRM may not just produce more
goods but different goods as well, green goods
that may attract a premium at the marketplace.
Organic food, ecological coffee, non-timber
forest products, certified timber, certified fish,
and many other sustainably produced goods
compete today in the global marketplace, in
some cases aiming to conquer a small market
niche, in other cases vying to become
tomorrow’s market standard. 
Financing SNRM projects with the sale of green
products is undoubtedly attractive in that it
would match SNRM efforts with markets willing
to pay for them.  Many examples of successes
and failures are offered, feeding a lively polemic
as to the potential and limitation of green
products to foster environmental conservation
and improve rural livelihoods.  There has also
been a learning curve as SNRM practitioners
realize the importance of understanding or even
creating the markets (e.g., developing markets
for certified wood), and also understanding the
institutional and commercial barriers that may
hinder the rural poor’s participation in markets
for environmental products and services (more
on this can be found in chapters 2 and 3).
One drawback of market-based financing is that
money will come late in the project cycle, once
the goods have been produced and sold.  Thus,
the need to raise financing for the start-up costs
remains.  A project with a very good market
prospect may be able to leverage financing for
start-up costs, but few SNRM projects dare to
repay initial costs out of market sales; instead
they will usually reserve the market incomes to
pay for the operation costs and to increase the
participant’s income.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All types.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?  Rural
production and buffer zones. 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant? Rural communities / landless
rural poor / peasants and small farmers /
large commercial farmers / local busi-
nesses.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up? From low
to high depending on the scale of the
production and the market. 
• Need for government facilitation: Low to
reach local markets, high to reach national
or international markets.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low to high.  
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium to high. 
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Medium. 
• Transaction costs: Medium to high. 
Where to go for the money: For those
planning to finance part or all of an SNRM
project through the sale of green products, it
must be noted that profits are not immediately
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available (sometimes not for years). So even if
an SNRM project is about marketing green
products it will probably have to begin by
searching for start-up financing from any of the
other sources we have discussed before (local
people’s savings, a grant, public support, etc.).
The difference is that here the project developer
may use the prospect of the future sales of
green products to leverage the start-up
financing.  In order to do so a solid production
and marketing plan may be required. Project
developers may want to (a) look around to see
which markets for the would-be green products
already exists at the local, national, and interna-
tional levels; (b) get solid marketing advice; (c)
study similar successful schemes; and (d) avoid
overselling the market prospects to the local
participants or would-be financiers.
Where to go for country examples: Look for
several of them in chapter 6. The reader is
referred also to the experience of the Forest
Stewardship Council, the most important
scheme of forest product certification, which
can be accessed at www.fscoax.org. 
Where to go for more information: Forest
Trends (www.forests-trends.org) has produced
interesting research outcomes and guidelines
on what is needed for the rural poor to partici-
pate in green forest markets.  Also from Forest
Trends see Sherr et al. (2002).
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38. Markets for biodiversity conservation and bioprospecting
39. Markets for carbon offsets
40. Markets for watershed protection
41. Markets for landscape beauty, including ecotourism and tourism
42. Markets for development rights and conservation easements
43. Quasi-markets and non-market systems of payments for environmental services 
The rationale for payments for environmental
services is straightforward. Many SNRM
schemes do not yield returns because what they
deliver largely consists of environmental
services that are not currently paid for, be they
at local scale (e.g., soils and water protection);
national scale (e.g., watershed protection, biodi-
versity, landscapes); or international scale (e.g.,
biodiversity, carbon sequestration). Should
these services be accounted for and paid for,
SNRM would be much more attractive and
rewarding to those that bear the cost of it,
particularly the rural poor. 
Although the amount of money that has thus far
been raised for SNRM through PES in general
and MES in particular is small, there are high
hopes that scaling-up may be possible, particu-
larly through carbon trading (based on the
Kyoto Protocol of the International Climate
Change Convention). In relation to the Kyoto
Protocol, Denmark, Norway, and other
European countries have been active in
financing Clean Development Mechanism
projects, namely projects in developing
countries that are beneficial to the recipient
country and at the same time result in a net
reduction in greenhouse gasses emissions. 
One drawback of financing SNRM projects
through PES is that money is received once the
service has been provided, which often takes
time. Consequently the need to raise financing
for the start up costs remains.  Extremely
promising PES prospects may be able to attract
financing for start-up costs, but to this day few
start-up costs have been repaid out of PES
incomes. Typically PES projects have benefited
from other sources of initial support and have
used the PES incomes to cover the operation
costs and increase the participant’s income.
• Available at what level? Regional, national
and international. The local scale will usually
prove very small to encompass both
providers and users of environmental serv-
ices.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All for international schemes of
PES but large and middle income devel-
oping countries mostly in the case of in-
country PES schemes.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas. 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Rural communities / landless
rural poor / peasants and small farmers /
large commercial farmers / local businesses
/ national-scale firms / government agen-
cies / international corporations.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up?  Medium
to high. 
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• Need for government facilitation: Medium to
high. 
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: High. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Low in the short run to medium in the long
run.
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Low in the short run to medium in the
long run.
• Transaction costs: High in the short run,
may decrease in the long run.
Where to go for the money: When consid-
ering financing part or all of an SNRM project
through a PES approach the project developers
should look around to see if a related PES
scheme to which the project could be integrated
already exists at the subnational, national, or
international level.  If that is not the case practi-
tioners should be aware that developing a PES
scheme from scratch may take several years
(though the same can be said of trying to put in
place many other financing mechanisms such as
trying to pass a law to earmark public funds for
SNRM).  Even when a PES scheme is already in
place, actual payments may take a long time to
materialize since the SNRM project may be
asked to deliver these services to some agreed
standard before collecting payments. In that
case the SNRM project developer needs to look
for other financing sources to pay for the
SNRM project's start up costs. The difference
is that now the SNRM project may be able to
use the prospect of future sales of environ-
mental services to leverage the initial money
requirements. 
Where to go for country examples: Look for
several of them in chapter 2. IIED (www.iied.
org) has an extensive portfolio of PES case
studies available through its Forestry and Land
Use Program. Chomitz et al. (1998) discuss in
detail Costa Rica’s experience with PES.
Hardner and Rice (2002) briefly discuss conser-
vation concessions in Guatemala, Indonesia, and
Peru. Also, the World Bank's Environmental
Department features case studies of PES on its
Web site. 
Where to go for more information: Chapter
2 of this survey summarizes the extensive
research on PES recently published by IIED.
See Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) and visit
www.iied.org. More information is available at
the World Bank's Environmental Department
(www.worldbank.org/eadvisor). 
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36. Resource extraction charges directly collected by the SNRM project
37. Allocating part of national, state, or local extraction fees to SNRM projects in the extraction areas
44. User fees and entry fees directly collected by the SNRM project
45. Allocating part of national, state, or local user charges to SNRM projects in the area providing the
environmental services 
Applying all or part of natural resources–related
incomes to SNRM, can be seen as a form of
payment for environmental products or
services. The relation may be direct—for
example, national parks keeping the money
collected as entrance fees, or local communities
engaged in wildlife conservation receiving all or
part of the incomes generated by safaris and
ecotourism. Or it may be indirect; for example,
in many countries the central government or
the state government collects extraction and
user fees and redistributes them to state and
local governments, which, in turn, may use all
or part of these fees to finance SNRM projects.
There may be good reasons for concentrating
and redistributing schemes (e.g., supporting the
most remote or poor areas); unfortunately, in
most of these cases a substantial portion of
these incomes get diverted to uses not related
to the sustainable management of the natural
resource base that generates them.
Most countries have well-developed systems of
charges for the extraction of oil and minerals
but charges for extraction or use of renewable
natural resources (e.g., forest, water, effluent
discharges) or environmental services (e.g.,
watershed management, biodiversity conserva-
tion) may range from very low (e.g., stumpage
and grazing fees) to nonexistent (e.g., water,
biodiversity). In the last 20 years many
countries have either put in place or have
considered putting in place more comprehen-
sive systems of charges for extraction and use
of natural resources, either at the local, state, or
national level. So these charges have become or
may become an important source of financing
for SNRM projects. 
Developing countries (and the international
advisors that some times oversell these
schemes) should carefully weigh the impact
that charging extraction or user fees may have
on the poor, and if needed put in place buffering
measures to protect their livelihood.
• Available at what level? National, state, and
local. 
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All, but see above on equity and
livelihood concerns. 
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas. 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  Forests / wetlands / coastal
areas / watersheds / agricultural lands.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant?  Rural communities / landless
rural poor /  peasants and small farmers /
large commercial farmers.
• Degree of difficulty in starting up? From low
to medium. 
• Need for government facilitation: Medium 
to high. 
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low. 
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Medium to high.
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• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Low to medium.
• Transaction costs: Low. 
Where to go for the money: If the legal
framework already exists, the SNRM project
developer should make sure that the project
participants are either eligible  to receive part of
the money that is being collected or are entitled
to collect it themselves. In many cases clarifying
and strengthening the property and user rights
is a precondition for the local community to be
able to claim the rights to collect natural
resource–related fees, or to receive a portion of
the fees collected by the state. If the legal
framework is missing it may still be possible to
develop it as part of the SNRM project, but it
would be worthwhile to carefully assess how
complicated that would be. In any case there
will usually be some activities that the SNRM
project needs to undertake before it is able to
collect the would-be fees, and the financing for
these activities may need to be secured from
other sources. 
Where to go for country examples: Many
African countries have systems in place
whereby communities are engaged as stewards
of the local wildlife and receive all or part of the
safari fees collected. See in the next chapter the
case study on Zimbabwe's Campfire and
Namibia's Torra Conservancy. See also the
Conservation Finance Alliance Guide (2002) for
discussions of Suriname's bioprospecting
scheme. Shilling and Oscha (2003) briefly
discusses several more cases.  
Where to go for more information: IIED
has evaluated and discussed many cases of
community-based biodiversity and wildlife
conservation projects of this type. See them at
www.iied.org. WWF has been a promoter and
partner of similar schemes around the world,
one of the largest being the Namibia LIFE
project, which can be accessed at
www.panda.org. 
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46. GEF payments for the global commons
47. Funds for SNRM associated with international treaties 
48. Other possible systems of international payments for global commons 
49. Earmarking for SNRM part of one or more international taxes (so far hypothetical)
The term “global commons” refers to the envi-
ronmental components of global public goods.
The latter, following a UNDP definition (Faust et
al. 2001), are public goods whose benefits are
strongly universal in terms of countries, people,
and generations. The atmosphere, the oceans,
biodiversity, and tropical forests are all
examples of global commons. International
peace, the control of pandemics, and the eradi-
cation of poverty are all examples of nonenvi-
ronmental global public goods. The adequate
provision of public goods is difficult to achieve
even at a national scale, usually requiring
government interventions to force the benefici-
aries to pay the suppliers (e.g., through regula-
tions, taxes, the creation of special markets,
etc.). Imagine the difficulties in securing the
provision of global public goods on the interna-
tional scale where there is no world authority to
regulate, tax, or create markets. Yet there has
been progress in acknowledging and paying for
the global commons, mostly, but not exclusively,
through international treaties.
The best known case is the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF) created in 1991
and funded mostly by voluntary contributions
from rich countries, with the purpose of
financing the provision of global commons.
Furthermore, GEF is the designated financial
mechanism for the international agreements on
biodiversity, climate change, protection of the
ozone layer, and persistent organics. 
International treaties also create sources of
financing the provision of global commons that
need not go through international entities. For
example, trade in bioprospecting and on carbon
sequestration are the result of international
regulations about biodiversity property rights
(Convention on Biological Diversity) and
control of climate change (Climate Change
Convention).
Beyond the limited resources currently
available to finance the provision of the global
commons, there is an ongoing international
discussion that began in the early 1990s
regarding what more should or could be done.
Proposals to raise money to pay for the global
commons include environment-related taxes
and charges, such as a world carbon tax, a
world charge on the use of the ocean, an inter-
national air transport tax, or an up-front tax for
global commons conservation. As well,
proposals have been made to earmark part of
non-environmental-related world taxes.  The
most debated thus far is the Tobin tax (a tax on
international currency transactions, proposed by
the economist and Nobel laureate James Tobin).
• Available at what level? International.
• Mostly available to which type of developing
country? All, but particularly those that
harbor an important piece of the global
commons.
• Mostly used for which type of SNRM?
Protected areas / buffer zones / rural
production areas. 
• Mostly used for which type of natural
resource?  All but many agricultural areas
may not qualify.
• Mostly used with which type of project
participant? All landowners and land users.
(continued)
94 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
DESCRIPTION CARD 15 (cont’d.)
• Degree of difficulty in starting up? From low
to medium. 
• Need for government facilitation: Low to
medium.
• Need for third-party facilitation or
brokerage: Low to medium.
• Potential in terms of SNRM achievements:
Low to high.
• Potential in terms of rural poverty allevia-
tion: Low to high. 
• Transaction costs: Low. 
Where to go for the money: GEF funds are
jointly managed by the World Bank (www.
worldbank.org), UNDP (www.undp.org), and
UNEP (www.unep.org).  The World Bank
oversees GEF grants for investment projects
and programs (which is where most of the
money is), UNDP oversees regional policy
development projects, and UNEP manages
scientific projects.  The best information source,
including how to contact the GEF countries’
reference office, is found on the GEF Web site
(www.gefweb.org). Other financing opportuni-
ties for SNRM projects associated with interna-
tional treaties were mentioned earlier in
description card 13, and are also discussed in
more detail in chapter 2. Other international
charges and tax schemes are still in a concep-
tual phase, but don’t discount them! 
Where to go for country examples: Several
of the case studies described in the next chapter
had partial financing from GEF (e.g., the
Uganda Forest Conservation Trust Fund).
Quintela et al  (2002) discusses GEF-funded
projects in Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso,
Romania, and others. The GEF Web site
mentioned above will lead you to case-by-case
descriptions of all the projects in its portfolio. 
Where to go for more information: For
money that is currently available, information is
found in the sources mentioned above (particu-
larly GEF and World Bank). For what is not
here yet but may be in the future the best
reference is the ongoing discussions on global
public goods fostered by the United Nations in
the late 1990s (search for the Zedillo report at
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf) and
for UNDP contributions see Faust et al. (2001)
and Kaul et al. (1999). See also Bezanson and
Sagasti (2001) (downloadable from www.ids.ac.
uk/ids). 
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The 12 case studies presented below offer brief
illustrations of many of the financing options
discussed in the previous chapters and the
contextual issues they raise.  They have been
prepared for this survey by members of Danida’s
Working Group on Sustainable Financing, by the
International Institute for Environment and
Development, and by WWF country offices. Table
5 lists the projects, the financing issues that each
raises, and identifies the authors. 
There are several ways to group and relate these
case studies. Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Namibia,
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe may all be read as cases
of financing through payments for environmental
services (PES) schemes. Still there are many
differences among them. Brazil's ICMS Ecológico
and the Ecuador and Zimbabwe cases are govern-
ment-led PES schemes.  The Bolivia and
Zimbabwe cases are NGO-driven PES schemes.
Namibia, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe can be
considered examples of markets for environ-
mental services (MES).  The South African
outgrower program is a case of financing through
payments for environmental products. The two
South African cases and the Namibian case are
also examples of private businesses' partnership
with communities and NGOs. Ecuador’s DPFA
case and Malawi are two small successes in the
difficult transitions from external donors’
financing to participants’ self-financing. The
Uganda Impenetrable Conservation Fund conveys
the lessons of Africa’s first conservation fund, and
together with Bhutan shows the need and difficul-
ties of multisource financing.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
CHAPTER 6.  CASE STUDIES OF F INANCING FOR SNRM
by Camille Bann, Tom Blomley, Therese Brinkate, Lars Christensen, Maryanne Grieg-Gran, Søren Hastrup, Andreas
Jensen, Karsten Raae, and Chado Tenzin
1. Bhutan / 
Biological corridor 
Landscape Project
A strategy of financing diversification to support a complex
conservation project encompassing 9 percent of the
country’s territory.  Financing from NGOs, bilateral aid,
development aid agencies, foundations, and public budget.
Chado Tenzin / WWF-Bhutan
2. Bolivia/ 
Noel Kempff Climate 
Action Project
Payments for carbon sequestration.  Financing from markets
for carbon offsets, NGOs, nonlocal investors, public budget.
Summary by Camille Bann /
IIED
3. Brazil / 
ICMS Ecológico 
Payments for environmental services. Financing through the
earmarking and distribution of state-level taxes.
Maryanne Grieg-Gran / IIED
4. Ecuador / 
DPFA (Andean Participative
Forest Development Project)
Very poor communities are still willing to invest in SNRM
project.  Financing from bilateral aid and household savings
and labor assets.
Lars Christensen / LC Consult /
member of Danida Working
Group on Sustainable Financing
TABLE 5. LIST OF CASE STUDIES
Country / 
Project or program name Financing scheme or related issue of interest Author / Affiliation
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5. Ecuador / 
Pimampiro program
Payments for watershed conservation. Financing from
water charges. 
Summary by Camille Bann /
IIED
6. Malawi / 
Community-based natural
resource management, Lake
Chilwa Wetland
The foreign financing ends and the local beneficiaries take
up the project. Financing from bilateral aid, public budget,
and local not-for profit and for-profit sources.
Andreas Jensen / Danida
7. Namibia / 
The Torra Conservancy
Private sector–community partnership for tourism
and safari.
Summary by Camille Bann /
IIED
8. South Africa /
The Green Trust Fund
A NGO–private financing program. Therese Brinkate / WWF-South
Africa
9. South Africa / 
Outgrower schemes 
Private sector–community partnership for wood production. Summary by Camille Bann /
IIED
10. Tanzania / 
MEMA project
This case illustrates how an SNRM project branches out to
a new initiative that requires new partners and new
financing arrangements.  Financing from bilateral and
private investment by local and non-local businesses.
Karsten Raae / Danish Forestry
Extension / member of Danida
Working Group on Sustainable
Financing
11. Uganda / 
Mgahinga and Bwindi
Impenetrable Forest
Conservation Trust
A prime ecosystem, many funding sources, many institu-
tions, and a trust fund.  Financing from NGOs, bilateral aid,
GEF, and public budget.
Tom Blomley, CARE
International
12. Zimbabwe / 
CAMPFIRE project
Community-based wildlife management. Financing from
NGOs, bilateral aid, and public budget.
Søren Hastrup / PFF Consult /
member of Danida Working
Group on Sustainable Financing
TABLE 5. LIST OF CASE STUDIES (cont’d.)
Country / 
Project or program name Financing scheme or related issue of interest Author / Affiliation
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This case illustrates a strategy of diversifying
financing to support a complex conservation
project encompassing 9 percent of the country’s
territory.
Background
Bhutan is a small and sparsely populated—
658,000 people in 2000—country with a tradition
of small-scale agriculture in the relatively few
areas of good agricultural soils.  As of 2000 some
7 percent of the territory is cultivated. The
communities in the alpine region are mostly
herders, while the communities in the temperate
and subtropical regions are farmers although they
also own a few heads of animals. Bhutan is
situated at the convergence of the Palearctic and
the Indo-Malayan biogeographical areas that
together create a varied geography with altitudes
ranging from 150 meters in the southern foothills
to over 7,000 meters in the north with annual
rains varying from 500 mm in the north to over
5,000 mm in the south.  These contrasts nurture a
rich and unique biodiversity.
During the 1990s WWF-Bhutan was an important
stakeholder in facilitating sweeping changes in
the country’s natural resource management.
These included the devolution of natural resource
management rights to local communities, and the
establishment of a comprehensive system of
protected areas and biological corridors that as of
2003 encompassed 35 percent of the country’s
territory.  WWF also helped in putting in place
the world’s first Environmental Trust Fund in
1992.  The other contributors were the Royal
Bhutan Government, GEF, UNDP, Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Switzerland. The fund's capital is 20 million
dollars and in recent years it has financed
between 15 and 19 SNRM projects a year for an
annual total of approximately 1.3 million dollars
(see detailed information about the fund at www.
bhutantrustfund.org). 
Biological corridors are the new addition to
Bhutan's protected areas system. They were
designated in 1999 as "Gifts to the Earth" from
the people of Bhutan under WWF’s People and
Plants campaign program. The biological
corridors comprise 9 percent of the country's
land area and are spread throughout the country
to connect protected areas, allowing the flow of
genes between otherwise isolated populations of
plants and animals and ensuring the continued
survival and evolution of Bhutan’s unique biolog-
ical resources.  Over 70,000 people, most of them
subsistence farmers, reside in and around the
BCLP. They graze their cattle in the nearby forest,
extract timber for construction and roofing and
fuelwood and for cooking and heating.  They also
collect non-wood forest products such as
mushrooms, canes, and medicinal herbs. 
Financial arrangements
The sustainable management of the biological
corridors encompasses an array of different activi-
ties, from basic research to protected areas
management plans, to community-based inte-
grated conservation and development programs
in the areas near the corridors.  All of these
require financing. Early on, Bhutan’s government
and WWF-Bhutan realized that it was necessary
to look for a variety of funding sources, since the
sheer magnitude of the project’s financial needs
made it improbable to derive them from a single
source, and also because a multisource financing
strategy would allow a better match between a
specific subproject and the would-be funder priori-
ties.  Progress as of early 2003 included the
following:
Case study 1. Bhutan—Biological Corridor Landscape Project (BCLP)
Reported by Chado Tenzin / WWF-Bhutan
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
• The Field Museum of Chicago, the
MacArthur Foundation, and WWF-Bhutan are
financing biological research in the corridors.
Two rounds of joint surveys have been
carried out, in 2001 and 2002. When the
research program is completed all of the
equipment and other facilities purchased with
the MacArthur Foundation money will be
transferred to the Bhutanese Government.
• The GEF medium-sized project grant
program (MSP) will finance the five-year
"LINKPA—Linking Protected Areas Project"
to prepare corridor management plans begin-
ning in March 2003. Bhutan’s Nature
Conservation Division of the Ministry of
Agriculture and WWF-Bhutan will be in
charge of this project. 
• WWF developed a three-year proposal for
crafting a management plan for Sakten
Wildlife Sanctuary and its Biological
Corridors (SWS-BC). The MacArthur
Foundation will support surveys—ecological,
wildlife, and socioeconomic—to generate
information for drafting the management
plan. The MacArthur grant will also support
capacity development of the park staff and the
local authorities and establish basic infra-
structure network so that the park staff can
start implementation of the management plan.
• The Netherlands is financing an 18-month
pilot Integrated Conservation and
Development Project (ICDP) that is being
carried out by the government and WWF-
Bhutan. The project will focus on three sites
98 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
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within or adjacent to the corridors. It is
expected that the experience from the pilot
project will be scaled up into a larger five-year
project. 
• The pilot ICDP will focus on community-
centered activities. Some of the common
activities for the sites are protecting drinking
water sources; greenhouses on pilot scale;
creating plantations of multipurpose trees in
degraded areas; intensifying agriculture and
livestock production through improved seeds
and breeds; developing pasture to check
cattle migration and grazing in the wild;
installing improved stoves to reduce fuelwood
consumption; supplying corrugated metal
sheets for replacing shingles in roofing
houses; cash-earning activities (supplying
billets for mushroom cultivation, supplying
pullets for backyard poultry, and promoting
traditional crafts); supplying solar panels for
lighting; starting nonformal education; and
conducting training and workshops to
educate the communities in sustaining the
project activities.
• The Bhutanese Government, WWF, and
UNDP have partnered for a 1.8 million-dollar
project to manage several of the corridors
with the twin objectives of nature conserva-
tion and poverty reduction. Funds for this
project came from WWF, Bhutan's govern-
ment, and GEF.
Project lessons
Although more needs to be done to support
Bhutan’s protected areas system and to enhance
the livelihood of the neighboring rural commin-
utes, what has been accomplished bears
testimony to the country's positive context for
SNRM, including:
• The government’s policies and legislation
strongly support conservation efforts, and the
conservation programs make up part of the
country’s economic and social development
goals.
• The government is strong and stable, and
development partners are confident that
planned activities will get implemented.
Further, the bureaucracy is relatively small
and the government's financial management
is efficient and transparent.
• Bhutan is willing to explore new and innova-
tive political, socioeconomic, and environ-
mental development mechanisms—for
example, the devolution of power from the
throne to the people. Bhutan also started the
first Environment Trust Fund, devoted to the
long-term financing of conservation efforts. 
• Foreign development agencies and NGOs
share a positive view of Bhutan’s commitment
to conservation and social development.
• WWF has a strong relationship with the
Bhutan's royal government, and is seen as a
reliable development partner with no hidden
agenda.
A lesson for both the Bhutan government and
WWF-Bhutan is that in a world of increasing
competition for conservation and development,
funding the conventional approach, "one project,
one donor" does not work, particularly for conser-
vation projects that lack immediate tangible
outputs. The alternative is to develop a clear
understanding of the macro-program, and then
look for different funders for each component. 
Additional references and contacts
For further information visit WWF-Bhutan's Web
site at www.wwfbhutan.org.bt or contact the
author of this case study, Chadho Tenzin, at
ctenzin@wwfbhutan.org.bt. 
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
This project illustrates payment for carbon
sequestration services.
Background
The Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project
(NKMCAP) in Bolivia was established in the
1990s as part of the United States Initiative on
Joint Implementation (USIJI) pilot phase. The
project aims to promote carbon sequestration,
biodiversity enhancement, and local benefits.  It
seeks to avoid carbon emissions through forest
conservation, the monitoring of indemnified
logging companies,26 and community assistance in
sustainable agriculture and forest management.
The project includes a forestry program and a
community development program.  The
NKMCAP has been at the center of international
debate on whether to include certain land use
activities in international climate agreements.
However, in light of the March 2001 U.S. with-
drawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the exclusion
of avoided deforestation from the CDM, the initial
enthusiasm has waned somewhat. 
The Noel Kempff Mercado Park has almost
doubled in size since the inception of the project
and now comprises 1,523,446 hectares of diverse
lowland and upland forests.  By avoiding and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from logging
and agriculture it is expected to lock-in up to 7
million metric tonnes of carbon (t/C) over 30
years at a cost of US$1.00 t/C.  It is also argued
that the project will contribute to a reduction in
the pace of deforestation in this frontier area.
The project developed an offset-sharing system
that provides 49 percent of the offset credits to
the Government of Bolivia, 49 percent to the
industry contributors, and 2 percent to American
Electric Power (AEP), the lead investor, as a
project development "bonus." The government is
required by contract to spend the proceeds from
the sale of offset credits on park management
activities in Noel Kempff and throughout Bolivia,
and on other biodiversity preservation activities.
The environmental benefits associated with the
project therefore appear to be encouraging.
Financial arrangements
There have been many actors involved in the
development of the project including private
sector investors, international and local NGOs,
local government, and communities.  The Nature
Conservancy and a consortium of companies
including AEP, with the Bolivian government,
acquired logging concessions, in order to reduce
deforestation, thereby reducing carbon emissions.
The project provides funds and support to the
Joint Implementation (JI) Office in Bolivia, and
the park administration is financed through an
endowment fund administered by the Nature
Conservancy.  
As part of the project, in 1998 an incentive credit
and rotational fund was established to give credits
to community members who undertook changes
in land use practices and activities that reduced
carbon emissions. These included the planting of
economically useful palm species, agroforestry
model farming, substitution of beef cattle with
dairy cows, and ecotourism and small business
initiatives.  The average amount of credit provided
was under US$200.  The uptake was poor and the
sense of indebtedness large at the end of the
project cycle.  Reasons for this include a lack of
capacity, a lack of understanding of the repayment
system, and a lack of enforcement for repayment.
The organization of the credit committee and the
management of funds proved difficult with
corruption occurring in at least one of the
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Case study 2. Bolivia—Noel Kempff Climate Action Project
Summarized by Camille Bann / IIED from works by P. May, E. Boyd, F. Vega and M. Chang
26 Indemnified logging companies are those that receive compensation for prac-
ticing sustainable forest management. 
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communities.  When the loans were exhausted it
was expected that carbon credits would help
support the Park and provide financial assistance
to the communities to avoid carbon leakage
effects.  However, the issue of direct credit distri-
bution at the community level was not considered
in the formal project design.   
The adoption of more sustainable agricultural
practices was poor due to limited technology
transfer and a limited understanding of the
concepts of leakage and conservation.
Communities felt that the changes introduced
were not compatible with local practices, and thus
gave them a low priority.  For example, the
income generated by small-scale production of
diary products or hens was not generally consid-
ered sufficient, and people expressed a need to
generate income from "real activities" such as
forestry, fishing, and tourism.    
In hindsight it is possible to conclude that the
provision of cash incentives was not the best
choice given that the community functions
through a barter and trade system of goods and
services.  Besides the fundamental problem of
introducing credit into a barter economy, the
incentives were focused on agricultural activities
that affected the poorest members, yet the richer
community members, who could take larger
loans, chose to invest in activities unrelated to
agriculture, such as shops and bakeries.  Other
reasons for the lack of success included high
rates of loan default; limited employment genera-
tion alternatives; limited uptake of technology
transfer; perception that the project caused job
loss by removing timber activity; loss of financial
resources due to an agreed period of fishing ban
to allow for the preparation of a fish management
plan; deterioration of roads formerly maintained
by logging companies, which led to increased
transport expenses; and the lack of enforcement
of penalties. 
Project lessons 
• The project design was not sufficiently clear
and inclusive of local partners.  A clear set of
guidelines for evaluating the social impacts of
carbon projects needs to be devised or
adapted to the specific context by communi-
ties and the national government.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
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• The case study illustrates that multiple-level
projects might encounter barriers owing to
the complexity of bringing together the
multiple interests of investors, governments,
and NGOs. 
• The project had unclear carbon, conservation,
and development links.  Clarification of how
activities will contribute to carbon sequestra-
tion was needed.  These activities should
represent realistic opportunities for communi-
ties and be based on in-depth knowledge of
the community livelihood strategies.
• The rights and responsibilities of the commu-
nities in relation to the rules established by
park authorities and the project were not clear.
In terms of the community it is recommended
that local rules and dynamics be incorporated
into project activities and clear rules be
conveyed using information and awareness-
raising through community outreach.
Additional references and contacts
For further information read the 2003 report,
"Local Sustainable Development Effects of
Carbon Sequestration Projects in Brazil and
Bolivia: A View from the Field," available at www.
iied.org. One of the paper's authors, Peter May,
may be contacted at pmay@pronatural.org.br. 
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This case illustrates a payment for environmental
services scheme based on the distribution of a
percentage of states’ sales tax.
Background
The ICMS Ecológico is a tax revenue–sharing
scheme between different levels of government in
Brazil,27 designed to promote the conservation
and management of protected areas.  The ICMS
(which stands for tax on circulation of goods and
services) operates at the state level in Brazil and
is an important source of revenue for local
governments.  The Federal Constitution of 1988
stipulates that 25 percent of the revenue raised by
the ICMS should be allocated by the state govern-
ment to the local governments.  A further require-
ment of the Constitution is that 75 percent of the
total passed on to local governments should be
allocated according to the amount of value-added
generated by each county.  The state govern-
ments have the authority to set distribution
criteria for the remaining 25 percent.  Typically,
the state governments have used criteria based
on population, geographical area, and primary
production.  In 1992, the state of Paraná intro-
duced an ecological criterion based on the area of
land subject to protection.  This was in response
to pressure exerted by the mayors of certain
counties that had large protected areas and
watershed protection areas within their territo-
ries.  They argued that they were losing out on
the allocation of the ICMS revenue since so much
of it depended on the amount of value-added
generated and their counties were hampered by
land use restrictions that limited the scope for
developing activities and generating value-added. 
The new system in Paraná became popularly
known as the ICMS Ecológico.  Other states
observed Paraná’s experience with this new
approach and decided to introduce similar
systems. By 1997, three more states—Rondonia,
Minas Gerais, and São Paulo—had introduced the
ICMS Ecológico. At this time WWF-Brazil began
a campaign to promote the benefits of the
program to other states. By 2002, another seven
states had adopted this approach.
Case study 3. Brazil—The ICMS Ecológico
Reported by Maryanne Grieg-Gran / IIED
27 Brazil has 26 states, each with revenue-raising powers.
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Financial arrangements
While the major motivating factor for the intro-
duction of the ICMS Ecológico was the need to
compensate counties subject to land use restric-
tions, it was envisaged that it could also act as an
incentive for increasing the area of land set aside
for protection and improving its management.
The share of ICMS revenue for each county is
calculated by a consolidated index, which adds up
the scores of that county for each criterion, with
the relevant weight applied.  The ecological index
for each county is based on the total area set
aside for protection in relation to the total area of
the county.  To be included in the calculation of
the index the protected areas have to be regis-
tered and legally defined.  Protected areas can be
designated at federal, state, or county level.  This
is important since federal and state governments
had previously designated the majority of
protected areas and until ICMS local authorities
had no strong incentives to do so.  In Rondonia,
for example, as much as 36 percent of the land
area was subject to some sort of protection in
1997—and only 0.01 percent of this protected area
had been designated by local governments.  
In most of the states that have implemented the
ICMS Ecológico the emphasis in revenue alloca-
tion is on the amount of protected land area.
Some states such as Minas Gerais take into
account the degree of land use restriction by
using weighting factors.  Paraná has gone further
and introduced a system for evaluating the quality
of management of protected areas.  This
addresses concerns expressed in the initial years
of the scheme about a proliferation of "paper"
parks.  The assessment of management quality
affects the overall score/ecological index for the
county and, if necessary, protected areas that are
not being adequately managed can be disqualified
and removed from the register.  Various types of
protected areas qualify: those that involve indirect
use or have considerable land use restrictions
(e.g., biological reserves, ecological stations, and
parks) as well as those involving direct use (such
as indigenous areas, extractive reserves, and
sustainably managed forests).  In some states
such as Minas Gerais, the latter categories are
given lower weight in the calculation of the index
to reflect the extent of land use restriction.  Thus
an ecological research station has a weighting
factor of 1 while an indigenous reserve has a
factor of 0.5.  Privately owned protected areas also
qualify although any ICMS revenue associated
with them accrues to the local government and
not to the owner of the land.  
Project lessons
Early evaluations of the ICMS Ecológico empha-
sized the impact on attitudes and environmental
awareness.  Instead of regarding protected areas
as an obstacle to development, local governments
were starting to see them as an opportunity to
raise revenue (Grieg-Gran 2000).
Later evaluations have been able to examine
trends in the area designated for protection.  In
Paraná the area subject to protection grew by 165
percent between 1992 and 2000 (May et al. 2002).
In Minas Gerais there was an increase of 65.4
percent in the first five years of the program, but
some of this can be attributed to efforts made by
municipalities to formalize conservation areas
that had not been legally registered.  
In both states, and particularly in Paraná, there
has been a large increase in the amount of area of
private land designated for protection, reflecting
efforts made by the state governments to
promote this approach through formal recogni-
tion in the legislation and more general promotion
activities (May et al. 2002).
However, there has been little assessment that
goes beyond statistics to look more in depth at
the impact on biodiversity in protected areas.
WWF-Brazil is promoting the idea of more
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
systematic monitoring of the impact of the ICMS
Ecológico, starting in two pilot states.
While the ICMS Ecológico was introduced to
compensate municipalities for the loss of tax
revenue from the use of land for conservation, it
seems likely that it would also have a positive
social impact.  However, this tax is not an addi-
tional revenue; it is merely a redistribution of tax
resulting from a change in allocation criteria.  The
inclusion of a new criterion implies that the weight
given to one or several previously existing
criterion have to be reduced.  The net effect of
these changes may favorably or unfavorably affect
the poorest countries.  An evaluation of the
scheme (Grieg-Gran 2000) found that 40 percent
of the counties with protected areas in Rondonia
were worse-off in terms of tax revenue after the
introduction of the ICMS Ecológico.  The evalua-
tion also found that the counties that lost out from
the introduction of the ICMS Ecológico tended to
be the poorer ones.  As a group, the counties that
did not benefit from the program had a lower level
of value-added per capita prior to its introduction
than the counties that benefited from it.  Some
counties with very large proportions of their
territory set aside for conservation, however,
experienced dramatic increases in revenue after
the introduction of the ICMS Ecológico.  In the
state of Minas Gerais, the county of Marlieria
experienced an increase in its share of ICMS
revenues over 2,000 percent between 1995 and
1998 (Grieg-Gran 2000).  In Paraná, the county of
São Jorge do Patrocinio, which has 52 percent of
its territory dedicated to conservation, derived
17.6 percent of its budget from the ICMS
Ecológico in 1998 (May et al. 2002).  
Much depends also on how the local govern-
ments use any additional revenue generated and
the extent to which this expenditure favors the
communities most closely involved with the
conservation units. Paraná provides both positive
and negative examples.  In the faxinais (common
property forest resources), efforts have been
made to use the money to improve the living
104 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
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standards of the communities concerned through
expenditure on health and education services and
road maintenance.  In counties where many of the
new protected areas have been created by private
landowners, the attempt by local authorities to
create incentives such as drainage improvement
and road maintenance and access improvement
has led to complaints that public money is being
used to benefit just a few large landowners (May
et al. 2002).
Future of the program
There is concern in Brazil that as governments
set the revenue-sharing criteria, the system may
fall victim to changes in political priorities
following a change in government.  More specifi-
cally, counties cannot know exactly how much
they will receive as a result of creating a
protected area since their benefit depends partly
on what the other counties in the state are doing
and the extent to which they are also creating
additional protected areas.  From the outset there
has been concern that the incentive effect of the
ICMS Ecológico will become diluted as numerous
local governments respond to it and designate
more conservation areas.  Some counties—for
example, Alto Caparão in Minas Gerais—have
seen their ICMS Ecológico transfers decline over
time because of actions taken by other local
governments (May et al. 2002).
From a project developer's point of view, the
ICMS Ecológico is not an ideal mechanism to
fund specific conservation projects directly or in
their initial stages. This is because local govern-
ments are not obliged to spend the revenue
generated by the ICMS Ecológico on conserva-
tion activities—although the state of Paraná has
entered into agreements for this purpose with
some counties.  Nor can the local authorities
estimate with any great certainty how much they
will receive as a result of a specific conservation
action.  Their share of the ICMS Ecológico
transfers depends both on the actions taken by
other local governments and on the amount of tax
revenue collected across the state.  But the ICMS
Ecológico does have the advantage of stimulating
political support at the local level for conserva-
tion.  It can also strengthen community support
for conservation areas where the revenue
generated is perceived as being used by local
governments for activities beneficial to them
(May et al. 2002).  The ICMS Ecológico should
therefore be seen as a complement to other more
direct sources of funding. 
The program has developed in a specific political
context, a federal country where subnational
governments have revenue-raising powers and a
constitutional requirement to share certain types
of tax revenue with lower levels of government.
However, most countries, whether they have a
federal government or not, have systems for fiscal
transfer between central and local governments
often involving complex criteria and formulas for
allocation.  With the increasing emphasis on
political decentralization and the decentralization
of natural resource management, there is signifi-
cant potential for adopting approaches that are
similar to the ICMS Ecológico in other countries.
Additional references and contacts
For further information, consult M. Grieg-Gran,
2000, "Fiscal incentives for biodiversity conserva-
tion: The ICMS Ecológico in Brazil." Discussion
Paper No. 00-01, IIED, London; or P. May, F. Veiga
Neto, V. Denardin, and W. Loureiro, 2002, "Using
Fiscal Instruments to Encourage Conservation:
Municipal Responses to the 'Ecological' Value-
added Tax in Paraná and Minas Gerais, Brazil."
In S. Pagiola, J. Bishop, and N. Landell-Mills
(eds.), "Selling Forest Environmental Services
Market-Based Mechanisms for Conservation and
Development." London: Earthscan.  Maryanne
Grieg-Gran may be contacted at maryanne@
iied.org. 
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This case illustrates local investment in SNRM
made possible by low opportunity costs of labor
and a strong community organization that is
responsible for an equitable distribution of in-kind
benefits and revenues.
Background 
From 1992 to 1995 FAO ran the Andean
Participatory Development Project (DFPA) in
four South American countries—Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. The project estab-
lished national programs and tested participatory
rural development approaches to rural extension
services, agroforestry, community forestry, and
small-scale forest-based enterprises. DFPA’s aim
was to empower the local community to identify
its own measures of wealth and success-indicators
and prepare natural resource management plans
that reflected those community goals and values.
Several of these plans were community forest
management plans, where local resources were
the main input to the project. This case study
describes one such plan developed by the
Chauzán San Alfonso community in Ecuador.
Chauzán San Alfonso is an indigenous community
of some 100 families with a strong cultural
identity. The community has a highly organized,
democratic system. People are self-reliant and
traditional forms of sharing labor through
common work-days and "labor-lending"(minga,
prestamano) are common.  The mountain envi-
ronment (slope, soil, wind, altitude) offers
moderate to extremely difficult conditions for
rural production.  The local economy is based in
subsistence agriculture with limited surpluses
available for sale. Arable land is scarce. Only 15
percent of the families have holdings of more
than 10 hectares. Another 60 percent have 1–10
hectares, and a quarter of the households have
little or no land. The principal economic activities
are agriculture and livestock (grazing). Gas or
fuelwood is used for cooking; the latter is
collected, mainly by the poorer families from the
communal forest. 
In late 1993 DFPA helped the Chauzán San Alfonso
people to prepare a community forest plan.  As part
of this exercise the community identified its priori-
ties including, in descending order: improving agri-
cultural production for self-consumption;
reclaiming more agricultural land; improving the
ecology of the community lands; creating more
work opportunities within the community;
improving health conditions; improving educa-
tional opportunities; increasing income; and
strengthening the community organization.
Consistent with the above priorities the
community developed a forest management plan
for the 83 hectares of communal forests, and
began applying it in 1994. The management plan
called for converting the best part of the forest—
some 44 hectares—to a silvipastoral system, of
pine cypresses and pastures. The plantation
would create new work opportunities for the
landless households and deliver pasture,
fuelwood, improved ecological conditions, and
increased incomes to the community. The forest
plan employs a 30-year rotation scheme in two
sections of the 44 hectares. 
Financial arrangements
The first stage of the DFPA project, the develop-
ment of the community-based management plans,
was made possible by a grant from the Dutch
government and administered by FAO.  The
actual implementation of the plan, however, is a
community financed initiative. To this end a
Community Forest Management Fund was estab-
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Case study 4. Ecuador—Participative Forest Development in the Andes (DFPA)
Reported by Lars Christensen / LC Consult / member of Danida’s WGSF
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lished within the existing community organiza-
tional structures, since members were accus-
tomed to managing and distributing common
earnings. 
To manage the plantation, labor is hired from
among local landless families for whom the
offered salaries compare favorably with their
daily income, making the arrangement attractive
to both parties. Under this condition external
evaluators have estimated an annual internal rate
of return of 16 percent for a complete forest
rotation cycle. 
Through the Community Forest Management
Fund the community distributes the revenues and
benefits of the plantation as follows: (a) local
laborers working in the plantation are paid; (b)
plantation related expenses such as replanting are
covered; (c) 10 percent of the annual profit is
reserved for unforeseen expenses; (d) the net
profit (revenues minus the first three items on
this list) is distributed equally among the
community households; and (e) use of the
improved pasture in the silvicultural system as
well as the other lands outside the plantation are
annually apportioned among the community’s
households. 
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
A group of men are helping build a new roof for a community house. Mataje, Awa Reserve. Awa Ethnic Forest Territory, Ecuador
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Project lessons
The approach developed by DFPA ensured that
the project responded to the community priorities
and took into account the local socioeconomic
context. This in turn made it possible to mobilize
local investment and establish a plan for the long-
term sustainable management of the natural
resources in question anchored in the local
community. As seen in the above analysis the
entire community benefits from the management
of the common natural resource. Some of the
more specific lessons are summarized below: 
• The presence of a strong community organi-
zation capable of managing investments as
well as securing equal distribution of benefits
is essential.
• The approach requires external technical
assistance in the initial phase in order to
support the community in developing and
starting the management activities. This
could impede replication where no funds for
initial investments in technical assistance are
available. On the other hand, the technical
assistance costs are low.
• The case illustrates the importance of
including an analysis of the local context. In
this case the economic viability of the plan is
tied to the opportunity cost of the landless
households' labor. Incidentally, this fact may
also work as a project liability, in that a signif-
icant increase in the income-earning opportu-
nities available to the local landless
elsewhere may jeopardize the plantation’s
economic viability. 
• This methodology of participatory rural
development planning could be replicated
anywhere. However, whether that would lead
to cases of sustainable financing of natural
resource management depends very much on
the local situation. In general, the potential
would be significant in situations where the
two key conditions are present: low opportu-
nity costs of local resources and humanpower
within the community, and a strong demo-
cratic tradition in the community.
Additional references and contacts
For more information on this project you may
want to read "Proyecto FAO-Holanda,  Desarrollo
Forestal Participativo en los Andes," DFPA, 1994.
You may also contact Charles B. Kenny-Jordan
(former Chief Technical Adviser of DFPA) at
cjordan@sdssa.com; FAO's representation in
Ecuador (fao-eco@field.fao.org\or\) and Lars
Christensen (larsoghanne@get2net.dk).
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This case illustrates a municipal system of
payments for watershed conservation.
Background
The town of Pimampiro is located in the munici-
pality of San Pedro de Pimampiro, Imbabura
province, Ecuador. The town is situated in the
Pisque River watershed and the Palaurco River
sub-watershed.  The Palaurco River is used for
irrigation and drinking.  Approximately 25
percent of the population has limited access to
drinking water, which is of poor quality because
of agricultural discharge upstream.  Despite the
lack of detailed hydrological information, the
common perception is that the forests ensure
water quality and flow, particularly in the dry
season.
Financial arrangements
Under a pioneering pilot project for Ecuador,
landowners in Pimampiro are being paid to
manage the forest in the watershed in order to
protect water sources.  Many actors are involved
in this initiative, among them: Asociación
Autónoma de Agricultura y Ganadería Nueva
América (Nueva America Agriculture and
Livestock Autonomous Association), which
consists of 24 members, with property titles
adding up to approximately 638 hectares of land,
who are supplying the environmental service;
Desarrollo Forestal Comunitario (DFC), an FAO-
funded project for community forest management;
CEDERENA (Ecological Corporation for
Renewable Natural Resource Development), an
NGO that evolved out of DFC; the Inter-American
Foundation (IAF), a U.S. funding organization;
and the municipality of Pimampiro.
In 1999, CEDERENA signed an agreement with
the municipality to work on an IAF-funded
project, "Sustainable Management of Renewable
Natural Resources of the Pimampiro District for
the Maintenance of Quantity and Quality of
Water."  As part of this project the UMAT
(Pimampiro’s Environment and Tourism Unit—
part of the town’s governmental structure) intro-
duced an environmental payment system that
provided incentives for forest conservation.  This
pilot scheme was implemented in Nueva America
where 20 members of the Nueva America
Association are receiving payments for environ-
mental services.  
In 2001 the municipality approved a new
ordinance that established a Water Regulation for
the Payment of Environmental Services from
Forest and Paramo Conservation, which became
part of UMAT’s responsibilities.  A fund was
created under this ordinance to channel payments
by beneficiaries (domestic water users) to those
investing in the continuous supply and quality of
water through the maintenance of forest cover.
The fund had an initial endowment of US$15,000
and it was expected to receive US$500 a month
from a charge placed on drinking water fees.   
The fund is managed by a committee composed
of representatives from the municipality and
CEDERENA.  The committee verifies property
titles, measures and inspects the holding, and
then determines the amount that should be paid
to each landholding family.  Monthly payments
range from US$0.50 to $1.00 per hectare
depending on land category.  These payments are
a result of political negotiation rather than a
technical analysis of the hydrology, water
valuation, or financial planning of the fund.  The
payment amounts could increase as the market
for watershed services is developed and more
resources are generated. To receive payment
each member of the association must sign an
agreement with the municipality. 
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Case study 5. Ecuador—Pimampiro payments for watershed services scheme
Summarized by Camille Bann / IIED from works by M. Echeverria, J. Vogel, M. Alban, and F. Meneses
Project lessons
From the demand side there are concerns about
the sustainability of the fund. The IAF funding
ended in 2002 and it is not clear what will happen
to the payment scheme.  Because as of 2002 only
60 percent of water sold was paid for, the munici-
pality does not provide the agreed-upon amount
to the fund. In 2002 collection of the water tax
amounted to approximately US$ 200 per month (a
low amount compared with the originally
estimated US$ 500 per month) and does not cover
the payments for watershed services, which by
2002 amounted to US$ 455 per month.
Furthermore, in order to protect all of the water
sources (covering an area of 4,200 hectares), the
payments would need to be around US$ 4,000 per
month, far beyond the scheme’s reach.
Participation of the irrigation system’s users
would be vital to expand the scheme; however,
this participation is not being pursued.  There is
also the possibility of involving agricultural
producers through the property tax collected by
the municipality.  The lack of hydrological data
demonstrating the hydrological benefits linked to
forest cover further hampers the development
and sustainability of the market.
From the supply side, a household survey has
been undertaken in order to evaluate the social
impacts of the compensation mechanism.  The
reliability of this survey is uncertain, however,
owing to concerns that respondents may have
answered strategically.  The survey showed that
payments contributed to family income and
motivated participation in the scheme.  Payments
are commonly used to meet short-term needs
(such as food, gas, and school fees). However, the
payment scheme does not meet expectations—
heads of households feel they should be paid
more to protect the forest.  The payment system
has not strengthened the level of organization
within the recipients.  Association and transaction
costs are high—conservatively estimated at three
times the amount actually paid to farmers in the
first year of the project. Payments have improved
environmental awareness among recipients.
However, CEDERENA believes that support for
conservation is still underdeveloped and that
people intend to change their land use in the
future.  It is also clear that sanctions are required,
as violations such as slash-and-burn forest degra-
dation and unauthorized wood extraction are
common.
Additional references and contacts
For further information, read Ecodecision, 2002,
"Impact Assessment of Watershed Environmental
Services: Emerging Lessons from Pimampiro and
Cuenca in Ecuador." IIED, London. Marta
Echeverría can be contacted at mechavar@
ecnet.ec. 
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This case illustrates the phasing-out of an SNRM
project’s external financing, and its successful
adoption by the local stakeholders. 
Background
The long-term objective of this project was to
ensure that the natural resources of the Lake
Chilwa wetland and its catchment area were
utilized and managed by local communities in a
sustainable manner. With this long-term objective
in mind, the project focused on empowering local
communities to conserve and manage their
natural resources through institutional capacity
building and coordinated technical support by
line ministries in the Zomba, Machinga, and
Phalombe districts. 
By the end of the first phase the project's achieve-
ments included the following:
• Three environmental district offices (EDOs)
were established in the Machinga, Phalombe,
and Zomba districts.
• Three district development committees
(DESCs) were established in the above three
districts and 45 members were trained.
• Twenty-three studies on wetland issues were
conducted by consultants in preparation of
the Wetland’s State of the Environment
Report.
• Five hundred copies of the Wetland’s State of
the Environment Report were produced and
distributed.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Case study 6. Malawi—Lake Chilwa Wetland Project
Reported by Andreas Jensen / Danida (based on project completion report by Daimon Kambewa)
Fisherman at Msaka fishing camp at Chimpamba Village, spreading his catch of fish to dry in the sun Malawi. 
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• A Wetland Management Plan was approved
by riparian district assemblies.
• Forty-one awareness sessions, using a local
band, a local drama group, and an NGO were
conducted; these resulted in the establish-
ment of 43 community working groups in the
three districts combined. (Community
working groups are a crucial part of the
management plan since they are supposed to
prepare and implement action plans.)
• Four hundred and fifty copies of the districts'
State of the Environment Reports (DSOERs)
and Environmental Action Plans (DEAPs)
were produced and distributed (150 per
district).
• Ten micro-project activities were imple-
mented in 46 villages.
• A communication strategy was produced.
This allowed the project to promote wise use
through TV, a video documentary, newspa-
pers, preaching manuals, radio programs, and
project flyers.
• Sixteen bird breeding areas were established
as sanctuaries respected by the local people. 
• Forty-three Beach Village Committees were
supported and trained.
• Two training manuals on community working
groups were produced, packed, and distrib-
uted as a toolkit for 25 frontline staff to use
when forming and training community-
working groups.
• Staff from two EDOs attended a training
session in Denmark in Integrated Water
Management.
• Twenty-three journalists from print and elec-
tronic media were trained in investigative
reporting, which resulted in more news
coverage on environmental issues in Malawi.
• Seven Ramsar signposts were erected in all of
the three districts around Lake Chilwa.
• A Lake Chilwa Inter-District Management
Committee was established with a fully oper-
ating secretariat.
112 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
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Financial arrangements
The project was funded by a Danida grant of 10.5
million DKK during a first phase of 36 months
(October 1998 through September 2001). A
second phase was anticipated, but never
executed, because Denmark ceased development
aid to Malawi in 2002.
As Danida support came to an end there was a
concern about the sustainability of the program in
terms of country ownership (that is, whether the
country and particularly the local stakeholders
were interested in using the project products) and
financing (that is, whether they had the resources
to pay for them). Two years after the project
ended, reports from Zomba, Malawi indicate the
following:
• Some project activities such as developing
DSOERs and DEAPs were deemed sustain-
able because there were institutions that
would continue to produce them. In this
regard the District Environmental
Subcommittee of DESC was viewed as the
appropriate responsible body that could lead
the process of developing and implementing
district plans on natural resource manage-
ment. DESC members in the three districts
have received training in the planning
process and as a result they have been able to
develop DSOERs and DEAPs in their
districts.
• Another institution that will sustain project
activities is the Lake Chilwa Inter-District
Management Committee for the three
districts of Zomba, Machinga, and Phalombe.
This body was expected to be a custodian of
the wetland and ensure coordination and joint
planning among the three districts
surrounding the lake. However, the districts
were not be able to financially support the
secretariat for the Inter-District Management
Committee because they themselves were
struggling financially. Fortunately MBERU (a
department of the local university) offered to
support the secretariat until the districts were
able to do so on their own.
• Local CBNRM committees established for
bird catching and fisheries survived on their
own. They have the support of the traditional
leadership and generate small revenues from
fines and licenses. The input required for
their operation is minimal (books, ledgers,
pencils, and expenses for meetings) and in
view of the economic value of the Lake
Chilwa fisheries there should be room for
more support from the artisan fisheries
industry (fisheries annual average yield of
11.000 tonnes, with an estimated value of US$
11 million per year).  Bird catching results in
significantly more profits (1.2 million birds
trapped and shot, with an estimated value of a
quarter-million U.S. dollars).  In spite of the
positive outcome it is also evident that the
relatively quick phase-out of Danida’s assis-
tance exposed weaknesses in many of the
management structures that were solely
dependent on foreign aid.
Project lessons
• The key context condition that helped the
project to achieve community-based natural
resource management on the ground within a
relatively short period of time was the close
linkages with traditional authorities combined
with a very active media campaign to reach
all villages in the catchment area. In addition,
earlier work by the Fisheries Department and
Germany's Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) laid a strong founda-
tion for promoting CBNRM among the lake
communities. A general move toward decen-
tralization and empowerment of local govern-
ment in Malawi aided in the achievement.
• A Wetland Management Plan will not achieve
anything alone. Local ownership of the
process of preparing the plan is extremely
important to ensure its implementation—
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
especially when foreign assistance pulls out
before the implementation of the prepared
management plan, as happened with this
project.
• Economic benefits of management interven-
tions should be very tangible, both locally as
well as on a large scale and they should be
communicated to all stakeholders.
• Active participation of resource user groups
is the key to success (for instance, organized
as beach village committees, bird committees,
etc.).
• Using the communication element as a
strategic tool to support the project and stake-
holders’ dialogue is critical.
• Linking all communities, traditional authori-
ties, district assemblies, and national institu-
tions is an exercise that is almost impossible
to complete on a full-scale basis. Systematic
planning should promote prioritization at
different levels and enable interventions to be
implemented in selected "hot spot" areas.
• Most development agencies—be they govern-
mental institutions, nongovernmental organi-
zations, or private firms—lack the requisite
skills to plan, implement, and monitor micro-
projects targeting natural resource manage-
ment with communities. Therefore local
institutions should handle micro-projects
instead.
• Environmental planning should be main-
streamed locally as an integral part of the
decentralization process, that is, DSOER
should be part of the District Socioeconomic
profile and DEAP part of the District
Development Plan.
• DSOERs and DEAPs should ultimately include
an analysis of economic values compared to
management costs for various sectors.
• Duration of similar CBNRM projects should
be longer than three years to allow full
assimilation of the CBNRM processes by
district assemblies, traditional authorities,
and the like.
• As it happens in other cases, it was found that
some training program participants were
there only to collect daily allowances. Caution
should be exercised when devising these
types of interim payments because they may
raise false expectations and jeopardize future
participation.
• At the district level, the general movement
toward a more decentralized public sector has
enabled broad political discussions on the
local management of natural resources.
However the decentralization process was
initiated as recently as 1998 (by the new Local
Government Act) and the limited degree of
on-the-ground decentralization thus far
achieved may affect the practical implementa-
tion of CBNRM. 
• Resources available at the district level were,
in many respects, very limited, particularly
concerning extension and government serv-
ices delivered to the communities.  The
decentralization process must, therefore, be
accompanied by increased resources avail-
able to district authorities either from the
central level or from the increased local
revenue, taxes, ground rent, levies, etc.
Additional references and contacts
For more information on this project, read some
of these publications available from Danida: "Lake
Chilwa Wetland and Catchment Management
Project," Project Document, April 1998; "Lake
Chilwa Wetland State of the Environment Report,"
June 2000; "Lake Chilwa Wetland and Catchment
Management Project," October 2000; "Lake
Chilwa Wetland Management Plan," September
2001; "Lake Chilwa Wetland and Catchment
Management Project," Project completion report,
December 2002.  Or contact, in Malawi, the
Director of the Environmental Affairs Department
and in Danida, Andreas Jensen (andjen@um.dk). 
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This project illustrates a case of private
sector–community partnership that runs a conser-
vancy for tourism and hunting.
Background
The Torra Conservancy, established in 1998, was
one of the first of its kind in Namibia.  It is located
in the Twyfelfontein region of the Kunene
Province in northwest Namibia and covers 80,000
hectares.  It has 300 members and an estimated
population of 500 living within the conservancy.
The conservancy is characterized by spectacular
mountain scenery and a wide range of wildlife.
The main production activity is livestock farming
but because of the arid conditions cattle numbers
are low.  Opportunities for paid employment are
limited in the area and many of the young people
from the community migrate to urban areas to
look for work.  The need for jobs is one of the key
factors influencing the conservancy committee’s
decisions.
Establishing and running a conservancy implies
responsibilities and costs in addition to those
explicitly specified in hunting and tourism agree-
ments.  In order to qualify for an annual hunting
quota (issued by the government), the conser-
vancy needs to demonstrate that it is managing
the resource well.  This requires expenditure on
monitors to guard against poaching, surveys of
wildlife resources, and maintenance of the conser-
vancy (e.g., fencing and water holes).  The
conservancy, as of 2000, employed five game
guards, one secretary, and a field officer.  It
maintains an office and a vehicle, with the conser-
vancy committee putting in unpaid time.  Running
costs are estimated at N$ 137,000 annually, of
which 20 percent is provided by Integrated Rural
Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC),
an NGO.  IRDNC also employs a field coordinator
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Case study 7. Namibia—The Torra Conservancy
Summarized by Camille Bann / IIED from works by D. Roe, M. Grieg-Gran, and W. Schalken
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Meeting to discuss the quota and charges of trophy hunting, Torra Conservancy, Kunene, Namibia
who acts as treasurer on an unpaid basis for the
conservancy.  The intention is for external assis-
tance to be phased out so the conservancy will
have a greater cost burden in the future.  The
conservancy is therefore keen on developing
income-generating activities to cover these costs.
Nevertheless, the community has showed, in the
course of negotiations with companies, that other
issues such as ownership, employment, and nonfi-
nancial benefits are also high on its agenda.
In 2002 the Torra Conservancy was the only
community in Namibia that had both tourism and
hunting agreements.  It also provided the only
example in the country of a formal agreement
between a large tourism company and a
community—a good model for other communities
to follow.
Financial arrangements 
In 1996 the Residents Trust, which preceded the
conservancy, signed an agreement with
Wilderness Safaris (WSN’s), a large African
adventure travel company, for the establishment
of a luxury tented camp, Damaraland.  Direct
financial benefits to the community from the
Damaraland Camp include a lodging tax of 10
percent of the accommodation price (net of sales
tax) and an annual rental of N$ 3,000 for the
permission to occupy the land. Payments to the
community from lodging taxes have been fairly
significant despite low occupancy levels; between
July 1998 and June 1999 they amounted to N$
174,846, equivalent to N$ 582 per community
member (although revenues have not been
distributed this way).  This would be comparable
to about three months of pension payments or
wages from casual agricultural labor. 
Community representatives demanded that
WSN’s train employees and transfer its ownership
rights rather than increase its revenue share.  As
a result of these negotiations, employment at
Damaraland Camp is considered an important
benefit for the community.  It pays more and is
more reliable than the other two employment
opportunities available in the region.  Fourteen
people from various parts of the conservancy
work and live at the camp.  In addition, there is
employment for people who live in the camp's
vicinity.  Payments of salaries (including salaries
of those who do not live in the camp) are around
N$ 200,000 per year.  In addition, small amounts
are paid to the community for laundry services
(N$ 4,930 over the 12 months to June 1999).
Ownership of the venture was a key issue in the
negotiations and a flexible approach was adopted.
The agreement states that WSN has ownership of
the assets of the enterprise but allows for the
possibility of the community purchasing the
assets either at the end of the 10-year agreement,
or extending the contract by five years and
acquiring 20 percent of the assets each year
through a corresponding reduction in the
payments of rental and lodging tax levy.  A
training program was also negotiated.  Thus,
some community members benefited from the
company’s expenditure on training, estimated at
N$ 23,812 in 1998/99.  
Benefits from hunting agreements have been
primarily financial but the conservancy is consid-
ering ways of increasing nonfinancial benefits as
well.  In 1998 Savannah Safaris, the company with
the hunting concession, paid a lump sum or area
fee of N$ 17,000 and fees per animal shot that
amounted to N$ 120,000.  It was also agreed that
bushmeat from animals hunted by the safari
company would be distributed locally.  There was
no provision for formal training in the agreement
but people from the community were involved in
skinning and thus learned by doing.  In addition,
one of the conservancy’s game guards worked
with the hunting company although the conser-
vancy did not pay him.  Part of the reason for the
predominance of financial benefits is that hunting
contracts have been only one year long.  The
conservancy committee intends to move to three-
year contracts in order to increase the scope for
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nonfinancial benefits.  The short-term nature of
the contract also explains why there has been no
investment by the hunting company in lodging
within the conservancy. 
Project lessons
The Torra Conservancy has done very well in
relation to similar initiatives in other Namibian
communities. Some of the reasons for its success
are the high value of its landscapes and wildlife,
high level of interest from important travel
companies, and the well-organized community. By
2001 the conservancy had two agreements with
total revenues far exceeding the costs of running
it, and it was also likely to benefit from a proposed
agreement with Skeleton Coast Fly-In Safaris.
However, as of 2002, conservancy representatives
felt that nonfinancial issues, particularly local
involvement in management, were more
important (a training program agreed on as part
of the Damaraland negotiations has been slow to
develop).  The conservancy committee turned
down a proposal that did not sufficiently involve
the community—the conservancy wanted the
community to retain access to the land involved
and for there to be a training component, while
the investor wanted the site for his exclusive use.
Wilderness Safaris submitted a proposal for a
rhino-tracking venture at a site called Poacher’s
Camp.  The conservancy requested a more
detailed proposal with income projections over
five years.  They recognized Poacher’s Camp as a
site with great tourism potential and have consid-
ered starting their own enterprise there.
Alternatives to a community-owned enterprise
would therefore have to clearly demonstrate their
means of generating income for the conservancy
while involving the community. 
Additional references and contacts
For further information, peruse the book by Roe
et al. 2001 available at www.ieed.org; or contact
Maryanne Grieg-Gran at maryanne@iied.org.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
This case illustrates an innovative partnership
between an NGO and a private business, and the
opportunities and challenges that it entails. 
Background
In October 1990, a groundbreaking and innovative
partnership between WWF–South Africa (WWF-
SA) and a major South African bank, Nedbank,
established an environmental fund known as "The
Green Trust." Since its inception, the trust has
raised over R47 million (approximately 5 million
U.S. dollars) and has supported over 125 conser-
vation projects with a strong emphasis on the
involvement of local communities.  The projects
funded are primarily within South Africa but some
have been funded in Mozambique, Malawi, and
Namibia. 
Back in 1990 when the Green Trust was founded
conservation organizations in South Africa were
seeking a new image for conservation.  Although
the country was still a few years away from free
and fair elections, there was already a conscious-
ness among conservation NGOs of the need to
bridge the gap that existed between the NGOs
and millions of disenfranchised people in the
country.  Conservation was at best unknown
among many rural communities and at worst
tainted with an image of a white middle-class play-
ground fiercely protected by paramilitary game
guards.  It was only during the early 1990s that
concepts such as "people and parks" and
"community-based conservation" began to take
form and to become entrenched in conservation
policy.  These were exciting times.  The field was
fresh and untested and the needs enormous.
Case study 8. South Africa—The Green Trust
Reported by Thérèse Brinkcate / WWF–South Africa
Without a doubt it presented one of the most
important challenges that South African conserva-
tionists had yet faced.  But challenges lie in the
foundations of conservation—and the creation of
a new conservation fund, especially a fund specifi-
cally targeting community-based conservation,
introduced financial muscle into the realm of lofty
idealism.  The vision of the partners in the Green
Trust, WWF-SA and Nedbank, in creating the
trust was a significant contribution to conserva-
tion in South Africa. 
The Green Trust is a mutually beneficial business
partnership and Nedbank's support of the trust is
not simply charity.  The benefits to Nedbank lie
largely in the contribution that the trust adds to
the bank's marketing strategy, which ultimately
aims to establish new clients and maintain client
loyalty by appealing to the clients' sense of contri-
bution to a higher cause. 
The projects funded by the Green Trust have
covered a significant range and a diverse group of
environmental interventions with a strong focus
on community-based conservation.  However,
over time, there has been some pressure from the
donor for more species-focused projects, the
thought being that these might appeal to the
Nedbank client. This has been dealt with by
creating a broad-ranging portfolio of diverse
projects that allows for high-profile flagship
projects and less appealing but no less important
conservation projects.  
From 1998 to 2002 the trust’s funding priorities
have included sustainable use of renewable
natural resources; species and habitats of special
concern; protected areas; support to the develop-
ment of legislation; policies and treaties related to
SNRM; pollution control; and consumption of
nonrenewable natural resources.  In addition,
three approaches are recognized as important
processes in achieving environmental conserva-
tion and will, wherever possible, form part of the
focal priorities—these are community-based
conservation, environmental education, and
capacity building in environmental conservation.
Projects funded by the Green Trust have encom-
passed both urban initiatives such as community-
driven urban greening as well as rural
community-based natural resource management
initiatives.  The trust has also facilitated the
conservation of some highly endangered species,
including the African wild dog, the cheetah, the
blue swallow, the Kalahari lion, and the Brenton
blue butterfly.  All of these projects look closely at
innovative ways of managing species-human
conflict.  On a more strategic level, the Green
Trust has influence at the highest levels of the
South African government through its support of
advisors to four different Ministers: the Minister
of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Minister of
Land Affairs, the Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism, and the Minister of
Education.  
The Green Trust is administered by WWF-SA. It
has a staff of two full time persons (a manager
and an assistant) who are the direct link between
the executors, Nedbank, and the board of
directors.  They handle daily business such as
processing new applications for funding, designs
for new projects, drafting contracts, approving
reports, managing project payments, monitoring
progress of projects, and maintaining communica-
tion with executors.  An important additional role
is maintaining the relationship with Nedbank and
managing media links to get as much exposure of
the trust and its projects as possible.  These two
staff members work as part of the whole team at
WWF-SA and report directly to the trust’s board
of directors.
The board meets three times a year to evaluate
the status of projects and to approve any funding
for new projects.  It consists of three members
from WWF-SA and three members from
Nedbank. The board of directors in turn reports
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to a board of trustees who meet once a year to
evaluate the status of the trust.
Financial arrangements
Nedbank initially donated seed money of R5
million when the Green Trust was established in
1990.  In 1995, this pledge was renewed for an
additional five years.  In late 1999, Nedbank
renewed its commitment to the trust with a
pledge of R7 million over the next five years. In
addition to this direct financial support, Nedbank
implemented a unique and innovative way of
providing ongoing financial support, namely a
range of "Green" banking products, through
which bank clients make contributions to the
trust.  These products include youth and adult
savings accounts, checkbooks, ATM cards, and
credit cards.  The Nedbank Green home loan was
added to the product range in early 1999, and the
bank will also offer Green insurance (R1 per
policy per month is donated to the Green Trust).
The Green affinity banking products are the only
banking products available that are aimed at
restoring, preserving, and developing South
Africa’s wealth of natural resources.  The "green"
visuals on the checkbooks and cards indicate the
client’s contribution and commitment to the envi-
ronment.  All of the money accrued by Nedbank
from these promotions is passed on to the Green
Trust.  The Green banking products allow
Nedbank clients to support the aims of the trust
and of WWF-SA through Nedbank, at little cost
(and no additional effort) to themselves.  These
affinity products have enabled Nedbank, its
clients, and other stakeholders to generate in
excess of R47 million for the Green Trust from
1990 to 2002.
However, after 10 years, the bank reported stag-
nation in the amount of clients who support the
various Green banking products.  In May 2001,
Nedbank revamped its "Green" brand with a
whole new marketing campaign under the
banners of Nedbank Green, Nedbank Arts, and
Nedbank Sports to try to revitalize it.  Nedbank
also has tried to compensate for the decline in its
brands approach by offering various
"lifestyle–enhancing" packages to clients.  In this
framework a particular problem for the Green
Trust is that the Green brand is only one of the
many brands offered by the bank and is often not
actively endorsed by regional branches.  Clients
may then assume that they are contributing to the
Green Trust when, in fact, they are not.
Project lessons
This being a business-NGO partnership, Nedbank
often had expectations that were beyond the
capacity of a conservation NGO—for example, the
assumption that the Green Trust would "market"
itself, using funds designated for conservation.
The lesson here is that expectations must be
clearly spelled out from the beginning.
The original agreement between WWF-SA and
Nedbank was a loose agreement which stood
most definitely in the bank's favor.  The
agreement has now been restructured in order to
achieve a more equitable partnership, but not
before causing some damage to the partnership.
The lesson here is that an explicit agreement
must be made right from the start.  A key issue is
establishing a positive relationship between the
partners and maintaining it through staff
changes.  
The demand for marketing profile from Nedbank
has led to some pressure for certain types of
projects to be funded, for example, species-
focused projects that would appeal to the general
clientele of Nedbank.  The lesson here is that
there is some need to provide a certain "give and
take" in such a partnership but Nedbank has
easily been accommodated by ensuring that the
trust has a balanced portfolio with some key high-
profile projects interspersed with less publicity
worthy but no less important projects.
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
As a highly innovative and unique funding
mechanism for conservation the Green Trust has
achieved much since its inception.  No matter
how successful this fund is, though, its long-term
sustainability is by no means guaranteed.  The
trust has been in place since 1990, but with the
current agreement between WWF and Nedbank
ending in 2005, the future is uncertain.  A world
economic slowdown, increased competition, and
aggressive changes in branding and marketing
may result in Nedbank taking a less favorable
look at its involvement.  Having said this, though,
undoubtedly the trust would be able to continue
on reserves for a certain amount of time, having
established itself as an important conservation
entity in its own right, and if necessary it might
possibly find alternative donors.  The lessons
learned in terms of the business agreement,
marketing strategies, and demands of business
partners are crucially important for conservation
organizations seeking to replicate this funding
mechanism elsewhere. 
Additional references and contacts
For more information on this project visit www.
wwfsa.org.za. 
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This case illustrates a private sector–community
partnership for wood production.
Background
In an outgrower scheme a company provides
marketing and production services to farmers to
grow trees on their land under purchasing agree-
ments laid out in a contract. By 2002 outgrower
schemes in South Africa involved some 12,000
smallholder tree growers on about 27,000
hectares of land.  The two schemes with the
largest membership are operated by the country’s
biggest forestry companies, Sappi and Mondi.
While outgrower timber only provides about 10
percent of the two companies’ pulp mill output,
and is more expensive per ton than wood from
other sources, it provides the fiber that would
otherwise be unavailable because of land tenure
constraints.  This allows the forestry companies
to achieve a volume of production that reaches
valuable economies of scale.  The scheme also
provides companies with a progressive image that
is crucial at a time when the distribution of land
rights in South Africa is being called into
question.  
Two other outgrower schemes provide alterna-
tives to the private company schemes, one
operated by the South African Wattle Growers’
Union and the other by Natal Cooperative
Timbers, which provides wood, fiber, and wattle
bark to tanning extract factories. 
Community motivations for joining outgrower
schemes are primarily tied to the cash income at
harvest; trees are also seen as a form of savings.
Other minor incentives include ease of manage-
ment compared with food crops, reliability of
yield, and the possibility of obtaining fuel and
selling wood to neighbors.  The major barrier to
households joining the scheme is inadequate
landholdings.  Other reasons include the long
growing cycle, fear of cattle damage, and concern
for what would happen if the timber companies no
longer needed outgrowers’ trees.  
Competition with food crops for land or labor
does not appear prevalent as yet in all the
reviewed cases because trees are generally
planted on land unsuitable for food crops and
operations are carried out during times in the
year when agricultural activities are minimal.  But
Case study 9. South Africa—Outgrower schemes
Summarized by Camille Bann / IIED from works by J. Mayers and S. Vermulen
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there is evidence that outgrower woodlots have
depleted water sources in some areas—and
contrary to expectations, they also do not signifi-
cantly improve fuelwood availability.
Financing arrangements
Smallholders grow eucalyptus trees with
seedlings, credit, fertilizer, and extension advice
from Sappi and Mondi, two forest companies.  In
return the companies expect to buy all the
harvest at the end of the growing cycle. 
The South African Wattle Growers’ Union and the
Natal Cooperative Timbers operate in a similar
way but, in addition to financing the inputs’ cost
and marketing the output, they seek the best
prices for the products and offer a share of the
downstream tanning factory profits. 
Project lessons
Outgrower schemes have substantially
contributed to household income in communities,
providing participating households with about 20
percent of the income needed to be just over the
national "abject poverty line."  But the schemes
alone cannot take households out of poverty
because access to land in communal areas is
limited. Small growers also face problems with
opaque government policies and uncoordinated
service provisions from public agencies.  Their
associations lack the power to engage with the
policies and institutions that affect their liveli-
hoods.  Nonetheless, outgrower schemes have
had positive impacts on communities’ asset bases.
Land rights have been secured and infrastructure
has been developed in some areas.  The schemes
have even been able to benefit the poorest and
most labor-deficient of smallholders, through the
credit extended by companies.  The landless poor
have benefited in some areas through employ-
ment—such as weeding, tending, harvesting, or
transport.  But some outgrowers are dissatisfied
with being tied to supplying a single timber
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
Forestry workers in Mondi's Gilboa Plantation in South Africa's KwaZulu Natal province.
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industry client.  These South African experiences
suggest the following lessons: 
(a) A strong field staff giving sound technical
advice is crucial; 
(b) Competent administration saves money; 
(c) Intercropping with legumes in the first two
years gives growers income in the early
stages and improves soil fertility; 
(d) Consolidating should be preferred over
spreading too thinly across areas—transport
costs and other costs are prohibitive if
volumes per area are too low; 
(e) Strong relationships between growers are vital;
(f) Transparency is essential—e.g., allocation
systems must be explained in terms of supply
and demand. Reasons for cutbacks must be
understood by all concerned; 
(g) Management needs change over time—in the
early years it is focused on silvicultural exten-
sion, later on managing timber supply, e.g.,
on quota systems and contractors’ availability
and pricing; and 
(h) Reputation rather than heavy marketing
spreads the word.  
Additional references and contacts
For further information peruse Mayers and
Vermeulen (2002), available at www.iied.org; or
contact the author at James.Mayers@iied.org. 
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This case illustrates how an SNRM project
branches out to a new initiative that requires new
partners and new financing arrangements, in this
case a partnership between private businesses
and the local community.
Background 
This case study looks into a recent offshoot of the
Danida-funded MEMA project in Tanzania.
MEMA is a Swahili abbreviation for sustainable
management of natural resources and protection
of nature values. The project was initiated in 1999
and operates in the northern part of the Iringa
region, a part of Tanzania’s central highlands
extending from the northern tip of Lake Malawi
to approximately 100 km south of Morogoro and
Dodoma. MEMA facilitates the transfer of user
rights and ownership of natural woodlands and
forest reserves to local communities. As of 2002
the forests involved included the Nyang’oro
Forest Reserve (118,000 hectares), Kitapilimwa
Forest Reserve (3,699 hectares), and village
forests surrounding the Kitapilimwa Forest
Reserve (12,042 hectares).  MEMA encourages
the establishment of village natural resource
committees in charge of the management of the
forests, based in a management plan developed
by the villagers and facilitated by MEMA. 
Overall MEMA objectives include the following:
(a) to develop, test, and implement replicable
community-based forest management models for
environmentally sustainable management of
natural forests and woodlands in the pilot areas;
(b) to support capacity development in natural
forest, woodlands, and biodiversity resource
management in Iringa District; and (c) to support
the marketing of products from the resources
handed over to the villages. Ownership and the
ability to generate income are crucial to the part-
nership.
With MEMA financing and technical advice from
the District Lands, Natural Resources and
Environment Office and the national Forest and
Case study 10. Tanzania—MEMA Project
Reported by Karsten Raae / Danish Forestry Extension / member of Danida’s WGSF
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Beekeeping Division, villages in the project area
have taken over the management of traditional
commercial woodland products such as charcoal
and fuelwood for tobacco and fish curing. 
During a January 2002 mission to the MEMA
project area a Danish consultant discussed with
the local stakeholders the potential of the area to
attract international ecotourism. Local and
national partners were identified and the initial
concept was developed. The Danish consultant
followed up on the search for international
partners and brought a group of full-paying
guests to test the area. The test took place in
September 2002. Encouraged by the positive
results, the participants decided to establish an
operation based on long-term business-to-
business relations among three partners; the
villagers (supported by the District
Administration and MEMA); a locally based tour
operating company, JGST (Jungle Giraffe Safari
Tours ltd.); and a Danish travel agency, DJ
(Dumas-Johansen Agricultural Tours). The three
partners’ responsibilities are as follows:
• Villagers—Providing services and renting out
rights to use their natural resources for
hunting, fishing, camping, etc.
• JGST—Hospitality and organization of all
activities in Tanzania such as agreements
with villagers, logistics, and safety.
• DJ—Marketing in Europe and providing a
professional guide to accompany the groups.  
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
The lush forest of the Udzungwa Mountains National Park, the largest remnant Eastern Arc forest, Tanzania
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Financing arrangements
The January 2002 consultantancy was financed by
Danida through the MEMA project, as was the
consultant who accompanied the test group in
order to monitor the concept and evaluate the
capacity and performance of JGST. MEMA has
supported the villagers in their efforts to deliver
services and JGST in its efforts to become a
serious partner with the Danish travel agency. For
all of this MEMA has invested about 150,000 DKK
and quite a number of hours from expatriate staff
and regional staff, all financed by Danida.
The unanimous conclusion from the pilot run was
that the concept was appropriate but improve-
ments were needed especially on the quality of
the camp established on community land. Hence,
it was decided to apply to Danida’s Private Sector
Development Program for help with a start-up
facility; 500,000 DKK was granted in January
2003. A Danish consultant will facilitate the
handover of the concept, will act as a liaison
between JGST and DJ, and will help with the
marketing in Europe. The first tour was expected
to take place in August 2003 on fully commercial
terms, and there are good prospects that it will
deliver substantial benefits to all three partners.
Project lessons
Through the ecotourism initiative a village natural
resource committee has been established, and its
capacity improved. Value has been added to local
natural resources, which makes it more likely that
they will not be overexploited and lose their
ability to generate income—hence, nature protec-
tion has been improved. Through the Village
Land Certification and Forest Management
Agreements supported by MEMA, villagers are
confident in their ownership of the natural
resources and are more willing to participate in
the tourism scheme.  Jobs have been created
resulting in substantial income.
A plan for tourism will be developed based on an
arrangement that includes maximum involvement
of locals on a regional and especially village level.
That means training people to be involved in
hospitality, guiding, scouting, production of handi-
crafts, and other services. Purchase of local goods
will take place whenever possible. The use of
nature will be based on sustainability principles
and there is no deliberate intention of introducing
mass tourism.
The game shot by tourists will be consumed in
the camp and surplus meat will be distributed to
the villagers; quotas are calculated by the authori-
ties and built into the village’s natural resource
management plan. To a large extent this activity
will replace poaching. Former village poachers
have been hired as scouts.
Walking safaris in the area will have minimal
impact on the woodlands except for the creation
of a few primitive footpaths. The local fishers will
organize fishing; hence, it will not hamper their
opportunities, it will add to their income. The
villages, according to what is allowed in the
management plans, will provide firewood. The
camp is built of local recyclable materials and the
infrastructure will be built into the landscape. The
camp is only planned to remain in service for four
to seven years at the same location. Garbage, in
cases where it cannot be decomposed locally, will
be removed from the camp and enter the Iringa
town solid waste management system.
Future of the program
In general, the potential is high for eco-tourism,
which has been one of the fastest-growing indus-
tries in recent decades. The area selected for this
project has many of the features vital to
ecotourism: a distinctive and still unspoiled local
culture, scenic beauty, reasonable infrastructure,
national parks, mountainous rainforest, friendly
population, safety, etc. 
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A number of potential markets (consumer
groups) have been identified so far, including: (a)
Danish groups of 10–12 coming six to nine times
a year; (b) eventually similar groups from other
European countries; (c) expatriates and upper
middle-class households in the Iringa area using
the camp for extended weekends; (d) expatriates
and upper middle-class households in other parts
of Tanzania; (e) educational institutions and
groups of students from abroad and from
Tanzania using the camp for training, courses,
and "summer school"; and (f) organizations, insti-
tutions, companies, and the like using the camp
for workshops, seminars, etc. 
It is important to start up the business slowly so
as not to overwhelm the capacity of the two
Tanzanian partners (JGST and the villagers) and
the carrying capacity of the area, which still
needs to be assessed.
This is a very recent initiative and its success will
depend, among other things, on the continued
support of the MEMA project; retaining
committed staff at the district administration
office; good personal contact and mutual trust
among district staff and villagers; local hospitality
companies' willingness to innovate and upgrade
services; and continued commitment from the
Danish participants in the tourism scheme.
Many difficulties remain and must be dealt with.
At the local level, although the MEMA program
has fostered the devolution of resource ownership
to villagers, titling is lagging and villagers are
insecure about their rights. Also, villagers have
low social capital28 and a history of mistrusting
public authorities, especially those at the national
level. The project will have to deal with legislation
that lacks transparency and also, with inconsistent
enforcement. For example, hunting regulations
have been passed by parliament but are not
enforced. The tourism infrastructure is poor and
both local tourist operators and villagers have
little understanding of the importance of
providing tourist services of quality and consis-
tency to attract foreign ecotourism. 
As for the barriers the project must negotiate at
the national government level, the most serious is
a lack of consistent support due to a certain
degree of mismanagement, a laissez-faire attitude,
carelessness, ignorance, and corruption.
Additional references and contacts
For more information on this project contact
DFE's Karsten Raae (info@dfextension.dk); Iringa
District Council's Jumanne Hanti
(memairinga@twiga.com); FBD Iringa's John
Massao (memairinga@twiga.com);
MEMA/Danida's Henrik Lerdorf
(memairinga@twiga.com); and JGST's Zabron
Luvinga (mrhotels@hotmail.com).
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
28 Social capital is defined as the ability and willingness to cooperate.  There must
be a general level of trust, a tradition for networking, and confidence among
members of society.
This case illustrates the accomplishments and
shortcomings of a trust fund and several institu-
tions trying to protect a World Heritage Site.
Background
Mgahinga Gorilla and Bwindi Impenetrable
National Parks are critical afro-montane habitats
located in the southwestern corner of Uganda,
close to the borders with the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Rwanda.  Previously forest
reserves, both areas were upgraded to national
park status in 1991. Bwindi Impenetrable National
Park (BINP) is one of 29 forests in Africa
accorded the highest conservation status and was
declared a World Heritage Site in 1994.  It serves
as an enclave for at least 12 Red Data Book
species that are endangered or threatened with
extinction.  It is the only forest in Africa with a
continuum of low-to-high altitude forest types, and
the rare afro-montane vegetation provides the
richest habitats in east Africa for birds (346
species), butterflies (202), and trees (200).  It also
hosts 120 mammal species, seven of which are
diurnal primates, including chimpanzees and just
under half (circa 280) of the world's population of
mountain gorillas.  Like Bwindi, Mgahinga Gorilla
National Park contains rare afro-montane rain
forest vegetation, but owing to the elevations of
three volcanoes, Muhabura (4,127 meters),
Sabinyo (3,645 meters), and Gahinga (3,475
meters), it offers a particularly rich diversity of
habitat that includes montane, bamboo, and
alpine flora, and extensive marshes lying between
the volcanoes.  At 34 square kilometers,
Mgahinga is Uganda's smallest park, but supports
a great diversity of wildlife.  
The Bwindi Trust is overseen by a board of
trustees consisting of members of national
government institutions; local community repre-
sentatives; members of CARE (an international
NGO), a local NGO, and a local research institute;
and representatives of the private sector.  On the
local level, representatives drawn from communi-
ties surrounding the two protected areas have
organized a Local Community Steering
Committee (LSCS) to vet and select development
projects for trust funding and increasing local
conservation awareness.
According to its bylaws the trust’s overall
objective is to maintain the biodiversity and
ecosystem health of the Mgahinga Gorilla and
Bwindi Impenetrable National Parks.  This is not
a narrowly defined conservation project and a
substantial portion of the annual expenditure
actually goes toward supporting local develop-
ment projects in the immediate vicinity of the two
protected areas.  In recent years the trust has
invested in the following:
• Community development activities: This
includes support to communities, groups, or
individuals for social development projects or
business activities.  Sixty percent of the
annual budget of the trust is spent on these
activities.
• Research and ecological monitoring: Twenty
percent of the trust's annual budget goes into
supporting long-term ecological monitoring
(via a local research institute) as well as
studies undertaken by Ugandan students or
other local researchers.
• Park management: Twenty percent of the
annual budget goes to support increased
management capacity of the two parks—
through capital purchases, training support,
and covering some recurrent costs as well as
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Case study 11. Uganda—Mgahinga and Bwindi Impenetrable Forest
Conservation Trust
Reported by Tom Blomley / CARE International
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supporting the Trust Administration Unit:
This covers salaries, office rent, utilities, and
other recurrent running costs as well as the
costs of regular board and local community
steering committee meetings. 
The trust has been working alongside a number
of other organizations united by a common
interest in the conservation of the two protected
areas and the sustainable development of the
rural areas in the immediate vicinity.  Other key
players have included the CARE Development
Through Conservation Project, the Institute for
Tropical Forest Conservation, and the
International Gorilla Conservation Program.
Given the range of players working on similar
issues together with district local governments
and the Uganda Wildlife Authority, it is hard to
assess or attribute to the trust all of the improve-
ments witnessed in the area over the last decade.
However, on a broad scale, the changes have
been impressive.  From a deeply conflictive
situation in the early 1990s, following the estab-
lishment of the two national parks (and the associ-
ated loss of benefits to local people), there are
increasing signs of acceptance of the two
protected areas as well as signs of increasing
collaboration between local communities and park
management authorities.  Some of the key indica-
tors to date include:
• Changes in local attitudes. CARE and the
trust have been tracking changes in local atti-
tudes toward the two parks and the park
authorities by randomly sampling households
living in the immediate vicinity; these studies
show dramatic positive changes.
• Reversals in encroachment rates. From the
1970s to the early 1990s agricultural
encroachments over the boundaries of the
two protected areas were significant and
largely unchallenged.  Much of this was
caused by the breakdown of law and order in
the country at the time and the effective
"open access" nature of the two national
parks.  However, since 2000 there have been
no recorded encroachments and the bound-
aries of the two parks are being entirely
respected by local people, despite the limited
ability of the parks' staff to effectively patrol
these remote areas.
• Reduction in fires. In the early 1990s,
following the establishment of the two
national parks, arson was a common occur-
rence.  Fires continue to be a problem, but
this is largely because agricultural clearance
at the end of the dry season is often facili-
tated by burning bush on fallow land, which
can easily spread into forest areas.  What is
significant is that on many occasions since
2002, community members were quick to
respond to fire outbreaks and assisted park
management by swift reporting as well as
active (and voluntary) assistance in extin-
guishing the fires before more serious
damage was caused.  
• Improvements in health care. The trust’s rural
development initiatives have made a clear
impact.  Clinics built in remote rural areas far
from district health services have had a
significant impact in reducing local mortality
from diseases such as malaria and cholera,
while enrollment in primary schools has been
boosted following the construction of local
primary schools.  Local incomes have been
raised as a result of income-generating activi-
ties such as beekeeping and tailoring. As a
result of targeted information campaigns,
local beneficiaries are able to clearly appre-
ciate the links between local development
projects and the continued existence and
protection of the two national parks.  
Financial arrangements
The main financing mechanism envisioned by the
park stakeholders was a conservation trust fund.
The Mgahinga and Bwindi Impenetrable Forest
Conservation Trust (commonly known as the
Bwindi Trust or MBIFCT) was established as an
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
independent organization in 1995, with an initial
grant from GEF of US$ 4.3 million. This money
became the trust’s capital endowment, was
invested in the London stock market, and
managed by a U.K.-based asset management firm.
The original idea was to let that capital compound
to reach about US$ 10 million dollars at which
level the interests on the principal would be
enough to pay for the trust’s annual budget—the
underlying principle being that if the trust’s
capital base remained intact it would ensure the
financial sustainability of its activities in the
future. Hence, the original capital was not tapped
and grew to 7.4 million dollars by late 2002 when
plummeting stock markets reduced it to a current
value of approximately 5.4 million dollars. 
Since1995 several other sources have contributed
to the trust’s conservation activities in and around
the parks. The United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the
Dutch government were major donors. Other
donors or institutions directly working in the area
included CARE, WWF, the International Gorilla
Conservation Program, Uganda’s Institute for
Tropical Forest Conservation, Uganda’s govern-
ment, and Park’s Revenue Sharing Program
through which 20 percent of the parks' gate entry
fees were spent on social projects in nearby
communities.  From 1995 to 2002 the trust was
able to use these other sources of money and
keep the trust fund untouched.  However, in late
2002 the support from USAID and the
Netherlands ended and the trust was forced to
begin withdrawals from its capital account in
London.
The main challenge that the trust faces is its long-
term financial sustainability.  Despite significant
successes in terms of both environmental and
128 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
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social development impacts, as well as the high
profile of the two "gorilla-parks," obtaining addi-
tional funding beyond the original GEF grant and
the two early large donors has proven difficult.
This, combined with recent losses on the
endowment due to falling stock markets, has
resulted in a bleak financial outlook.  If the trust
is to have a long-term future the capital base
needs to be significantly raised beyond its current
levels. In the short term, the trust is attacking
this problem on two fronts.  First, cost reduction
measures are being analyzed with a view to
reducing operational running costs to a minimum.
At the same time, a deliberate fundraising
strategy is being pursued to raise the overall level
of the endowment—from private donors in
Europe and North America as well as from more
traditional institutional and bilateral donors.
Unfortunately, it has proven extremely hard to
obtain funds from private foundations and trusts
to supplement the Bwindi Trust endowment—
largely because many of these grantmaking insti-
tutions question the sense in transferring funds
from one endowment to another, particularly if
rates of return are insecure.  
In terms of reducing costs, significant challenges
remain as well.  The project's working area is
large, remote, and inaccessible, necessitating
four-wheel-drive vehicles and causing them signif-
icant wear and tear.  In addition, the trust is based
on principles of accountability and transparency,
with a local steering committee drawn from
locally elected representatives, which screens and
selects funding proposals, and a national board of
trustees, which oversees the organization as a
whole; these institutional arrangements have
costs and clearly there are trade-offs to be consid-
ered between high levels of accountability and
overall cost levels.
Project lessons
The trust was the first of its kind in Africa and as
such it has been a pioneer, providing much
needed guidance to other emerging conservation
trusts elsewhere on the continent.  There have
been frequent visits by representatives from
emerging trust funds in countries such as
Tanzania, Malawi, and Cameroon. Following the
early successes of the Bwindi Trust, GEF has
gone on to support the establishment of trust
funds in other parts of the globe, including South
America and Southeast Asia.  
The basic fundamentals of the Bwindi Trust have
high levels of replication—namely a locally run,
transparently managed grantmaking body,
supporting both conservation and local socioeco-
nomic development, drawing funds from a capital
endowment.  However, some key lessons have
emerged from the last decade which may be of
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
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use to others about to embark on a similar
venture:
• The initial grant was too small to sustain the
trust in the long term.  It is essential to
consider the size of the endowment needed to
support the long-term operations of a conser-
vation trust and ensure that the starting
capital is not too far off this figure.
• A fundraising strategy was only seriously
considered when finances became a major
issue. It is essential to develop and fund a
long-term fundraising strategy at the earliest
possible stage to avoid funding and financing
crunches later on.  
• Measures should be put in place to reinforce
the conservation-development linkage. In the
early days of the Bwindi Trust it was
assumed that if people were to make the
conceptual link between trust-supported
initiatives and conservation, micro-projects
had to center around natural resource activi-
ties such as planting woodlots, handicraft
projects, and energy-saving stoves.  It
became increasingly clear that, provided a
good communication strategy was put in
place, it was possible to meet people’s
priority development needs (such as health,
education, or income) and still increase good-
will toward conservation.
Additional references and contacts
For more information on this project visit
www.mbifct.org or contact Tom Blomley at
blomley.pfm@cats-net.com.
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This case summarizes one of the best-known—
and still argued about—examples of community-
based wildlife management in Africa.
Background
The Communal Areas Management Programme
for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) was
formulated by Zimbabwe’s Department of
National Parks and Wildlife Management
(DNPWLM) in 1986. Two rural districts (Guruve
and Nyaminyami) were initially identified as
suitable for the program and activities in them
began in 1988. Following that start many other
Zimbabwean rural districts joined the program
and by 1996, 27 districts were actively engaged in
it. The projects are run by the rural district
councils involved, with advice from DNPWLM
and technical expertise provided by various
national and international NGOs, including WWF.
CAMPFIRE was developed as a tool to solve and
avoid the many conflicts in the use of wildlife
resources within Zimbabwe. The program’s main
objectives are as follows:
• Sustainably exploit wildlife in the communal
areas;
• Curb land degradation caused by tilling by
offering the alternative of sustainable wildlife
management;
• Enable rural communities to benefit directly
from indigenous wildlife; and
• Minimize the threat posed by wildlife to
humans and vice versa.
CAMPFIRE depends on a number of interrelated
ecological, economic, social, and institutional
factors. Ecologically, it hinges on the proposition
that the management of wildlife is an appropriate
form of land use in areas that are of marginal
interest for agriculture. Economically, it is based
Case study 12. Zimbabwe—CAMPFIRE Project
Reported by Søren Hastrup / PFF Consult / member of Danida’s WGSF
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on the assumption that markets exist for the
goods and services that can be provided under
the program. Institutionally, the program's
success depends on the flexibility of government
agencies and district authorities and their willing-
ness to empower communities in communal areas
to participate. Although CAMPFIRE is not a
panacea for communal land development, it repre-
sents a bold change in the thinking of ecologists,
environmentalists, planners, and policymakers
with respect to their perceptions of natural
resources and conservation.
CAMPFIRE projects have been implemented in
sparsely populated areas where the tsetse threat
was removed or in rugged terrain of little agricul-
tural value.  The program involves changing
people’s perceptions of wildlife, and fostering the
notion that wild animals constitute a viable
resource base to be protected and utilized. 
Benefits that have been accrued from the
program's activities—mostly the sale of hunting
and fishing permits as well as leases for tourism
purposes—are distributed among communities,
and have been used in construction works (e.g.,
schools, rural clinics, electrical fencing, roads,
and establishment of grinding mills) in provision
of food and water as well as payment of
household dividends and cash compensation.
CAMPFIRE very quickly became a success—to
such a degree that the ruling party, ZANU-PF
claimed in 1990 that the program had been a
party innovation. In 1991, 12 districts generated
US$ 1.1 million. In the seven years from 1989 to
1996, CAMPFIRE's revenues were around US$
9.4 million. 
A national CAMPFIRE Association has been
formed with the objective of promoting the
wildlife interests of the rural district councils in
the political arena and serving as an association of
producer communities. The association has been
very successful in making communal-land wildlife
producers an important political voice, but it has
been less successful in its role as a producer asso-
ciation, since its membership is restricted to rural
district council representatives and does not
include representatives from the communal
wards.  CAMPFIRE has been able to attract
strong support from donors.
Unfortunately, the recent years of political and
economical turmoil in Zimbabwe have delivered a
blow to all development programs, including
CAMPFIRE, and it is fair to say that 10 years of
CAMPFIRE success are in jeopardy.
The CAMPFIRE approach, endangered in
Zimbabwe, has been actively replicated in several
African countries including Zambia, Tanzania,
WWF–Macroeconomics Program Office, August 31, 2003 
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Namibia, and elsewhere. CAMPFIRE has become
a paradigm and a point of departure when
discussing community-based natural resource
management projects (CBNRM) in Southern and
Eastern Africa.
Financial arrangements 
CAMPFIRE is an entrepreneurial approach to
development based on wildlife management using
market forces to achieve economic, ecological,
and social sustainability. Potentially, it can satisfy
many of the material needs of rural people
without depleting wildlife populations or
degrading the natural ecosystem on which their
survival depends.
At its initial stage, funds for logistic and adminis-
trative purposes were provided by USAID and
technical expertise was supplied by the govern-
ment’s DNPWLM, WWF, the University of
Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST, a
public trust fund devoted to the promotion of
rural economic and institutional development).
Other NGOs, such as Denmark's MS came on
board later.
For the first couple of years, the rural districts
that had received "appropriate authority" to
manage the CAMPFIRE concept were granted
vehicles, motorbikes, and funds to cover salaries
of personnel (administration as well as game
guards) and initial training, which was all paid for
by USAID. DNPWLM and the Zimbabwe Police
Force provided the training of staff whereas
WWF, World Conservation Union (IUCN), and
ZIMTRUST conducted information and capacity-
building activities with the Rural Council
Administration, counselors, local communities,
and CAMPFIRE staff.
This initial external support decreased after a
couple of years (no standard procedure for the
phase-out was in place, resulting in different
trajectories among the districts) and increasingly
the districts would have to pay for the CAMPFIRE
costs out of the program revenues.  Most rural
district councils had no problems in negotiating
this transition since CAMPFIRE revenues were
considerably larger than costs incurred. In the
early 1990s, rural district councils that had
CAMPFIRE programs generated 65 percent of
their own resources, whereas the country average
was only 15 percent (with the rest coming from
central government allocations). 
The rural district councils manage CAMPFIRE
revenues according to DNPWLM guidelines that
recommend keeping 15 percent of revenue as a
levy, using up to 35 percent for district wildlife
management costs, and distributing not less that
50 percent of gross revenue to producer commu-
nities. The guidelines also specify that the
community’s wards should decide on the use of
the dividend received from the rural district
councils. These percentages were initially
honored, and some of the councils were able to
pay back to the community as much as 75 percent
of the total revenue. However, over the years
some rural district councils have retained an
increasing portion of CAMPFIRE revenues and
used them for purposes not related with
CAMPFIRE costs or wildlife management.
Project lessons
In recent years the significance of CAMPFIRE
revenues for the local population has decreased
as a result of rapid population growth from
increased immigration to rural areas. In real
terms this has resulted in an average decline in
financial benefit per household from US$ 19.40 in
1989 to 4.49 in 1996. 
Some decline in the wildlife population has been
noticed at some CAMPFIRE areas, a situation that
is complicated by disagreements between the
local communities and the rural district councils
regarding each one’s responsibility for wildlife
management. Another issue has been the reap-
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pearance of poaching.  The intense poaching that
took place in Zimbabwe in the 1980s was signifi-
cantly stopped by the CAMPFIRE program with
wildlife populations regaining their numbers by
the end of the 1990s. But farmers saw this wildlife
growth as a threat to their crops and have been
using the Problem Animal Control legislation to
encourage the return of poaching.
Additional references and contacts
For more information on this project peruse the
following publications: ENDA-Zimbabwe and
ZERO, 1992, "The Case for Sustainable
Development in Zimbabwe: Conceptual Problems,
Conflicts and Contradictions," CIDA;  David
Hulme and Marshall Murphree, 2001, "African
Wildlife and Livelihoods."  Or you may contact
Søren Hastrup (sh@pffconsult.dk).  Also, the
IIED has coordinated a multicountry evaluation of
community-based conservancies. The main publi-
cations are D. Roe et al., 2000, "Evaluating Eden:
Exploring the Myths and Realities of Community-
Based Wildlife Management"; and R. Hasler, 1999,
"An Overview of the Social, Ecological and
Economic Achievements and Challenges of
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE Program," Evaluating
Eden Discussion Paper No.3.  These publications
can be found at www.iied.org.
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This chapter offers links to most of the references
mentioned in the previous six chapters and lists
some additional ones that we think can be useful
to the survey’s users.29 They are presented in two
groups as follows:
Guides and resources to financing for
SNRM: Each one of these guides or Web sites
reviews a large number of financing mechanisms,
offering examples and links. Most of them focus
on all or some types of SNRM, but we have
included some more general guides (e.g., on rural
development financing, micro-financing, commu-
nity-based financing) because they provide addi-
tional insight and leads to financing for SNRM.
Each entry provides a short description of what
the reader can expect to find in the institution or
manual in question. It also provides the Internet
addresses of institutions, when available.30
Publications on financing SNRM: These are
publications and Web resources of a more analyt-
ical type, featuring in-depth discussions of one or
several types of financing options, as well as case
studies. Each entry provides a short description
of what the reader can expect to find in the publi-
cation in question, mentioning which financing
options are discussed and listing the case studies
reviewed (many of them are mentioned in the
description cards and elsewhere in this survey). 
7.  ACCESSING RESOURCES AND REFERENCES
by Pablo Gutman, Nola Chow, and Sarah Janicke
GUIDES TO AND RESOURCES FOR FINANCING FOR SNRM
Conservation Finance Alliance. 2002.  Mobilizing Funding for Biodiversity Conservation. A User-Friendly Training
Guide for Understanding, Selecting and Implementing Conservation Finance Mechanisms [an online guide].
To download: www.conservationfinance.org or http://guide.conservationfinance.org/.
Organization: The Conservation Finance Alliance is a partnership of CI, GEF, GTZ, IUCN, Ramsar, Redlac, The Nature
Conservancy, UNDP, UNEP, USAID, The World Bank, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and WWF.  
Description: Created in 2002, the Conservation Finance Alliance, is a joint initiative of 13 institutions encompassing
NGOs, international agencies, and donor agencies to foster the financing of conservation projects. Their Web site
describes the Alliance’s activities; provides links to related initiatives and institutions, including case studies; and
provides links to the Training Guide mentioned above. The Guide is designed to help expand the use of sustainable
finance mechanisms to support the conservation of biological diversity. The Guide is an interactive tool that also
provides instructions for project financial planning and links to other similar training material.
Country case studies: Ecuador, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico,  Uganda, Belize.
Financing options: Markets for watershed protection (DC 13), biodiversity conservation and bioprospecting (DC 13),
public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs (DC 1), environmental funds (DC 4), debt-for-nature swaps (DC 4),
international development banks’ loans (DC 3).
29 Some references that have little relevance as a source of information on
financing SNRM have been kept as footnotes and are not reproduced in this
chapter.
30 The accuracy of all the Internet addresses was checked during the preparation
of this survey.  However, because Web sites are changed often, long addresses
tend to be short-lived.  Thus it is probable that some of the publications’
addresses in this chapter may not be in operation.  In that case we suggest that
users access the institution’s Web site (the first part of the address). Once
there, you should be able to use the site’s search command to find the publica-
tion in question. 
(continued)
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GUIDES TO AND RESOURCES FOR FINANCING FOR SNRM (cont’d.)
EPA-USA. 1999.  “A Guidebook of Financial Tools” [an online guide].
To download: http://www.epa.gov/efinpage/.
Organization: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (http://www.epa.gov).
Description: This is a reference work intended to provide an overview of a wide range of payment mechanisms for envi-
ronmental investments in the United States. The Guide features information on approximately 340 financial tools and
references for further information. Although many of these tools may not be relevant for developing countries, many
others are.
Country case studies: United States.
Financing options: Earmarking for SNRM a percentage of one or more general taxes collected at national, state, or
local level (DC 1, DC 2), private-public partnerships (DC 11).
Global Development Research Center. 2003.  “Virtual Library of Micro-Credit” [an online resource].
To download: http://www.gdrc.org/icm/index.html.
Organization: The Global Development Research Center is a virtual organization that carries out initiatives in education,
research, and practices in the spheres of environment, urban, community, and information (www.gdrc.org). 
Description: The Virtual Library on Micro-Credit contains tools, guides, strategies, courses, methodologies, success
stories, best practices; articles, etc.  Although not focused in SNRM it provides many useful guidelines for the SNRM
practitioner.
Country case studies: Worldwide examples.
Financing options: Links to foundations and NGOs that are potential funding sources (DC 7).  Links to active micro-
finance institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States,
and Africa (DC 10).
Interagency Planning Group on Environmental Funds (IPG) (2002.  The IPG Handbook on Environment Funds [an
online resource].
To download: http://www.biodiversityeconomics.org/pdf/topics-222-00.pdf.
Organization: IPG is a network of several public and private institutions.
Description: This is a resource book for the establishment and operation of environmental funds. It is intended to share
with a wide audience the experience gained by directors and specialists who have been involved over the past 10 years
in designing, setting up, managing, monitoring, and evaluating environmental funds.
Country case studies: Mexico (The Mexican Nature Conservation Fund), Costa Rica (FONAFIFO), Puerto Rico (Puerto
Rico Community Foundation), Brazil (Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights), Philippines (Foundation for the Philippine
Environment). 
Financing options: Environmental funds (DC 4), multilateral aid and development agencies (DC 5), and bilateral aid and
development agencies (DC 5).
(continued)
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GUIDES TO AND RESOURCES FOR FINANCING FOR SNRM (cont’d.)
IUCN. 2002.  Biodiversity Economics Library [an online resource].
To download: http://www.biodiversityeconomics.org.
Organization: World Conservation Union (IUCN) (www.iucn.org). 
Description: This site explores the economic dimensions of the global biodiversity agenda as reflected in the work of
IUCN and the various biodiversity conventions, notably the Convention on Biological Diversity.  The section on biodiversity
finance features resources and links to the financing of biodiversity.
Kloss, D. 2002.  “Guide to Sustainable Financing of Biodiversity and Protected Areas.”
To download: http://www.conservationfinance.org/Documents/CFA%20Training%20Guide/GTZ-CF-Guide/guide.pdf.
Organization: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
Description: A compilation and brief analysis of many financing mechanisms at different levels. Intended as a tool for
practitioners, it briefly discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different financing mechanisms and lists sources
for obtaining further information.
Country case studies: Countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, North America, Europe. 
Financing options: Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more charges, fees, fines, and penalties
related to the use (or abuse) of natural resources (DC 2); user fees, entry fees directly collected by the SNRM project
(DC 14); markets for landscape beauty, including ecotourism and tourism (DC 13); earmarking for SNRM financing a
percentage of one or more general taxes collected at the national, state, or local level (DC 1); environmental funds
(DC 4); direct investment by nonlocal investors (DC 11); debt-for-nature swaps (DC 4); multilateral/bilateral aid and devel-
opment agencies (DC 5); markets for carbon offsets (DC 13); markets for development rights and conservation
easements (DC 13).
OECD. 2002.  “Environmental Financial Strategies.” OECD, Paris.
To download: http://www.oecd.org/EN/about_further_page/0,,EN-about_further_page-499-nodirectorate-no-no--8-no-no-
3,FF.html.
Organization: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (www.oecd.org).
Description: OECD has been assisting the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union in strengthening
the capacity of their domestic environmental finance mechanisms.  This site provides guides and resources to plan the
financing of environmental programs on a national scale.
(continued)
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GUIDES TO AND RESOURCES FOR FINANCING FOR SNRM (cont’d.)
PROFOR. 2002. “Financing Sustainable Forest Management” [an online resource].
Web addresses: http://www.profor.info/pages/publications/financing_SFM.html.
Organization: Program on  Forests (PROFOR) is a multidonor partnership that provides knowledge and capacity building
to strengthen national forest programs in the pursuit of sustainable forest management (www.profor.info). 
Description: As one of PROFOR’s analytical themes, the projects on financing sustainable forest management (SFM)
report on developments in innovative financing strategies and marketing systems that support forest conservation and
management. 
Financing options: Markets for environmental products and services (DC 12–15).
Spergel, B. 2001. “Raising Revenues for Protected Areas. A Menu of Options.”
To download: http://biodiversityeconomics.org/pdf/topics-226-00.pdf.
Organization: WWF (WWF-US), Washington, D.C.
Description: This paper describes 25 ways of raising revenue for protected areas. Intended as a tool for practitioners, it
summarizes the methods' relative advantages and disadvantages.
Country case studies: Philippines, Botswana, Uganda, Zimbabwe. 
Financing options: Public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs (DC 1); debt-for-nature swaps (DC 4); social
and environmental NGOs (DC 9); foundations (DC 9); environmental funds (DC 4); earmarking for SNRM financing a
percentage of one or more charges, fees, fines, and penalties related to the use (or abuse) of natural resources (DC 2);
user fees, entry fees directly collected by the SNRM project (DC 14); markets for carbon offsets (DC 13). 
(continued)
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PUBLICATIONS ON FINANCING SNRM
Ashley, C., and B. Jones. 2001. “Joint Ventures Between Communities and Tourism Investors: Experience in
Southern Africa.” International Journal of Tourism Research, special issue on fair trade in tourism, Vol. 3, No. 2.
To download: http://www.propoortourism.org.uk/ashley_jones.pdf.
Description: This article reviews experiences in Namibia, within the wider regional context, to identify some key princi-
ples and challenges.  Several lessons can be learned from the eight Namibian negotiations, and the three negotiations
on joint ventures.
Country case studies: Namibia (Damaraland Camp), Zimbabwe (CAMPFIRE), Botswana, South Africa.
Financing options: Markets for landscape beauty, including ecotourism and tourism (DC 13); private sector–community
partnerships (DC 11); community-based enterprises, formal and informal (DC 10). 
Bayon, R. et al. 2000. “Financing Biodiversity Conservation.” Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.
To download: http://www.iadb.org/sds/env/publication/publication_200_1887_e.htm. 
Description: This report provides an overview of existing and experimental financing mechanisms that can be used to
encourage the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
Country case studies: Mexico (FMCN), Brazil (FNMA, PROBEM), Ecuador (FONAG), Costa Rica (FONAFIFO, MIGA, and the
Rainforest Tram), The Netherlands (Dutch Green Funds, The POPM Mechanism), Brazil (Terra Capital Fund). 
Financing options: Environmental funds (DC 4); earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more general
taxes collected at the national, state, or local level (DC 1); international development banks’ loans (DC 3); commercial
bank loans (DC 3); environmental fund supported by user fees (DC 4, DC 2); special laws delivering extra-budgetary
financial support to particular social groups, geographical areas, or activities (DC 1); tax breaks or subsidies for SNRM
activities (DC 1); venture capital (DC 11); biodiversity conservation and bioprospecting (DC 13).
Ashley, C. et al. 2002. “Rethinking Wildlife for Livelihoods and Diversification in Rural Tanzania: A Case Study
from Northern Selous.” DFID London.
To download: http://www.odg.uea.ac.uk/ladder/doc/wp15.pdf.
Description: This paper recommends approaches within community-based conservation that would enhance livelihood
gains, including the contribution of wildlife-based enterprise to rural growth. 
Country case studies: Tanzania.
Financing options: User fees, entry fees directly collected by the SNRM project (in this case trophy hunting) (DC 14);
markets for landscape beauty including ecotourism and tourism (DC 13).
(continued)
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PUBLICATIONS ON FINANCING SNRM (cont’d.)
ECLAC-UNDP. 2002. “Financing for Sustainable Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.” ECLAC
Santiago, Chile.
To download: www.eclac.org. 
Description: An overview of financing for sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean at the country level.
Case study countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago.
Financing options: Public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs (DC 1); special laws delivering extra-budgetary
financial support to particular social groups, geographical areas, or activities (DC 1); PES (DC 12–14); GEF payments for
the global commons (DC 15).   
Chomitz, K. et al. 1998. “Financing Environmental Services: The Costa Rican Experience and its Implications.”
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
To download: http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/essdext.nsf/44DocByUnid/
6B8781730D0A31BA85256B750002812D/$FILE/
FinancingEnvironmentalServicesTheCostaRicanExperienceandItsImplications1998.pdf.
Description: This report examines Costa Rica’s efforts to develop systems of payments for environmental services
where landowners can receive payments for adopting specified land uses. The program is financed in a variety of ways,
including revenues from a fossil fuel sales tax, sales of certifiable carbon tradable offsets, and payments from private
power plants.
Case study countries: Costa Rica.
Financing options: Markets for carbon offsets (DC 13); markets for watershed protection (DC 13); markets for
landscape beauty, including ecotourism and tourism (DC 13); earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or
more selective taxes collected at the national, state, or local level (DC 2).
Bezanson K., and F. Sagasti. 2001. “Financing International Public Goods: Challenges, Problems and a Way
Forward.” Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Sussex, U.K.
To download: http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/Bilaterals/Sweden/Sweden1.pdf.
Description: A study on the financing mechanisms for the provision of global public goods and supporting case studies.
Two of the five case studies focus on natural resources: biodiversity conservation (developing useful products from biodi-
versity) and climate change mitigation (DC 13, 14, 15).
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Ferraro, P. J., and R. D. Simpson. 2000. “Global Habitat Protection: Limitations of Development Interventions
and a Role for Conservation Performance Payments.” RFF, Washington, D.C.
To download: http://epp.gsu.edu/pferraro/docs/globalhabitatprotectioncb.pdf.
Description: The author argues that paying individuals or communities directly for conservation performance may be a
more effective approach than indirect initiatives such as ecotourism or green products. 
Case study countries: Costa Rica (FONAFIFO).
Financing options: Environmental fund (DC 4), PES (DC 13).
Gutman, P. 2001. “Forest Conservation and the Rural Poor: A Call to Broaden the Conservation Agenda.”
WWF–MPO, Washington, D.C.
To download: http://www.panda.org/downloads/policy/Forest_and_Poverty.pdf.
Description: This paper addresses the causes of deforestation, and advocates paying the rural poor for their role as
stewards of the world’s biodiversity (DC 12, 13).
Hardner, J., and R. Rice. 2002. “Rethinking Green Consumerism.” Scientific American, May.
To download: http://www.cciforum.org/pdfs/HardnerSciAmFinal.pdf.
Description: The authors argue that buying "green" products is not enough to save biodiversity in the tropics.  They
advocate up-front payments for conservation that they term “conservation concessions.” The article provides some
examples from Conservation International activities in Latin America. 
Case study countries: Peru, Guyana, Guatemala.
Financing options: Markets for development rights and conservation easements (DC 13).
Faust, Michael et al. 2001. “Global Public Goods: Taking the Concept Forward.” UNDP, New York.
To download: http://www.undp.org/ods/pub-d17-online.html.
Description: This book addresses several issues of the global public goods debate, from rethinking the definition of
public goods to applying the theory to global issues and to outlining steps for operationalization (DC 15).   
Convention on Biological Diversity, Executive Secretary. 2002. “Financial Resources and Mechanisms (Articles 20
and 21)."
To download: http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/cop/cop-06/official/cop-06-14-en.pdf.
Description: This report provides an overview of financing mechanisms that have been proposed as part of government
activities related to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
Country case studies: General references to developing and developed countries. 
Financing options: Tax breaks or subsidies for SNRM activities (DC 1); multilateral aid and development agencies (DC
5); bilateral aid and development agencies (DC 5); private investment by local businesses (DC 10).
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Johnson, N. et al. 2001. “Developing Markets for Water Services from Forests: Issues and Lessons for
Innovators.” Forest Trends, Washington, D.C
To download: http://www.foresttrends.org/resources/pdf/Developing_Markets_for_Water_Services.pdf.
Description: The report examines innovative international experiences in the emerging markets for hydrological services.
It distills common issues and lessons from nine case studies and other experiences.  
Case study countries: France, Colombia, United States.
Financing options: Payments for environmental services through self-organized private deals, water-user fees, trading
schemes, and public payment schemes (DC 13–15).
Kaul, I. et al. 1999. “Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century.” New York: Oxford
University Press. 
Description: Part of the works sponsored by UNDP to explore what global public goods are and how to pay for them
(DC 15).
Landell-Mills, N., and I. Porras. 2002. “Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? A Global Review of Markets for Forest
Environmental Services and Their Impact on the Poor.” IIED, UK
To download: : http://www.iied.org/docs/enveco/MES_prelims.pdf (executive summary only).
Description: This is a global review of emerging markets for carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, watershed
protection, and landscape beauty.  In total, 287 cases are reviewed from a range of developed and developing countries.
Chapter 2 summarizes the findings.
Country case studies: Surinam, Africa, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, United States, Fiji, and others.
Financing options: Payments for environmental services (DC 13–15).
IFAD. 2002. “Rural Finance for the Poor. From Unsustainable Projects to Sustainable Institutions.” International
Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome.
To download: http://www.ifad.org/pub/other/rural_e.pdf.
Description: Reviews IFAD’s experience with financing peasants and small farmers in developing countries.  A strong
emphasis is put on self-financing and local credit schemes.
Case study countries: Indonesia, Guatemala, countries in Eastern Europe, Nepal, Tanzania, Philippines.
Financing options: Micro-saving, micro-credit, and micro-insurance (DC 10).
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Mayers, J., and S. Vermeulen. 2002. “Company-Community Forestry Partnerships; From Raw Deals to Mutual
Benefit.” IIED, London.
To download:, http://www.iied.org/psf/pdfdocs/partnershipsbook/PSF_prelims_partners.pdf (executive summary only).
Description: This report examines 57 cases of partnerships in forestry in 23 countries, from informal arrangements and
social responsibility efforts to outgrower schemes and joint ventures. 
Case study countries: South Africa, India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Ghana, Canada.
Financing options: PES, PEP (DC 13–15), private sector–community partnership (DC 11).
Nasi, Robert et al. 2002. “Forest Ecosystem Services: Can They Pay Our Way Out of Deforestation?” Center for
International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia.
To download: http://www.catie.ac.cr/cecoeco/Forest percent20Ecosystem percent20Services.doc.
Description: This paper provides an overview of what forest ecosystem services are and what they represent, as well as
the issues of price and valuation.  Both private and public financing sources are considered. 
Financing alternative: PES (DC 13, 15).
Pagiola, S., J. Bishop, and N. Landell-Mills. 2002. “Selling Forest Environmental Services: Market Mechanisms for
Conservation and Development.” London: Earthscan.
Description: The 12 articles contributed to this book are case studies of financing mechanisms for forest services. 
Case study countries: Costa Rica, India, United States, Ecuador, El Salvador, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, Bolivia.
Financing options: Different types of payments for environmental services, and payments for environmental products
(DC 12–15).
McNeely, J. 1999 . “Achieving Financial Sustainability in Biodiversity Conservation Programmes” IUCN, Gland,
Switzerland.
To download: http://economics.iucn.org.
Description: An overview of financing options for conservation.
Case study countries: Global examples.
Financing options: Markets for carbon off-sets (DC 13); earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more
charges, fees, fines, and penalties related to the use or abuse of natural resources (DC 2); PES (DC 13); private invest-
ment by local businesses (DC 10); debt-for-nature swaps (DC 4); special fundraising campaigns (DC 8); environmental
funds (DC 4).    
(continued)
144 From Goodwill to Payments for Environmental Services
PUBLICATIONS ON FINANCING SNRM (cont’d.)
Perrot-Maitre, D. and P. Davis. 2001. “Case Studies of Markets and Innovative Financial Mechanisms for Water
Services from Forests.” Forests Trends, Washington D.C.
To download: http://www.forest-trends.org/resources/pdf/casesWSofF.pdf.  
Description: This paper presents the background cases for the Johnson, N. et al. (2001) paper above.  It is a detailed
presentation of various types of financing mechanisms in various settings. 
Case study countries: France, Costa Rica, Colombia, United States, Australia, Brazil.
Financing options: Different types of payments for environmental services (DC 12–15).
Powell. I. et al. 2002. “Developing Markets for the Ecosystem Services of Forests.” Forest Trends, Washington, D.C
To download: http://www.forest-trends.org/resources/pdf/powellwhite_ecoservices.pdf
Description: An overview of opportunities to market forests’ environmental services. 
Case study countries: Colombia, Costa Rica, Australia, United States, France, China.
Financing options: Different types of payments for environmental services (DC 12–15).
Quintela, C et al. 2002a. “Financing Arrangements in GEF-Supported Biodiversity Projects.” Conservation Finance
Program, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Washington, D.C.
Description: The study examined financing arrangements in support of the objectives of GEF biodiversity projects,
including a review of the GEF portfolio and an in-depth review of 18 GEF-supported projects.  
Case study countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Romania, Nepal, Costa Rica.
Financing options: Community-based enterprises, formal and informal (DC 10); different cases of payments for environ-
mental services (DC 12–15). 
Pagiola, S. et al. 2002. “Generating Public Sector Resources to Finance Sustainable Development—Revenue
and Incentive Effects.” World Bank, Washington, D.C.
To download: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDS_Ibank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_03020504033653. 
Description: This paper discusses how developing countries can generate some of the resources they need for sustain-
able development, by eliminating harmful subsidies and better capturing natural resource rents. Besides providing a
description of various alternatives, the paper attempts a rough estimate of the magnitude of resources that might be
generated or made available by a variety of public sector actions.
Case study countries: Global examples.
Financing options: Freeing up existing public resources (DC 6); conservation concessions, ecotourism, and market-
based instruments (DC 11, 12); environmental taxes, pollution charges, user-fees, value-added taxes, environmental
funds (DC 1–4).
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Richards, Michael. 1999. “Internalizing the Externalities of Tropical Forestry: A Review of Innovative Financing
and Incentive Mechanisms.” Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.
To download: http://www.odi.org.uk/fpeg/publications/papers/eutfp/eutfp-01.pdf.
Description: This paper assesses the potential and limitations of a range of "innovative" financing mechanisms. It finds
that efforts to increase the incentives for sustainable forestry must be accompanied by effective regulation or control,
whether at the national or international level, and should be complemented by policy measures to make forest-degrada-
tion activities less profitable.
Case study countries: Costa Rica, Niger, Nepal.
Financing options: Different payments for environmental products and payments for environmental services
(DC 12–15). 
Roe, D. et al. 2001. “Getting the Lion’s Share from Tourism: Private Sector–Community Partnerships in
Namibia.” IIED, London.
To download: http://www.propoortourism.org.uk/namibia_vol1.pdf.
Description: This report reviews the current experience of private sector–community partnerships within the tourism
industry in Namibia and provides guidelines and practical advice for the development of future partnerships. Chapter 6
summarizes the findings.  
Case study countries: Namibia.
Financing options: Private sector–community partnerships (DC 11).
Scherr, S. et al. 2002. “Making Markets Work for Forest Communities.” Forest Trends, CIFOR, Washington, D.C.
To download: http://www.futureharvest.org/pdf/Final_Report.pdf.
Description: This policy brief lays out strategies to improve the contributions of forest markets to local livelihoods. 
Case study countries: Latin American countries.
Financing options: Different payments for environmental products and services (DC 12–15).  
Quintela et al. 2002b. “Literature Review of Financial Arrangements.” Draft, Conservation Finance Program, Wildlife
Conservation Society (WCS), Washington, D.C.
Description: A review of the literature on financing mechanisms for biodiversity conservation.
Case study countries: Brazil (ICMS Ecológico), Mexico (FFEM), Nepal, Costa Rica, Mali.
Financing options: Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more selective taxes collected at the
national, state, or local level (DC 2); environmental funds (DC 4); community-based enterprises, formal and informal (DC
10); markets for non-timber forest products (DC 12).
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Tognetti S. 2001. “Creating Incentives for River Basin Management as a Conservation Strategy—A Survey of
the Literature and Existing Initiatives.” WWF, Washington D.C.
To download: http://www.biodiversityeconomics.org/pdf/topics-336-00.PDF.
Description: This report provides an overview of existing initiatives to create economic incentives for river basin
management as a strategy for protecting biodiversity. It also identifies key issues that need to be considered when evalu-
ating the feasibility of this approach in a particular ecoregion, as part of an overall conservation strategy.
Case study countries: United States, Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, China, South Africa, Chile. 
Financing options: Different payments for environmental services and environmental products (DC 12–15); forestry
funds (DC 4); government investment in conservation (DC 1); water source protection funded by the government and
international donors (DC 1, 2); encouraging the mobilization of private resources (DC 6).  
Whiteman, A. 2001. “Financing Sustainable Forest Management: Constraints and Opportunities.” Working paper
on financing sustainable forest management, FAO, Rome.
To download: www.fao.org. 
Description: This is the summary of more than a dozen papers, produced as part of FAO’s program on “Financing
Sustainable Forest Management,” that include several case studies in Central African countries. 
Financing options: Public sources (DC 1–3).
World Bank Group. 2003a. “Prototype Carbon Fund” [an online resource].
Web address: http://prototypecarbonfund.org/router.cfm?Page=About.
Description: The operational objectives of PCF are mitigating climate change, demonstrating the possibilities of public-
private partnerships, and offering a "learning-by-doing" opportunity to its stakeholders.  
Case study countries: Worldwide examples.
Financing options: Market for carbon offsets (DC 13).
Shilling, J., and J. Osha. 2003. “Paying for Environmental Stewardship.” WWF–MPO, Washington, D.C.
To download: www.panda.org/mpo. 
Description: This report reviews institutional arrangements that may support paying the rural poor for environmental
stewardship.
Case study countries: India, Nepal, Costa Rica.
Financing options: Public sources, development banks (DC 1–3); earmarking fees (DC 2); encouraging the mobilization
of private resources (DC 6). 
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Zedillo, E. et al. 2001. “Recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development.” UN, New York.
To download: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf.
Description: This is the report of a high-level expert group convened by the UN as part of the 2002 conference on
Financing for Development. Among other recommendations the expert group suggested putting into place a system of
payments for global commons, including environmental services.
Financing options: Funds for SNRM associated with international treaties, other possible systems of international
payments for the global commons, earmarking for SNRM part of one or more international taxes (DC 15).
World Bank Group. 2003b.  Environmental Economics Group [an online resource].
Web address: http://www.worldbank.org/environmentaleconomics.
Description: The World Bank Environmental Economics Group’s Web site offers conceptual and empirical information on
systems of payments for environmental services. 
Case study countries: Worldwide examples.
Financing options: Payments for environmental services (DC 13–15), international development banks’ loans (DC 3).
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